THE ARTHASAAMI GRAHA
AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON MIMAMSA
BY LAUGAKSHI BHASKARA,
EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY G. THIBAULT PHIL. DR.
PRINCIPAL, BENARES COLLEGE.

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No. 4.

| अर्थसङ्ग्रहः |
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PREFACE.

The treatise edited and translated in the following is one of the best known and most extensively studied of the elementary works on the Mīmāṃsā-sāstrā. It closely follows—and in many passages literally agrees with—the equally popular Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa usually called the Āpadevi, which latter work would perhaps be the most recommendable to the beginner of all treatises on Mīmāṃsā. The Artha-samgraha has however been preferred for publication in the Benares Sanskrit Series on account of its smaller bulk. Its text has been repeatedly published before, in a lithographed edition at Benares together with a commentary and in a printed edition brought out by Paṇḍit Jībānanda Vidyā-sāgar at Calcutta. Both these editions are incorrect, especially the latter one.

The Arthasaṃgraha is by no means an easy book, in spite of—or as it would perhaps be more correct to say, owing to—its limited bulk in which a great amount of matter is condensed by means of the most pregnant language being used. I am greatly obliged to Paṇḍit Dhumḍhi Rāja the able and learned Sanskrit Librarian of the Benares College for continued assistance given to me while editing and translating the Arthasaṃgraha and revising the proofsheets. With regard to some specially difficult points I have likewise been greatly benefitted by the advice of the distinguished Paṇḍit Bála Sāstrī, late Professor of Law in the Benares Sanskrit-College who combines with a perfect mastery of the Śāstras a thorough knowledge of the Veda and therefore is entitled like few others to be appealed to in any question connected with the Mīmāṃśa-sāstrā.—A mere literal translation would have been of comparatively small value; numerous explanations have therefore been added and the plan of inserting them into the text by means of brackets rather than adding them in footnotes has been by preference adhered to.

G. THIBAULT.

Benares:
March, 1882.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

An attempt at an exhaustive review and criticism of the Mīmāṃsā-śāstra would be out of place here. A few remarks however on its general character will form a not unsuitable introduction to the Artha-samgraha and will, it is hoped, be of some use to those who wish to form an adequate idea of the subject matter of this hitherto some what neglected system. The only longer essay on Mīmāṃsā which exists—the one by Colebrooke—gives correct information as far as it goes, is however not well adapted to make the reader acquainted with the leading features of the Śāstra. The current accounts of the Mīmāṃsā found in handbooks &c. merely extract Colebrooke’s remarks and are as a rule more or less vague and incorrect.

The beginnings of the Mīmāṃsā may be traced distinctly enough in the Veda itself, the very word (mīmāṃsā; mīmāṃsate &c.) being used there to denote doubt and discussion with regard to points of doctrine and ritual. This early Mīmāṃsā may be designated a bonâ fide Mīmāṃsā as it tries to decide the points about which a doubt is raised by free reasoning taking into account the circumstances and exigencies of each case without submitting itself to any authority. It originated in the time when owing to differences in tradition, belief, ritual &c. the various Vedic Śākhās began to form themselves, a time when the whole religious and sacrificial system of the Brahmans still was in a comparatively unsettled and floating condition.—The later systematical Mīmāṃsā on the other hand—the Mīmāṃsā which is embodied in the śāstra—is of a more limited scope, owing to the altered circumstances of the time in which it arose. The creative period of Brahminical religious thought was then past and the spirit of free inquiry and discussion had yielded to an implicit faith in the authority of the sacred books handed down by unbroken tradition. Difficulties with regard to questions of sacrifice and ritual still indeed presented themselves but they were not as of old difficulties arising from the nature of the things themselves and to be re-
moved by an independent and unbiased consideration of all sides of the question, but rather difficulties originating in the peculiar nature of the sacred books and obstructing the procedure of any one who endeavoured to obey the injunctions contained in them. The character of the brāhmaṇas—that part of the Veda which more immediately concerns us here—is well known and there can be no doubt that any one attempting to carry out the precepts contained in them or—if we limit ourselves to the main point—to perform the sacrifices which they describe and comment on, would soon find himself assailed by numerous doubts and misgivings as to his actions being a faithful representation of what the sacred texts intimate. The description of the sacrifices contained in the brāhmaṇas is so incomplete and obscure, in the best cases so disjointed and unsystematic, so frequently interrupted by remarks and comments on the mystical signification of the sacrifice and its constituent acts that it would appear almost impossible for the sacrificer to feel assured of having done exactly what he ought to have done unless he had some other help to guide him. That such a help existed at a very early time already, I mean in the time immediately following on the composition of the chief brāhmaṇas, is a matter which does not admit of any doubt. We can not indeed confidently maintain that then already books of the nature of the kalpa-sūtras or prayogas existed, but at any rate there must have existed from the outset a full and circumstantial oral tradition referring to the proper performance of the sacrifices, a tradition for which we may even, from obvious reasons, claim a greater fulness and clearness the higher we ascend into antiquity.

We may thus assume that during a certain period consequent on the composition of the brāhmaṇas—of whatever length that period may have been—acts of religious duty, whereby are meant in the first place sacrifices, were performed on the double ground of the text of the Veda and of oral tradition, two sources of knowledge which we may suppose to have agreed tolerably well in all essential points. But this period was as we know followed by one in which a more systematical and critical spirit began to stir, a period in which the Brahmans felt the want of thoroughly reviewing and recasting all the knowledge they were then possessing, of proving
its soundness and validity by the best possible means and of em-
bodying it in treatises as pregnant and concise as possible. I of
course allude to the sūtra-period. One of the many tasks then
presenting themselves was to raise the doctrine of the sacrificial
performances on an incontrovertible basis. This was indeed a task
for which the proper way of procedure was much more clearly de-

defined than was the case with regard to most other departments of
knowledge. By far the greater part of the Veda directly refers
to the sacrifice and the object to be held in view was therefore to
compose treatises describing the different sacrificial performances
which should entirely base on the text of the Veda and against
which no body appealing to the latter would be able to raise any
objection. The difficulties besetting this undertaking originated,
as remarked above, in the peculiar nature of the Vedic texts
whose object, as is well known, is to point out the symbolical
and mystical meaning of the single acts of the sacrifice, not to
give a clear and connected description of the latter which the per-
former might follow with ease. It will suffice shortly to touch here
on some few of the circumstances which rendered the task of the
sūtra-writer a by no means easy one. It is f. i. observed that
those chapters of the Veda which refer to one and the same sacri-
fice do not immediately follow on each other but are separated by
intervening sections which treat of different matters. The fact that
throughout the mantras accompanying a certain sacrifice are com-
combined in separate sections apart from those chapters which contain
the corresponding brāhmaṇa is in itself a source of frequent per-
plexity.—Again it often happens that there is an apparent contra-
diction between two passages referring to the same matter as when
f. i. the brāhmaṇa-passage maintains that from out a series of sa-
cificial acts a certain one is to be performed in the sixth place
while in the section which contains the mantras accompanying the
series of acts the mantra referring to the particular act mentioned
occupies the tenth place.—Or again we find that of two actions re-
ferring to the same thing the one which according to the exigencies
of the case must be performed in the second place is in the sacred
text enjoined before the other one.—Or again the reader of the
Veda may be in doubt to whom a certain injunction contained in
the Veda is addressed, what kind of man, in other words, is entitled to perform the sacrifice enjoined and in return to expect the result promised in the Veda.—Or again we meet in the Veda with passages regarding which a prima facie doubt arises whether they enjoin an independent sacrifice to be performed from a special motive and attended by a special result or perhaps merely a subordinate sacrificial act which contributes its limited share towards the successful performance of one of the well known great sacrifices.

—Or again—and this must have been a point whose consideration very frequently pressed itself on the Brahmins at a time when the various sacrifices mentioned in the Veda were in reality regularly performed—it becomes a matter for reflection and doubt in what manner one has to perform the very numerous so-called vikrītis i. e. the sacrifices which are mere modifications of the few typical sacrifices and which as such the Veda does not describe in detail.

—It would be useless here to continue the enumeration of difficult cases of this nature as the treatise edited and translated in the following pages offers many additional examples.

The continually recurring necessity of dealing with difficult cases of the kind described led to the elaboration of a set of rules under the guidance of which it became possible to give an account of the sacrifice which was of real use for practical purposes and which at the same time could be upheld in every particular as being founded on the Veda. So f. i.—to mention only the principles by means of which two of the above stated difficulties are to be solved—it is laid down that whenever the place of the mantra accompanying a certain action and the place assigned to the action by a brāhmaṇa-passage are in conflict the mantra is to have greater weight than the brāhmaṇa because the former being actually recited during the sacrifice is connected with it more intimately than the latter which is not directly used during the performance.

—And of two actions referring to the same thing, as f. i the husking of rice-grains and their cooking, the one to which the exigencies of the case assign the first place is to be done first although in the sacred text it may be mentioned only after the other one; on the general principle that we must try to find for every individual act constituting the sacrifice a visible purpose by means of
which it may contribute towards the outward form of the sacrifice and that only in the case of such a visible purpose not being traceable it may be assumed that the act directly contributes towards the supersensuous result of the entire sacrifice. In the example alluded to above the visible purpose of the ricegrains being husked first is that thereby they are made fit for being cooked while no such purpose can be discovered if the cooking is made to precede the husking.

The exposition of these rules either directly stated as in the systematical treatises of later origin or implied in the discussion of particular Vedic passages as in Jaimini’s sūtras forms the bulk of what is called the Mīmāṃsā-sāstra and the latter might therefore broadly be defined as a body of rules enabling us to construct on the ground of the Veda a kalpa-sūtra or a prayoga (a treatise of the nature of the manuals called prayogas—either actually written down or else mentally conceived—forming the indispensable preliminary step for a kalpa-sūtra which is nothing but a prayoga highly abbreviated and condensed by means of certain technicalities and conventions). It would be a by no means uninteresting task to submit a kalpa-sūtra as f. i. Baudhāyana’s or Āpastamba’s to an investigation of this kind and to show f. i. by a comparison of the accounts given of some primary sacrifice in the Vedic texts on one hand and in the kalpa-sūtra on the other hand how the transition from the former to the latter can only be effected by certain rules of the Mīmāṃsā being had recourse to.

Although the remarks made in the preceding lines on the scope of the Mīmāṃsā sufficiently characterize the matter occupying the greater part of the sāstra and point out its chiefly practical character they by no means render full justice to the form in which the sāstra was finally elaborated and in which it appears in the systematical treatises a specimen of which is the Artha-samgraha. In this later form the Mīmāṃsā is a systematic analysis of that entire part of the Veda which refers to action, preeminently sacrificial action, of the so-called Karma-kāṇḍa. This part of the Veda comprises all Vedic writings with the only exception of the Upanishads, includes therefore the entire Samhitās and by far the greater part of the brāhmaṇas. The investigation undertaken by
the fully developed Mīmāṁsā has of course originated from the more practical questions above touched upon but it takes a wider scope and establishes a theory which may indeed be applied to the decision of practical questions but which in addition has its own independent interest. The chief features of this theory will be shortly indicated in the following.

The entire Veda (excluding the Upanishads) is declared to treat of dharma, i.e. acts of duty foremost among which are sacrifices. It in the first place enjoins certain acts of duty specifying at the same time the beneficial result which attends the performance of each act. If it be asked on what authority these acts are enjoined and certain results stated to belong to them, the answer is that the Veda as being nitya, eternal is authoritative of its own nature and needs no other basis to rest on. The proofs of the eternity of the Veda are of course by no means satisfactory and may if closely examined be reduced to the faith of the community basing on immemorial tradition. But this point really lies outside the scope of the Mīmāṁsā which rather presupposes the eternity of the Veda and consequently the binding nature of the precepts contained therein and enters on its real task when it begins to demonstrate that every part, in fact every line and every word of the sacred texts somehow or other refers to acts of duty incumbent on men. To do this it becomes necessary to classify the contents of the Veda. The most general classification is to distinguish the mantra-passages from the Brāhmaṇa-passages these two great divisions being clearly pointed out by their different form; the systematical books on Mīmāṁsā however as a rule start at once with the more detailed division of the Veda into injunctions (vidhi), mantras, names (nāmadheya), prohibitions (nishedha) and explanatory passages (arthavāda). Among these five divisions the first place in point of importance is claimed by the injunctions, vedic passages which—their character of eternity and authority being presupposed—impel man to perform a certain action in expectation of a certain result. As f. i. the passage “a man desirous of paradise is to sacrifice” (svargakāmo yajeta). Passages of this kind claim an instigatory character in consequence of their finite verb standing in the optative or imperative form, whereby the hearer or
reader is instigated to act. The difference between these optative forms as found in the Veda and those which are employed in ordinary human intercourse is that in the latter case the enunciation of the optative form originates in the mind of some individual person who has the wish of making another person act, while in the former case the instigatory power rests solely in the eternal word of the Veda which has no human mind for its antecedent. If we wish to bring the matter somewhat nearer to our way of thinking we might say that the optative forms of the Veda embody the eternal commands of God; although this would not exactly correspond to the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas to whom the Veda is a self-subsistent entity.

Among the numerous injunctions which are found in the Vedic texts we have in the first place to distinguish those which in the most general terms enjoin a certain action or sacrifice and to which all other injunctions referring to details are subordinate. Injunctions of this kind are called utpatti-vidhis i. e. originative injunctions and an example is f. i. “agnihotram jahoti” “he is to perform the agnihotra-oblition.” The very limited number of short sentences embodying injunctions of this nature constitute to the Hindū mind the very kernel of the Veda all the remainder of which comprising among the rest the entire Samhitās has its raison d'etre only in standing in a certain relation to the utpatti-vidhis and being useful to the person who endeavours to carry out the precepts contained in the latter. These utpatti-vidhis cannot be said to stand to each other in any necessary relation and—as far as known to me—the Mīmāṃsakas have made no attempt to subordinate them to some principle of unity. It can only be said that the order of the sacrifices enjoined in them is a definite one the sacrificer having to proceed in regular succession from the simpler ones to the more complicated. But even from this principle of unity the naimittika sacrifices i. e. those which have to be performed on special occasions arising would have to be excepted. Nor can a principle of unity be discovered in the results to which the sacrifices are said to lead, as these are of the most heterogeneous nature, long life, wealth, progeny, dominion or, as in many cases, paradise or the heavenly world (svarga). The latter is,
most probably on account of its indefiniteness, declared by the Mí mámsá to be the fruit of all those sacrifices for which the Veda does not mention a special result.

These originative injunctions impressing man’s mind excite in him the desire to perform the action as the result of which the heavenly world or else some earthly possession is pointed out. The utpatti-vidhi itself as a rule intimates the result and in addition to this the general nature of the action by means of which the result is to be obtained, this action being in most cases a sacrifice; but in order to enable the person desirous to sacrifice to carry out his intention the special mode of procedure (the so-called itikarta-vyatá) remains to be stated. This is done by the second class of injunctions distinguished by the Mí mámsákás, the so called viniyoga-vidhis, injunctions of application by means of which all the actions and things subsidiary to a certain sacrifice (the so called ángas or members of the sacrifice) are intimated. The injunctions belonging to this class are as they supply information about all the detail of the sacrifice very numerous and the discussion of the different principles according to which they are to be combined with each other and subordinated to the utpatti-vidhis is one of the most, practically perhaps the most important topic of the mí mámsá. The pramáñas which are to guide us in subordinating the various objects and acts constituting the sacrifice to one another and finally to the central action are stated to be six, of successively decreasing force and it must be admitted that the reasoning by which the relative strength of these pramáñas is settled shows extraordinary acuteness and an astonishing grasp of all the intricate and perplexing detail furnished by the Vedic texts. A full discussion of the matter will be found in the Arthasamgraha; here it must suffice to state a few cases exemplifying the general principles. Above was mentioned as an example of the utpatti-vidhi the passage “agnihotram juhoti” “he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation.” With this injunction now we have to connect the viniyoga-vidhi “dadhná juhoti” which as the Mí mámsákás explain, in reality means “dadhná homam bhávayet” “he is to effect the oblation by means of sour milk.” This passage shows us that sour milk is an ánga, a subsidiary matter of the agnihotra-oblation and the special reason from
which we infer the stated relation is in the present case śruti i.e. direct statement or direct enunciation, the instrumental form “da- dhná” showing directly that sour milk is the means by which the oblation is accomplished. This śruti is justly declared to be the strongest of all the proofs enabling us to infer the connection of subsidiary matter and principal matter; the one of widest application however and the one which must be applied at the outset when we wish to find the link connecting the entire sacrificial action with its constituent parts is prakaraṇa or interdependence i.e. the principle according to which we consider as referring to each other one passage which enjoins some sacrifice in general as leading to a certain result and another which enjoins some special act without naming a special result accruing from it. So f.i. when we read the passage enjoining the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice “he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice” we feel the want of other passages pointing out in what way the named sacrifice is to be performed and on the other hand when we meet with the passage referring to the oblations called samidh “he is to offer the samidh” we rest unsatisfied because we do not immediately see what is to be effected by means of the samidh. The consequence is that we become aware of the interdependence of these two injunctions, the particular action mentioned in the latter being subservient to the comprehensive sacrifice enjoined in the former one.

Again after we have by means of the viniyoga-vidhis understood the interior structure of the sacrifice and the successive subordination of its parts to the whole we require, in order to become able to perform the sacrifice, additional information about one point viz. the order in which the several parts have to succeed one another. This want is supplied by the so-called injunctions of performance, prayoga-vidhi. It is however to be remarked that we meet only in very rare cases with vedic passages having no other purpose than to settle the order of the acts constituting the sacrifice. In almost all cases this order of succession is to be concluded from the various indicia given in the viniyoga-vidhis, mantras &c. so that the prayoga-vidhis have rather an inferential than an actual existence.

—Here again there are enumerated six means of proof of varying
force by means of which order of succession is determined. The translation of the Artha-samgraha will be found to give the requisite details.

There remains one class of injunctions to be noticed, viz. the so-called injunctions of claim or qualification, adhikāra-vidhi. The injunctions enumerated hitherto have taught us firstly what acts are to be done, secondly in what manner the acts enjoined are to be done and thirdly which is the order of succession of the subordinate acts the aggregate of which constitutes the principal act. There remains one question more to be answered viz. who is the person to whom all these different injunctions are addressed? who is qualified to perform the sacrifice enjoined and to claim its promised fruit? and this question is settled by the adhikāravidhis. About this class of injunctions too it is to be remarked that few passages only are mere adhikāra-vidhis it frequently happening that one and the same passage is utpatti-vidhi as well as adhikāra-vidhi. And again we must note that a great number of adhikāra-vidhis have a merely ideal existence, as certain qualifications of the sacrificer are nowhere explicitly enounced but have to be inferred from the requirements of the case.—So much about vidhi, injunction.

If we now turn to the second of the five divisions of the Veda, the mantras, the first question presenting itself is again “in what relation do they stand to the sacrificial action? in what manner do they help the latter?” The answer here is somewhat curious. As already remarked the Mimāmsakas are extremely anxious to show that every part of the sacrifice, every word and gesture are of visible use, contribute their share towards the proper accomplishment of the outwardly appearing set of actions as which the sacrifice presents itself to the senses and they insist on ascribing what we might call a purely ceremonial character, a significance of a purely spiritual and supersensuous nature to those actions only for which a visible purpose can not by any means be made out. The principle is on the whole certainly a sound one as its application tends to convert the sacrifice into a well connected whole the parts of which are subservient to each other, while the too free use of the contrary principle i. e. of ascribing an independent charac-
ter to each individual act would resolve the whole sacrifice into a string of performances of whom no body would understand how they came to be combined.—In the special case of the mantras however the former principle appears to be carried too far. If we consider the point impartially we can hardly deny that by far the greater part of the verses and short sayings which accompany the different acts of the sacrifice can only have been meant to have a mystical, supersensuous effect, to contribute directly towards the transcendental result, the apúrva, which in a manner unknown to man is produced by the sacrifice and is the means of procuring for the sacrificer his reward. The Mímámsákás however maintain that while some mantras must be acknowledged merely to have the effect stated just now the great majority of them have the purpose of reminding the sacrificer of the different matters connected with the sacrifice, f. i. of the divinities to whom the various oblations are made. It is clear that the first position is here unduly assigned to a circumstance which is altogether secondary and accidental.

While it is easy to understand why injunction (vidhi) and mantra are declared to constitute two of the subdivisions of the veda and again why the same position is assigned to arthaaváda and niishedha, it is, on a superficial view of the matter, difficult to see why námadheya, name is coordinated with the four heads enumerated. The distinction of these four heads bases on the obvious circumstance that the many particular sentences constituting in their totality the “apaurusheyam vákyam” called Veda show peculiar characteristics naturally leading to the establishment of a fourfold division. The head “námadheya” on the other hand does not comprise entire sentences, but only particular words occurring in the vidhi-passages. The question of námadheya is in the Mímámsá regularly treated in connection with four different Vedic passages viz. “udbh'idá yajeta paśukámaḥ” “chitrâyá yajeta paśukámaḥ” “agnihotram juhoti” “śyenénábhieharan yajeta” and it might thus appear as if the quoted passages alone had given rise to the discussion. This is however by no means the case; every passage which contains the name of a sacrifice is equally implicated in the investigation and three at any rate of the four quoted in-
junctions appear to owe their selection merely to the circumstance of the sacrifices enjoined in them being comparatively little known or practised so that it was in addition to the theoretical value of the question a matter of some practical interest to decide what the terms "udbhidá" &c. really denoted. Passages enjoining well known sacrifices—as f. i. "darśapúrṇamásābbhyām yajeta" "jyotish-tomena yajeta"—might however as well be used as examples.—The reason now why in all such passages particular words like "udbhidá" "darśapúrṇamásābbhyām" are singled out as belonging to a special subdivision of the Veda is as follows. According to the theory repeatedly alluded to in the above all the parts of the Veda must be shown to be connected with the action or energy (the so called árthá bhávaná) roused in the believer by the injunctive passages. This energy requires a result towards which it tends, an instrument whereby to realize the result and the indication of the particular way of procedure. The last named demand is satisfied by the many subsidiary injunctions, as stated above. The instrument is implicitly mentioned in the ut páttividhis and is in fact the sacrifice itself, the verb "yajeta" having to be interpreted as meaning "yágena bhávayet" "he is to effect or realize by means of the sacrifice", the object to be effected being the result of the sacrifice. If we therefore transform the first of the above quoted passages in the same manner we get the following sentence "udbhidá yágena páśum bhávayet", in which the word "páśum" indicates the result while "yágena" denotes the instrument. Thus—various hypotheses on which the word "udbhidá" might be put in connection with the bhávaná having been disproved—there remains no other course but to declare that it merely serves to define or to limit the idea expressed by the word "yágena", is merely a name and as such occupies a position by itself, which entitles it to be considered as belonging to a special subdivision of the Vedic texts. The same reasoning applies to the other passages quoted.—I feel not quite sure whether this subtle distinction is really defensible or necessary but at any rate it is a striking proof of the thoroughness with which the Mímámsakas have carried out their analysis of the Veda.

The fourth subdivision of the Veda, viz. nishedha, prohibition may be left undisputed here, as its subject matter is not of prima-
ry importance. It is of course intimately connected with vidhi, in-
junction (many nishedhas being in fact only disguised vidhis) and it
is therefore unnecessary to dwell on the position it occupies
in the Veda.

Arthavāda, explanatory statement forms the last of the five sub-
divisions of the Veda adopted by the Mīmāṃsā. The translation
of arthavāda by “explanatory statement” is not quite adequate, as
arthavāda is defined as comprising all those sentences which either
contain a praise of the things enjoined (by vidhi) or a blame of the
things prohibited (by nishedha). These passages can not be main-
tained to be directly connected with the above mentioned ārthī
bhāvanā, as the whole action enjoined by vidhi is carried out with-
out any help from the arthavāda sentences, but they occupy a de-
finite position with regard to the so-called śabdī bhāvanā, i.e. the
energy inherent in vidhi-passages by which the latter are able to
impress man’s mind and make him act. For the special mode in
which the śabdū bhāvanā acts (its itikartavyatā) is expressed in
the arthavāda-passages, man being on one hand impelled to per-
form an action when he hears it praised and glorified and on the
other hand feeling disinclined to do things which others reprehend
and object to.

It is thereby shown that every part of the Veda somehow or
other contributes towards dharma and the task of the Mīmāṃsā is
thus fulfilled. It will at the same time appear that a theoretical
inquiry of this kind into the nature of the Veda satisfies all prac-
tical requirements as well; for if the logical connection in which the
sentences of the Veda stand to each other is understood the proper
way of procedure for him who wishes to act on the precepts of the
Veda can no longer be doubtful.

The above remarks have left many interesting points unnoted,
so f. i. the doctrine of the eternity of sound, the doctrine of the
different pramānas &e. A more detailed account of the system
I hope to publish in another place. The Mīmāṃsā certainly de-
serves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has
indeed none of the attractions which the other darśanas derive
from the speculative character of their contents; its scope is limit-
ed and the nature of the investigations in which it is engaged
leaves no room for high flights of the imagination. But it possesses counterbalancing advantages. Its subject matter is of a positive nature, its method is sound and its reasoning in most cases convincing.
अर्थसूत्रः ।
श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

वालुटे रमणात्म नला जैगानिक्षावः ।
कुलने जैमिनिनये प्रवेगायार्यसंरंचम ॥ १ ॥

चय परमकाशिणिको भगवान् जैमिनिर्घर्षिविकाय दानरजनेन प्रणिनय।
तचां धर्मविभासां चतुरामास चयानो धर्मजिज्ञासेन।
आनायथब्रह्म वेदाध्ययनानलयवचनः।
चनायथ विन वेदाध्ययन्यास देशायतं बृहं।
स्थायीय यथशेष इत्यथयानविदाः।
तद्धिर्मनस्यार्यज्ञानकुपस्तार्थकलेन व्यस्ता-पनात।
तथा च वेदाध्ययनान्तरं यतो ज्ञानकुपस्तार्थकां
तद्धिर्मनमो चेतनोधमें वेदाध्ययं जिज्ञासा कर्तशये श्रीपः।
जिज्ञासापद्धति विचारे लभणा। चतो धर्मविचारशास्त्रितिः
मारण्योगश्रीमति शास्त्रारम्भसूनताः ॥ २ ॥

चय को धर्मः किं तस्म लक्षणामिति चेदुच्चते। यागदिरे च
धर्मः।
मारण्योगविधानविधिः।

तत्र च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च

चय प्रतिपादः। प्रयोजनवद्याः धर्म इति। प्रयोजनमो जनविधानविधानविधिः।
भोजनात्मावतीयापिवारणाय प्रयोजनवद्याः।
चनायथानकलवाटनर्मस्य च च च च च च च च च च च च च
चनायभावात्माविधी भोजनात्माविधी भोजनात्माविधी
चनायभावात्माविधी भोजनात्माविधी।
न च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च
शास्त्रानविधविधि च च च च च च च च च च च च च च
शास्त्रानविधविधि च च च च च च च च च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च च च च च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च च च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च च च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च च
चनायथापद्धतिः। च च
चनायथापद्धतिः।

वेदस्य सर्वस्य धर्मतंत्रयवलेन धर्मप्रतिपादकल्वान् ॥
स च यागादिर्घिजेन सर्गकाम इवादिताकोन सर्गमुखिम् पुस्तं प्रति विधीयने। तथा च। यजनेत्वत्स्वमञ्चिन्यायं यजिधानुः प्रवयस्य। प्रवयं पुस्तं प्रवहयमाख्यातं लिङ्गं च। नायाभासानन्दारुण लिङ्गं पुनःलिङ्गमाचे। उभायमपञ्चाभ्यं भावेतोपचे। भावना नाम भवितुभवनानुकूलो भवितुभवाविशेषः। सा दिधा (१)प्राव्दी भावना ऋग्यो (२)भावना पार्थि। तत पुस्तप्राण्यनुकूलो भवितुभवाविशेषः प्राव्दी भावना। सा च लिङ्गेवनोचे। लिङ्गवर्णो यथा च मा प्रवर्त्याति मत्प्राव्द्यनुकूलयापारवाच्यति नियमने प्रोतस्ते। यत्र पूवात्शक्त्याद्विस्वत्यमः प्रतीयते ततस्य वाच्यम्। यथा गामायेत्यत्स्विन्याको गोङ्ग्रावद्ध गोङ्गम्। स च वार्तपरिशिष्टे बैकि- कवाको पुस्तनित्वो भवितुभवाविशेषः। बैकिर्कावाको तु पुस्तपा-भवितुभवादिश्रीङ्गनिष्ठः तद्। चत प्राव्दी भावेती वित्तो यवविष्णुये। सा च भावनाशरणवेचे साधयं साधन-मिलिकर्त्त्वये च किं भावेतोक्तं भावेतेक्त्वं भावयेद्विति। तत्र साध्याकाज्जः वच्यमाणाश्रणयोगेणा ऋग्यी भावना साध्येवनाचेति। एकप्रत्ययमाल्येन समाभिधानायुः। सं-ख्यादीनामेकप्रत्ययमाल्येन द्वियोगमवच साध्येवनाच्यः। साध्यानाकाज्जः निधादिच्चानं करणेवनाचेति। तस्य च करणेवनात् (३) न भावनोत्वाद्वकृलेन तत्वर्त्म मपि तस्यः प्राव्दी सत्ता।

(१) स च पुस्तकाचे: विद्विधा।
(२) स च पुस्तकाचे: साध्यभावना अर्थभाव।
(३) तस्य च भावनायं करणवाच्यपित नरत: स पुस्तकेः।
न। किं तु मार्गावाचार्यां प्रमाण-मार्गावाचार्यांमार्गिकता-मार्गावाचार्यांमार्गिते। प्रयोजनेच्यानि-शिक्षणवाचार्यांप्रभावेच्यानि-प्रभावेच्यांमार्गिते। सा चार्यांकाशकालामार्गिते। अर्थांद्वारे् भावना। सा चार्यांकाशकालामार्गिते। अभावात्मानोस्य व्यापारवाचिलन्। साधनसाधीनीसंपर्शषी साधन साधनमार्गिते। तत् साधन-काशकालामार्गिते। अर्थांद्वारे् प्राध्याप्तिक्यांं मार्गान्ति। तत्र साधन-काशकालामार्गिते। अर्थांद्वारे् प्राध्याप्तिक्यांं मार्गान्ति।

अथ कौ बेद इति चेदूर्धान्ते। अध्याप्तिक्यांं वाक्यं वेदेः। स च विधिमल्यामपेयनविधिमल्यामकांभेदात्।

तत्वाचार्यांकाशकालामार्गिते। स च तादात्। प्रयोजनवत्तघ्नांविधानेनाध्यात्मकां। साधन चार्यां मार्गिते। अध्याप्तिक्यांं मार्गिते। अध्याप्तिक्यांं मार्गिते। अध्याप्तिक्यांं मार्गिते। अध्याप्तिक्यांं मार्गिते।

(१) स च प्रयोजनेति पाठः। तत् गुप्तकोषः।
स्वाभाविकले किं तु विशिष्टखैकखैव विधानात्। न च “प्रज्ञोनमेन सर्गीकामो यजेन्” ति विधिप्राप्यागोधैश्रेण सोमजयपगुणचिन्हाणसेवासत् सोमेन यागं भावेदिनि किं मन्त्यभद्रणेऽति वाच्यम्। तस्याधिकारविधित्वेनोत्तर्तिविधिवासंभवान्।

ननूढ्रेण यजेन पशुकाम इत्यश्रेण ज्योतिर्योगोन्मेदनेत्त्वात् प्रज्ञोनमेनविधिकारविधिविश्रृंगमिनि चेन्न। इक्षुनायकावाक्यानारामांवेन अन्यथानुपप्यया तथावाच्ययणां। किं च ज्योतिर्योगोन्मेदनेत्त्वात्त्वंमयिविधिवेव उवैनेव यागस्त्वसंस्काराद्विपि वोधोत्रक इति सुहळो वाक्येनत्सहदरं सोमपदे मन्त्यभद्रणेऽति विशिष्टविधानाम्।

विधिवेद्वृत्तिः। ज्योतिर्योगविधिरविधिकारविधिः प्रयोगविधिरस्वतिः।

तत्त्वकर्मसङ्गमारात्वाधोकी विधिविश्लेषिविधिः। यथा उमिःहोत्र जुहोत्रीणि। चतुर्विधा कर्मण: करणलवनान्यायः। उमिःहोत्रामोनेत्त्व भावेदिनि। ननु यागस्त्व सूपे इत्यं देवता च।

तथा च रूपास्वायो उमिःहोत्र जुहोत्रीणि कथमुच्यति विधिः।

उमिःहोत्रश्रव्यसु तु तद्रवस्यायेन नामधेयवादिनि चेन्न।

रूपास्वायो उमिःत्त्वात्त्वारत्िविधिवाच्य। अन्यथा रूपास्वाहास्त्रा जुहोत्रीनात्त्वात्त्वाविधिविधः स्वान।

तथा चमिःहोत्र जुहोत्रीणि वाक्यभद्रणेऽतिः स्वान।

अप्रभावसंस्काराधोकी विधिविश्लेषिविधिः। यथा दश्वा जुहोत्रीणि। स ति तिनीकाः प्रतिप्रायंभावस्य दश्वा होमसंभवम् विधाने।

दश्वा होमं भावेदिनि। गुणाविधों च धातुवर्गम्
साध्यतेनान्यः। कविदाङ्गायतेनापि। यथा गुणन्त्रित्यकामसः जुझादितित्यत्र दृष्टिकरणालेन्नित्रियं साध्यतेनान्यः। तत्त्व किनित्समत्यत् जुझायं सम्बन्धितां प्रयोगां साध्यतेनान्यः।

एतस्य विषेः। सच्चारिषमीत पटोऽप्रसानानि। श्रृवणिज्वाकप्रकरणाय साध्यतेनान्यः। एतस्यकरणानेन विषिनार्जुनं परोऽप्रश्रेष्ठस्वकरणसाध्यतलङ्कः (१) पारायणरप्यायं साध्यते॥

तत्त्व निरपेक्षा ववः सुधि।। सा च तिनिधि।। विधाती ऋभिधाती विनियोगणी हि तत्त्व लिङ्गायतिकः। हिनिया श्री-ध्यायांसुधि।। यथा गुणांश्च अवपणार्येव सवस्यं प्रतीतिते सा विनियोगणी।। सापि तिनिधि विभक्तिलङ्कः एकाभिधानकः एकपदलङ्कः चेनि।। तत्व विभक्तिमुः च चेन्तम्।। यथा श्रीचिपिते यजेनेन तत्त्व सुधिः।। तदपि पुरोहि-श्यायत्तव गुणां यागाज्ञातम्।।

तदपि पुरोहित्तां श्यायत्तव गुणां यागाज्ञातम्। चरुपयो एकदायनं गा लोकं क्रीष्णान्त्यसोः वाके अग्रहायांश्च टौयायासुधि क्रृपायाज्ञातम्। तदपि गोरुप-द्रव्याबिशिष्टहस्तान न नु साध्यन्।। अभूव्यानुवात्।। श्रीचौन्याश्यस्य यजुर्वर्णवेत्ता श्रीकृष्णां गुणायासुधि क्रृपायाज्ञातम्।।

तदपि गोरुप-द्रव्याबिशिष्टहस्तान न नु साध्यन्।। अभूव्यानुवात्।। श्रीचौन्याश्यस्य यजुर्वर्णवेत्ता श्रीकृष्णां गुणायासुधि क्रृपायाज्ञातम्।। तदपि गोरुप-द्रव्याबिशिष्टहस्तान न नु साध्यन्।। अभूव्यानुवात्।। श्रीचौन्याश्यस्य यजुर्वर्णवेत्ता श्रीकृष्णां गुणायासुधि क्रृपायाज्ञातम्।।

तदपि गोरुप-द्रव्याबिशिष्टहस्तान न नु साध्यन्।। अभूव्यानुवात्।। श्रीचौन्याश्यस्य यजुर्वर्णवेत्ता श्रीकृष्णां गुणायासुधि क्रृपायाज्ञातम्।।

(१) रूपं यागाज्ञातसमि स गुणसमि:।
धान्यागङ्गम्। यदाचवनीये जुरदोत्तयाचवनीये यथा कृमाङ्गलं
समामोऽसुत्या। प्रवत्ययो ६३ विभक्तियास्त्रया विनयोगोज्या घेयः। पा-
पुजुन। यज्ञेतयाचकवतवंशयोऽ समानाभिधानसुत्या
कार्काङ्गलम्। यज्ञेतयास्त्रयाभिधितसंस्कारया
आर्यभावनाङ्गलम्। (१)
समानाभिधानसुतेरको (२) पदस्तुत्या च यागाङ्गवम्।
न चामू-नारायस्तसाः कर्य सावानाङ्गलव वाचम।
कर्तृपरिवेचबद्धरा न-धुपपते। कर्ता चाशीलभ्यः।
आर्यानेन हि भावोचलनाः।
सा च कर्तौर विनापुपपन्नेन महापिपति।
सर्य स्युदितज्ञान-दिभ्य प्रबुलम्।
निर्मादितुष्ण न प्रतापो विनयोजकः शब्दो दृष्टि
किं लु कर्मोऽ्; यथाच नौकर्मयोजकः। (२)
कर्मयेन नाववत्त्य-स्थया यथा विनयोगम्य कल्लेन
तेषां कपकलशतीयोहच्छतान्। अत एवैन्द्र।
निर्माणेनेन्द्रास्त्रयाधिकारः।
किं लु एन्द्राः
गार्दपत्यमुष्कपिपिष्टात्यत्र गार्दपत्यमिनि
दितीयासुर्या
गार्दपत्योपस्त्रयार्ष्णम्।

श्रव्दसमाध्यं निंज्ञम्। यथा इः। सामथ्यं सर्वश्रव्दाना निंज्ञ-
मित्यमिल्यावैनाः। सामथ्यं कृतिपरं।
तेन सामक्षातो नामनेदः।
चौगिकश्रव्दसमाध्यायो रूढात्मकलिं ग्न्यस्य भिन्नवान्।
(४)
तेन वर्णियेनस्तवं दासिनि मनस्य कुशलवाङ्गलं
न तन्नातिदिवनाङ्गलम्।
तस्य वर्णियेनलिङ्गान्तरक्षवन् प्रकाश-
श्रियतं समथेर्यान। एवमन्योपिति निजाभिनियोगो दृष्टव्य।
तदद्व निजां वाक्यादिभ्यों वनवन। अतः एव श्रीसे ते सदनं
कृषोभोगी मन्त्रम्य पुरोडाशसदनकरणांः। सदनं कृषोभोगी
निजाना न तु वाक्यान।

समभियारारो वाक्यम्। समभियारारश साध्यातिवाचा-
कहिनीयायचाबावे पि वस्तुं प्रेषपिविवाचकपदयों। सहोचा-
रणाम्। यथा यस्य पर्यायमि जुस्म्भवति न स पापं स्वोकां प्रश्नो-
वीत्तिक पर्यायूज्ञानों। समभियारारातेव पर्यायया जुस्म्भवतम्
न चानयक्षम्, अन्ययापि जुस्म्भा निहितानिि्यि वाचम्। जुस्म्भा
प्रवेदन नबाद्यापूर्वतरत्नान्। तथा च वाक्यार्थं। पर्यायया उव
कहिनीयचाबावारी जुस्म्भूवह भावेदितिन। एवं च पर्यायया यद्य
जुस्म्भा कियते नद्वेद नत्साध्याम्पूर्वे भवति नान्याणिि गम्यनद्वेदि
न पर्यायया वैस्यर्यम्(१)। अवकहिनीयचाबावारी चाव्यक्षं
वाक्यम्। अन्ययापि चुवादिविपि पर्याययात्। सेिं पर्यायमा अच
नारायणीपि सर्वप्रकृतिपिवहवत्वेदिन न विकृतिन्। ततं चढ़े
कोनापि नत्साध्यसंभवाचैः। नस्तत्त्त्वात्। यथा समाधीपदेपि
सा प्रकृति। यथा दुःथपूर्णमथा द्वि। तत्प्रकारणो सर्वाधिपानाम्
यथा न सर्वाधिपानाः। सा विकृति। यथा संग्यादी। ततं
कनिष्ठवादवभावान्ति भीमान्त। अन्यायविवधि समानवी
वधिः। तदद्व वाक्यव्रकरणादिभ्यों वनवन। अतं वेत्ताभावी
इद्वं कहिनीयचाबावारी सिद्धकरणांम् न तु प्रकरणांहर्ष्यपूर्णमानां
मात्रांलम्।

(१) एवं चत्वाराम्य वैस्यर्यमित्रत्वं। पाठों व पुस्तकों उपजनम्यते।
उभयाकाँज्ञा प्रकरणम्। यथा प्रयाजादिपु समिधो यज्ञी-त्यादी। वाक्य पलविशेषस्यानिर्देशान्त समिद्यागणन भावेदिति बोधानन्तरं किमिति उपकार्यादिज्ञा। दर्श्यंपूर्णमासवाको सूपी दर्श्यंपूर्णमासाभ्यं सूपे भावेदिति बोधानन्तरं कथमित्युपकार-रकाकांज्ञा। इत्यं चभयाकाज्ञा प्रयाजादित्रों दर्श्यंपूर्णमासाञ्चह्यम्। तच्च प्रकरणं दिविधम्। महाप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणं चेति। मुञ्चेष्वभावनासंबंधिक्रकरणं महाप्रकरणम्। तेन च प्रयाजादिों दर्श्यंपूर्णमासाञ्चह्यम्। एतच प्रकृतिवैवेद, उभयाकाज्ञा-या: संभवान्तु विकृतिः। तत्र प्रकृतिविधिकां कर्त्तिन्यत्तिदेश्येन कथ्यंभावाकाज्ञाया उपश्रेय्यमंपूर्णावलिक्षामायुभावाकाज्ञा-या चिनियोग्याप्स्त्वभावाय। नन्दाद्वाराज्ञानं खणाट्ये विकृत्यर्थ-व्यमिति। चःभावनासंबंधिक्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणम्। तेन चाभक्षमणादिं प्रयाजादिज्ञम्। तच्च सन्द्रेणेनैव चायते। नन्दाद्वाराज्ञानं खणाट्ये चाभक्षमणादियों दर्श्यावनकध्यंभाविवेलो प्रहणवस्त्र-ढेन युधानाग्निवाप्त्ते। एकाप्रानुवादेन विधोयमानयोरा-ज्ञीरनकारानां विलितं सन्द्रेण। यथा चभक्षमणेऽ। तत्र चि “समानायु उपभूतस्थितो वा”इत्यादिना प्रधानानुवादेन किं चिद्रं विधाय नदन्त्यरस्मापि प्रधानानुवादेन(१) “यस्यैव(२) चिद्रं प्रधान इत्यन्ते प्रेयौ जाक्त्यौ भाष्यानुवादिने भूमि-कामं ज्वात्यग्यत्विनितं” इत्यन्त्यायं “या वै प्रधानां मिथुनं वेदे”ैति किं चिद्रं विधायते॥

(१) परस्यविद्रुपः इत्याब्रम्य तरारित्वं च यक्षी गुप्तस्त्रे नेपत्यन्ते।
(२) प्रधानानुवादेन प्रधानत्वं परस्यविद्रुपमार्गि गुप्तस्त्रे।
(९)

प्रायाजांकमथे भिन्नितमभिकरण नद्वर्म। प्रयाजां
रपूः ज्ञात्वा यागोपकारं भावयेदिति जाने कथमभेदिरपूः के
त्त्वमिति कथंभावाकाज्ञायं सत्त्वानं। सा च स्वतंग्रपित्तिरे
भिकरणादितिमि सामायति न चाकाज्ञानायं कथंभावाकाज्ञायं
भाव। भावनााँगेन तत्वापि तत्रसंभवानं। तद्दैं (१) प्रक
रणं क्रियाया एव सामायमनियोजयं वृत्तमुण्योऽस्तु तद्वारा।
तथा च। यज्ञ सर्गकाम इत्यञ्च फलभावानायं कथंभावाकाज्ञायं
मिति संविधिपितान्यमानाद्वितीय क्रियाजातमुपकार्यादि
काज्ञाणिकसर्गान्वेन्ति। क्रियाया एव लोकेण कथंभावाकाज्ञायमन्वन्ति न चैर (२) कुटारेण किंच्चादि
स्त्रयं कथंभावाकाज्ञायां च्वार्यमाणो द्विपि हस्तो देवेन्ति किं
तु हस्तेनाद्ययं निरामायेन उदयमनिपातानं एव। हस्तस्य त
हस्तेनाद्ययं निपामात्रेन। इदं च सहायतिः कुल
वेल। चत एवांदेरीयति राजनमिति देवनाद्ययो (३) धर्मि
आभिमित्तिने तिथिपि पाठाति चैर सहायति नपातुं किं तु प्रक
रणाधीनयुक्तिः।

देशसामायणें स्थानमं। तद्विधमं। पाठसादेःग्रामसाधनमां
देवं चेति। स्थानं कमशेत्यन्यान्तसर्वम्। पाठसादेःग्रामसाध
विधमं। यथासंध्यस्थः स्मिरिपितामिति। तः चैत्रायमेकादशि
कालं निर्विवेच्यं वैस्वानरं दात्रप्रकारं निर्विविद्येववृक्षमिति
नेषु इत्याहरी रोचना दिव इत्यादीनां सायामुवाकामन्त्रा-

(१) यद्द्वाऽति पाटो “च च” पुस्तकोऽः।
(२) हस्ताक्रान्तिः च रो च पुस्तकोऽः।
(३) नाहिक चारित्री इति पाठः लग च पुस्तकोऽः द्वारायति च।
(१०) यथासंख्य प्रथमभि प्रथमं दिनीयमस्य दिनीयमित्वेंवेंवृहृपो
दिनियोगो यथासंख्यपाठान्। प्रथमपाठितमन्त्रम् चि कैमथचार्या-
कार्यायं प्रथमते विचित्तं कैमेव प्रथममुपनिषदते समानदेश
लावन्। एवं दिनीयममन्त्रायि। वैकुण्तानां प्राकृतिकानुवादने
विचित्तानां संदेशपतितानां विक्रत्यर्थवं सचिविपाठान्। यथा
आमन्होमानाम्। तेषां चि कैमथचार्यकार्यायं फलं विक्षर्थपूर्व
मेव भावत्वेन संवधानं उपस्थितत्वात्। स्वतंत्रफलकत्रे विकृतिमन्त्रिपाठान्यकृमस्युत्रः। पद्यभूमामामण्डिपास्याययार्थमस्य
मनुष्यानसादेशायं। औपनिषद्ये चक्षुं भ्रामणोऽयायं। पद्यरुप-
दीक्षायं तत्सनां ग्यायं नेमां ज्ञानः पद्यान्। अन्तर्सेवां कैमथचार्याय
कार्यामनुष्यानसादेशायं। चन्द्रसेवां नात्र यानशेषायं। चन्द्र एव प्रमुखमन्त्रः सानाधम्यपाठान्यकृमसादेशायं। न नु पौरोदाधिकारिमि समाख्यया
पूरोदाधिशास्त्राम्याम्॥

समाख्यया योगिक: प्रबद्धः सा च दिविष्या वैदिकी लेखनीची
च। तद्धौतसम्भव्याणिघर्ष्ट्वं होतदनमस्य इति वैदिकसमाख्यया। अध्यर्थसत्तत्वदार्याज्ञातं लेखकया अध्यर्थवर्तमिति
समाख्ययेति सहस्यं॥

तद्रेव निष्ठुरपिनि सहेतः आयाटूरीनि पटः प्रमाणानि एव
लक्षकृत्वं चिन्योगविधिन्या समिदादिभिसुपकृत्य दर्शपूर्णाः
मासायं ज्ञेतेन्द्रेवकृम्पेन यानि नियोजयते तान्यानचिरे विधान
निदुर्गुप्ताणि (१) क्रियाकृपणि चनि। तत्र सिद्धानि
(१) सिद्धानि इति पाठः "ख ग घ च" पुस्तकेभु॥
(११)

जातिध्वजसंख्यातीनि ताथिच द्वारार्थायन्येव। कियाक्षणां च विदिवधानिनुणकर्माणि प्रधानकर्माणि च प्रत्यायेव सतिपत्योपकारकाणि च आरादुपकारकाणि चौचिनो। कर्मोऽज्ञक्वलाहुर्ग्निनव विधीमानं कर्म सतिपत्योपकारकम्। यथा वर्जगान-प्रोक्षणानि तत्र द्वारायमदार्थायं द्वारायार्थायं चेनै। तत्र द्वारायमप्रसवानाति। च्वरायाध्वजानि प्रोक्षणानि। द्वारायाध्वजायं परसुपरो-वशादी। तदद्व द्र्यायागारिणार्यं अवर्ण द्र्यायादेवतािश्रेणे च द्र्यायासनयक्। व्रायामनृहिष्ठ सदेहं विधीमानं कर्म आरादुपकारकम्। यथा प्रयाजादि। आरादुपकारं च (१) परमापरायणवात्वद्वादेवस्युज्ञनं। सतिपत्योपकारं च द्र्यायादेव-सन्तानकारतारा यागस्त्रपद् १२नुपुरुज्ञनं। इत्यावं चारूयाय कर्मेन्तु चतुं। तदेव निदिन्पितं सहेतो विदिवधिगरिष्ठ।।

प्रयोगप्राप्तभाववावैधको विधि: प्रयोगविधिं। स चाज्ववकृ-कवाक्षणपञ्चं प्रधानविधिरेव। स चि चाज्वं प्रधानमनुष्ठायं-विचरसे प्रमाणाभावादविचरितमापरप्रार्थियं प्रयोगप्राप्तभावं विधित्व। न च तन्द्रविचरं गुपि प्रमाणोभावं इति वाच्चम। विचरसे तत्रप्रधानविधिकवाक्यानवगत्वार्थित्यायुवावति। विचरसे सुखमाणयोऽदार्थे रोिरजस्वने ससू कृत्सनिय सारिच्याव-हरामानव। स चाज्वेद्वानि नियमे कर्म चाँग्रीयमाणे भवति। अन्यथा स्ति खिमेत्तद्वन्तरमेत्तस्तावक्तः प्रयोगशेषात्तवेति प्रयोगविधिः। अतः प्रयोगविधिरेव वसविधेयप्रयोगप्राप्तभावविधिः चतुं नियमं कर्माणि पदार्थविशेषणनथा विधिः। अतः ए-
वाजन्यां क्रमवृद्धको विधि: प्रयोगविधिरित्यपि लक्षणम। तत्र कमो नाम विनिविशेषः। पैरा विकप्यकृतो वा। तत्र पट्ट प्रमाणान्ति सुपरये पादसानमुखयुग्मचायस्यानि। तत्र कमपरं चचन सुनिः। तत्र दिविधम। केवलकमपरं तद्विशिष्टपदार्थपरं चेनिः। तत्र वेदें कृता वेदिन्यानो विकरीतिनां केवलकमपरं वेदिकरणां त्रेवचनान्तरग्रहणत्वात्। वष्टकांशः प्रथमभाव इति तु क्रम-विशिष्टपदार्थपरस्म। एकप्रसरतामभ्येन भक्तानुवादन्ते क्रमायामक विधातुमप्रककत्वात। सेयं सुनिरितप्रमाणापेशया वल्लिनी नेष्यं वचनकपण्डरारा क्रमप्रमाणतवात्। अन्त स्वाभि-विनयेच्या पाठकामातृतीयस्याने यथाप्रथमकालावर्तिनो द्वारमा यृद्धातिन्ति वचनायुग्मस्याने यथाप्रभिमत्तकम्। यत्र प्रयोजनवशेषन क्रमनिर्यात्षि सो धयकमः। यथायामिनिहों जुडोति यथामु पचनीलामाठोऽच्यवागपाकयोः। अन्त द्वि यथामा दो-मार्थवेत्ते नवाकः प्रयोजनवशेषन पूर्वमण्योदेतो। स चायं पाठकामात्रयनवात्। यथापाठ च्यानुसारे क्रमप्रयोजनवाच्येदुस्त्राध-यें (१) यशस्। न दत्राचामालकारं क्रियामाणस्य पाकम्यों चिन्तित्युक्तं प्रयोजनमस्ति। पदार्थविधाभक्ति वाच्यानां यः क्रमं स पाठकम। तस्माच पदार्थ्यानां क्रम चाचीयनै। येन दत्र च क्रमेण वाच्यानि पट्टितानि सनेवं क्रमेणाधिनान्त्यं प्रत्ययं जनयति। यथाप्रत्ययं (२) च पदार्थ्यानुसारमुक्तानम्। स च पाठों दिविधः। मन्त्रापाठ राज्यपुष्पक्षेत्री। तचामेयश्रीरीमोह्योस्तचन्द्रा-

(१) दातों उद्यायांत्वें चेनि ‘त ग च’ पुस्तकौः।
(२) यथायेत्रमत्त्यमाति पाठो ‘ग च’ पुस्तकौः।
कार्य याज्ञानुवाकानी (१) पाठादः क्रम चार्यीयते स मन्भ-पालन् स चायं मन्तपाठी ब्राज्ञापाठाइनोयान्। अनुष्ठाने ब्राज्ञानुवावका पेश्या मन्तपाठस्मान्तरकऽन्तान्। ब्राज्ञावाको च च प्रयोगार्द्दरुवें कर्यायमितबवोधौ कर्तव्यं। मन्त्राः पुनः प्रयोगकाले व्यापिरन्ते। अनुष्ठानकम्य सारणकम्यतवान् त्वक्षम् त मन्त्रकम्यतवानलादन्तरकऽन्तान् मन्तपाठ इति प्रयाजानां समिधो यज्ञि तनुनपां यज्ञि इत्यवं विधिपाठकमायाः। (२) क्रमः स ब्राज्ञापाठकमाय। यदापि ब्राज्ञावाकानुवाकान्यथं विधाय कर्तायो मन्त्रापि प्रयाजादीना प्रञ्ज्ञातिः कर्मसारकलान्तरस्याभाष्यान्येव कर्मसार कालवेन चौक्षकित्वन्।

स्मानान् नामोपशिठितः। यस्य हि देशे यो नुष्ठीयते तवूर्त्तेने पदार्थे कृते स एव प्रथमस्मपस्थिनो भवनीति यूक्तं तस्य प्रथम-मन्त्रकलानम्। अत्र एव सार्थस्कृ चार्यीयोपमवनोयानुवन्धारानां सवनीयदेशे सहसुन्ताने कर्त्यं अधैं। सवनीयपब्रह्मानुव-भितरयोः पञ्चाः तक्षस्रोते आश्रितविद्धानानचारं सवनीयसखेव प्रथमस्मपस्थिते। तथा हि ज्योतिष्ट्रो तथः पषुपुयागा चार्यी-पोमेयः सवनीय चालुक्यायशिनि। ते च भिन्तेद्वाः।। चार्यीपोमेय चौपवस्त्ये उद्घ सवनीय सत्यानां चालुक्यायन्ते। चार्यस्को नाम सोमयागविशेषं। स सायत्तालाज्योतिष्ट्रो-विकारः। अतस्ते चर्यो पुष्पुयागाः सार्थस्को चोटक्ष्टना-

(१) रस्तवायानुवाकान्यकमायाः क्रम आधारायतृति पाठः 'स' ग' पुस्तकयोः। रस्तवायानुवाकान्यकम आधारायते इति 'च' पुस्तकये॥

(२) इतयविधिवाकान्यकमायाः इति 'स ग' पुस्तकयोः। इतयविधिवाकान्यकमाय इति 'च' पुस्तकये॥
तत् तत्र साहित्य सुतं सच्च प्रदाननाभवत् इति। तत्
साहित्य सवनीयें देशे प्रधानप्रनयाससे: स्थानातिकामणा-
साम्याच। सवनीयें देशे चनुष्ठने सृष्टिपीयानुवनन्य: सान्-
स्थानातिकामो भवति। चर्चितामीयें देशे दुनवन्यधे वान-
ष्ठाने चयावाससपि मध्ये हयो: सक्षस्थानातिकम्॥ (१)

प्रधानकमेण यो जगानां क्रम: स मुख्य: क्रम:। येन हि क्र-
मेण प्रधानानि कियलो तेनेव क्रमेण तेषामक्रायणानृतो।
तदा सर्वपानः स्वरे: प्रधानसृज्ञन्य व्यवहारं भवति। यु-
त्रमेणानुष्ठाने केषा चिट्ठानां स्वरे: प्रधानभैरूत्तमस्वावदानं
केषा चिट्ठानलयवादानं स्वाच्छायुतं भैरूत्तमानखर
चार्याविधाययो:। चतु: प्रधानकमो तुष्प चहुकमेण हेतु:। चतु
एव प्रयाजपेतेणादावागनेहंद्रियो भिषारणां पत्ताहैकः
दश्न: चार्याविधाययो:। प्राध्यायिकः। एव च हद्योरिच्छयर्भि-
धारणयो: साधनप्रधाने सुन्धमकात्तितं व्यवहारम्। चर्च-
मेणाभिधारणो न्यागनेहंविरभिधारणान्यायायो: योरतनलम-
व्यवहारम्। ऐन्नत्यनभिधारणान्यायायो: हायलातितं व्यवहारं
तचायुत्तमान्यवादसृज्ञ। स मुख्य: क्रमः पाठकमाहंवर्तः। मुख्य-
कमो हि प्रमाणान्तरस्पष्टप्रधानकमप्रनिपितिमात्रेष्यन्तया वि-

(१) मपी स्वस्तवि पाठः ‘च’ पुस्तकेः।
(१५)

लक्षितप्रतिपतिकः पालकमङ्कः निरपेक्षाक्षायपालकमाचा प्रस्थापितया न तयैििी वल्लबान। स चायं मुखकः प्रवृत्तिक्रमाच वल्लबान। प्रवृत्तिक्रमे चि दिलोयादिपमार्थार्थं निर्माणानुष्ठितक्रमापेशं वल्लनामज्ञानं (१) प्रधानत्रिपक्रणानुक्षेत्र कः तु सुक्रियकर्त्॥

चतु प्रयुद्यमनेशु प्रधानेशु सन्निपातनमज्ञानामार्थात् तुनुज्ञाने कर्तवे दिलोयादिपमार्थार्थं प्रथमानुष्ठितक्रमादृः कः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः। यथा प्राजापत्यप्रवृत्तिः प्राजापत्या चि वैष्णवीं चला प्राजापत्यकृष्णनीति वाक्यं दिलोयादिपमार्थाक्रियकर्तव्यानां कः कात्रची विशिश्ना अतस्तपा नदेशानां चोपाकरणियोजनप्रभूमीएः साहित्य संपाद्य। तथा प्राजापत्यप्रवृत्तिः संप्रतिप्रकरणाक्थलन (२) युगपटनृत्यां दृष्टिनुज्ञानादुःध्यत्ते। नदेशानां चोपाकरणादेरों युगपटनृत्यां दुःध्यत्ते। अतस्तपा साहित्यमविविधनृत्यांसंपाद्य। तचेक्षोपाकरणरूपिकायायापरस्योपाकरणां विषयम्। एवं नियोजनान्तिकक्रमः। तथा च प्राजापत्यप्रवृत्तिः कसाधिचिवोरार्थः एवं सर्ववेयानुष्ठाय (३) दिलोयादिपमार्थालेव क्रमणानुष्ठाय: स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः। सो ५यं सुयामिबाद्यो दुर्बलः। तदेवं संक्षेपतो निर्णयितः पदविधाक्रमणी-सृष्टिते प्रयोगविधिः॥

कर्मज्ञानफलार्थको विधिरधिकारविधि:। कर्मजः-

(१) वल्लबान। प्रवृत्तिक्रमाच वल्लबान्। प्रवृत्तिक्रमे हि वल्लनामज्ञानामाति पाठे 'ग व' पुस्तकः।

(२) देवताकाळवेत्तः पाठ: केशु चित्तुस्कुपक्रियासृष्टिति दायाक्षेत्रो वगम्ये।

(३) एकं संवेदनानुचायितः पाठ: 'स व च' पुस्तकः।
न्यायकायं कम्यजन्यफलभोक्तालम्। स च यजैत सर्गकाम 
इत्यादिकृतः। सर्गमुद्दिष्याय गांव विद्रघ्ना जलेन सर्गकामस्य 
यागजन्यफलभोक्तालं प्रतिपाद्यने। सधूर्विन्मर्यागिणुर्ज्ञेन 
द्वित्ये रूपं जामानं ध्यायंकलं निर्विचित्रितादिनानिदानां- 
हृद्य निमित्ते कर्म विद्रघ्ना निमित्तवत: कर्मजन्यपापयुक्त- 
फलसार्यं प्रतिपाद्यने। एवंसहर्ष: सन्यासुपासोत्वादिनां 
पुआचितविन्मिकाणजीविनं सन्योपासनजन्यप्रवेशवयपरिचार- 
रूपफलसार्यं व्याख्या। तच्च फलसार्यं तन्वेव यो ध्यकारिविद- 
शिष्यः। अधिकारस्य (१) यदििधिवाकोषु पुद्मविशेषणालेन अन्न- 
नेन। यथा कामे कर्मणि फलकामानं नैसिर्ते कर्मणि निमित्त- 
निमित्तीयः। नित्ये सन्योपासनांतः पुआचितविन्मिकाणजीविलम्। 
अनं एव राजा राजादेवम् स्वाराज्यकामो यज्ञेनकानं विधिकोषे 
व्याख्या स्वाराज्यमुद्दिष्याय विद्रघ्नापि न स्वाराज्यमात्रकामयं 
तत्त्वसारसङ्ग्रहं प्रतिपाद्यने। किं न राजा सत: स्वाराज्यमात्र- 
संवेद राजलस्मापि अधिकारिविशेषणालेन अवछान। क चित्रः 
पुद्मविशेषणालेनाभमाध्यकारिविशेषणाम्। यथा ध्यकारिविद- 
शिष्यस्वा विद्या कन्तविन्मिकाणमस्क्रमं प्रश्नियलियलेनाध्यकारिविद- 
शिष्यस्वा ज्ञानवस्तः प्रत्येक प्रबुद्धः। एवत्तब्रजनित्साकमसत: अधान- 
स्वागमनिमित्तमयात्। अधागमनित्साकमम्योद्धवनितस्वात्संगतीद्वारा- 
माध्यकारिविनिमित्तमस्तं प्रत्येक प्रबुद्धः। एवं सामाध्यमयि। अधा- 
स्वागमनित्साकमयं ब्रूततः प्रश्नः: सहकारिविनि न्यायान्त समयं प्र- 
त्येक विधिप्रदृष्टः। नस्ते निन्दृपिनो विधिः।

(१) अधिकारस्य स एवंते ‘ल ग च’ पुस्तकेषु।
(१७)

प्रयोगसमवेतार्थकारका मन्नाः। तेषा च नादश्चार्थकारकानीवैतार्थवक्तम्। न तु तदुच्छारणमद्यायम्। संभवति द्रष्टिफलकलक्षकलपनाया अन्यायवाच। न च द्रष्टिश्चार्थकारणाय प्रकरान्तरणापि सम्ब्रवार्तान्त्रां व्यर्थतित्वाचम्। मन्त्रेव स्त्रियेमतिमि नियमविधियायवाच। नानासाधनसाधक्षीयायामेकसाधनप्राप्तव्यापसरसाधनसः प्राप्तको विधिनियम-मविधिः। (१) यथावि:। विधिनियमकृपाः सिद्धि:। पाषिको स्वति। तत्र चायत्र च प्रांगिणी यथाक्रम। अधिकारः। प्रमाणान्तरणाप्राप्तस्तु प्राप्तको विधिपूर्वविधिः। यथा वज्ञत ख-ग्याकाम इत्याडः। स्त्रियेकामयामक प्रमाणान्तरणाप्राप्तसन्न विधानाः। पथे प्राप्तस्तु प्राप्तको विधिनियमविधिः। यथा प्रोचियांविन्दतत्त्वादि:। कथमस्तु पथे प्राप्तप्राप्तकल्पितो वादिल्यम्। अणैन वादिल्य मैतृवायं न प्रतिपादते उनव-ध्वनितिरक्षकिल्लान्। किं तु नियमः। स चाप्राप्ताश्चूरणम्। वैदित्यस्य चि नानोपायसाधियायाद्र वंभां परिवर्ज्ज उप वायान्तरु शृवहुतमारभते नद्रा वेयास्याप्राप्त स्थविणादना-मक्कप्राप्ताश्चूरुपरमेनवाहिना स्विडिया कियते। अतः निम्मविध-वायाप्राप्ताश्चूरुपरमेनको नियम एव वाक्यायः। पथे प्राप्ताप्राप्त-झातसः विधानमितिमि यावः। उभयस्य युगप्राप्ताविद्याविद्याव-निपर प्रिय परिबंधविधिः। यथा पञ्च पञ्चनख भच्चा इतिः। इद्द चि वाक्यः न पञ्चनखभक्षणपर्वं नतः रागान्तः प्राप्त-
त्वां। नापि नियमपरं पञ्चनक्षोपचनक्षभवशणक्षयुगपत्रांः
पको प्राप्यभावान् । अत इदमपञ्चनक्षभवशणक्षनिश्चितिपरमिति
भवति परिसंख्याविधिः । सा च दीविधा । श्रीणी लाभशिकी
चेनि । तत्तुष्ट्य द्विवेयत्त्वोऽन्त्री परं श्रीणी परिसंख्या ।
एवकारणां पञ्चमानालिनिरक्षोपचन्त्वादिभिमित्तात् । पञ्च
पञ्चनक्ष भव्ययो
इति तु लाभशिकी । इतरंनिश्चितिविभावप्रमादभावान् । अत एवे
शाश्वात तिरूपथनः । दोषसुयौ च श्रीतान्तासुन्तक्षपनां प्राप्वायु
घोषे नि । तदुकाम । श्रीतान्ताय परियागादसुन्तक्षपनान् प्रा
पच्चत्वाय वार्तादिवृवं परिसंख्या विद्वूषण इति सुताय पञ्चनक्ष
भवशणक्षयुगाद । अनुपाल्यापञ्चनक्षभवशणक्षनिश्चितिः कयपनालिन
ष्क चारपञ्चनक्षभवशणक्षयुगाद वाक्याति । अस्वस्त दोषग्रे दो
षोऽद्य रश्मिनिष्ठम् । प्राप्वाशिर्ष्यनिष्ठ इति दिक्क । येषां तु प्र
योगसमवेतायमशाकलेन न सभवतित तदुकामालिनयुगाद
स्त्रीस्तुर्यक्तं कल्पनेऽइिति नान्यकामिति ।

नामदेयायां विशिष्यायवर्णिक्षं त्र्यक्षमु तथा
चिह् । उर्णसा यजनं पराकाम इत्रीवीज्ञक्षमव्यो यागायामध्येयं
तेन च विशिष्यायवर्णिक्षं । (१) क्रियेन । तथा चिह् । चालन वाक्यो
नाप्राप्तवान फलोहिग्रेन यागम विधीयेन । याससायत्नमयवीर
धेनवादास यागविय्यश एव विधीयेन । तत्र को अस्वा यागविय्यश
इत्रीवीज्ञक्षमव्यो याग इति विधायेन दहस्त्रा
यागेन पर्यं भाववैद्यत्समानाधिकारणेऽनामदेयान्यवातः
नामवियलं च निस्मत्वतुष्ट्यायान् । मल्लविश्वशणभाग्यादायकाः

(१) अभिशेषायवर्णिक्षं हति 'ब' पुस्तकोऽ
தொக்கில்கா ஜோன் பாரங்கம் இவ்வினாக்கம் யானைத்துள்ளது மல்லிகாவதையும் தான் சிற்று. நாயகன் வானவே விளக்க பின்னால் யாரும் பின்னால் சுருக்கம் செல்தும். வானவேதான் உடோள்வு முன்னால் சுருக்கம் யாரும் பின்னால் சுருக்கம் செல்தும். உடோள்வு யாரும் பின்னால் சுருக்கம் செல்தும்.

சிங்கரா ஜோன் பாரங்கம் இது குறுங்கட்டு கருணாவர்கள் கருணாவர்கள் வரல் வானவேதான். தான் சிற்று. நாயகன் வானவேதான் விளக்கம் நூற்று. ராது மது பாரள் சுருக்கம் செல்தும். வானவேதான் உடோள்வு முன்னால் சுருக்கம் யாரும் பின்னால் சுருக்கம் செல்தும். வானவேதான் உடோள்வு முன்னால் சுருக்கம் யாரும் பின்னால் சுருக்கம் செல்தும். வானவேதான் உடோள்வு முன்னால் சுருக்கம் யாரும் பின்னால் சுருக்கம் செல்தும். வானவேதான் உடோள்வு முன்னால் சுருக்கம் யாரும் பின்னால் சுருக்கம் செல்தும்.

(1) தரும் பிரகாபக்குறுத்து பாது: 'சு க' புத்தக்குறுத்து.
चेन। तहेवताया प्रामाण्यान्तरा प्राप्तलाय। किं तच्छाणायार-मिति चेन। यद मयेचे प्रजापतोये च सायं जुहोटीयती को चित। श्रपरे त्वायासयन्त्रीतिमित शपृश्चात्तिनि मन्त्रवर्ण एवारिष्ठूपदेव-वन्तप्राप्तक। नव्येमाण्त्रवर्षिनन्त्री प्रजापतिंद्रेवताया वाधः श्याम। मन्त्रवर्णला चत्तरोने दुर्बललाय। यथाच।

तद्दितमन घुट्ट्याय च मन्त्रवर्णव वा पुनः।

देवताया विधिस्थल दुर्बलं तु परंपरमित।

चेन। यद मयेचे प्रजापतोये च सायं जुहोटीयत्यन न केवल प्रजापतिविधानम। किं तु मन्त्रवर्णप्रामाण्यान्तरा नक्षमुचित-नप्रजापते। एवं च न वाधः केवलप्रजापतिविधानावावान। न चाच समुचितनेष्वविधानसे च नेति वाचच। समुचितनेष्वविधानापेशय द्वन्द्वत: प्रामाण्यान्तरा नक्षमुचितप्रजाप-तिमाचविधाने वाघवान। एवं च प्रायाजिष्ठ समिदारिदेवतानां समिधः समिधो चान चाचर्ष्व व्यविधानमन्त्रवर्णस्य: प्राप-लाय। समिधो यज्ञोवादिशु समिदारिदेवास्त्रप्रवाहणशाक्तवर्णानि-त्त्वान्तानाधेधय:।

श्रयोनेराभिरबर यज्ञोवादिशु श्रयोनद्वैशव कर्ममाध्येयाचिन त-प्रदेशाय। तेन व्यपरेशुपंपमाणाचदन्त्वथायनुपपूर्वतातितिय याव-न। तथा चि यद्यिधिय तस्य सेव भाविन्त। यच्च श्रयोन। विधेयः श्वान तदार्थवाच तात्तितिस्वत: कार्त्य। यथा वें श्रयोन निपत्ता-दृष्टी एवमय विषय निपत्ता इत्यन्तार्थवादे श्रयोन: स्वतं न प्रकायः। श्रयोनपमाणार्थानन्तरस्य त्रित्यमाणालाय। न च प्रयोनपमाणत्वेन स एव द्वोत्तः प्रकायने। उपमाणापमेयवा-
वस्त्र भिन्नविन्दुलान। यदा तु प्रयेनसंज्ञा करो यागी विधीनेन तद्भाष्टतून प्रयेनोपमानेन तस्य स्वरूपं कर्तं प्रवक्तवृत्तिः प्रयोगश्रवेण केवलं कर्मनायसंधियं तद्भप्रेमेणाद्रितिः। उत्तरानिन्द्रयुगुणदीपिक्येक्ष-मात्रि पन्ध्रम नामयेवनिभिन्निततिः कार्यत। यथा वैष्टेवेन यज्ञेत्यादिः। अन्तर्द्धक्केेनिनिंश्छजातिर्यातीनां बनीयक्षवैशेषतेवेत्रप्रक्रिया-बद्धस्य विषेषेण तेवर्तेवलातविधायकलं न संभवतीत न कर्मनायसंधियल-म्। केवलस्य न तद्भयाख्यानन्यातेवा कर्मनायसंधियलम्। प्रकर्त्त-यागे विषेषेण तेवयुगुणस्यान्तरत्र सत्तात। यहिस्वेषेत्रताः समयजन्त तदेष्टेवेत्रयायस्तेवेत्रवस्त्रेवं सत्रा-त। पुष्पश्चा निवर्तकं वाक्यं निपृष्ठः। निपृष्ठवाक्यान्यांनयं सुतु-क्रियानिनिश्चितनकलनेवायिवच्छान। तथा हि। यथा विधि: प्रवर्तनाः प्रतिपादयन्त स्वप्रतिपादिविन्यासाः विधिवाच्य यथाद्विद्विषायेवक्ष्यवाच्यसंभवन्त्येव। पुष्पश्चा विद्विषायेवक्ष्यसंप्रतिपादस्यायस्यार्थवाच्छक्षेतिष्टुः सत्तात। यहिस्वेषेत्रताः समयजन्त तदेष्टेवेत्रयायस्तेवेत्रवस्त्र निपृष्ठः।
भावो यत्समसमिभ्याहत्तपदार्थिरोधिविधिवीधकलम्। यथा घटी
नास्तीयाहै। अस्तीतिश्चसमसमिभ्याहत्तो नजू घटस्तुच्छिरोधि
घटस्तु गमयनि तदिच निद्धसमिभ्याहत्तो नजू निद्ध्रे-
प्रवर्तनावरोधिनां निर्वर्तनामेव वोधयित। विषिवाक्रयाः प्रया
मां प्रवर्तयतौ निर्निर्यात वाक्याः। यद्रा तु प्रवर्तार्थार्थम् तचान्ये वाधकं तदा धात्यान
खैव तचान्ये। तच्च वाधकं हिविधम्। तस्य जनसमिह्युक्तं
विक्षिप्तप्रसंक्षिप्त। तचाद्ये नेत्रेनस्तभानभीतः तस्य
जनसमिह्युक्तेतदक्यापाठाः। तथा चाच पञ्चुदासार्थानम्।
तथा हि। जनानवाक्य तर्कायर्थे रूढवाख्यातं जनसमिह्युक्त
महान अनांकाय तर्कायर्थे नेत्रेनेन्द्रनित्यात्नि तर्कायर्थ
एव प्रवर्तिपादनियः। अन्यथा पुर्वस्याक्यायोंहीकाकलं न स्थान।
तथा च न-अयोः न प्रवर्तार्थान्यः। कर्त्तार्थान्वीनोधान।
विस्मार्यप्रवर्त
तर्कायरोधिनिवर्तनाय। तस्य निद्ध्रनेन बोधनाः। तस्याः
कर्त्तार्थायत्तात्माः। नस्ताः हेदनेत्यत्व नजा धात्यान विरोधिनियो-
णं कर्त्तार्थायत्तात्माः। नस्ताः हेदनेत्यत्व नजा धात्यान विरोधिनियो-
णं कर्त्तार्थायत्तात्माः। अन्यथा। पुर्वस्य नेत्रेनेन्द्रप्रवर्तिपादनियः।
शीताञ्जिनियानोपयोगानेन्द्रियबिधिति वाक्याः। ततः भावाक्याः।
हेनमा हिदिक्तो भवनीति वाक्येष्वः।

(१) प्रवर्तिपादनियः। प्रवर्तनार्थान्वीतिरित्यः। यद्रा यज्ञे स्त्रीकाम इति विषिवा-
क्षेत्रम् ६ यत मां प्रवर्तिपादनिय प्रवर्ततार्था तिरित्यः कलहं भक्ष्येत्रोद्वादशिनियबाक्षेत्रम् ६ यत मां निर्वर्तनाय नितिनिर्वर्ततार्थायत्त्वाहारणे। विषिवाक्रयाँ दिगुत्वातः। कर्त्तार्थायत्तात्माः।
(२३)

वगनः पापशयो मायनया स्वेच्छिनि। एवं च पूर्वेत्र्योरेकवाक्यवं निवर्वद्ध्येव। न च च धार्मिकविरोधिनः पदार्थात्तरङ्गापि संभवक्यमोघनीशुष्कसंकपस्वेच्छः मायनान्य इति वाच्यम्। तथा कर्त्त्वत्नाभावेन प्रकृते मायनान्यायोऽग्नि। द्वितीयं यज-निन्धु येघजामं च करोति नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च विकल्पसस्ति। च प्रयुः दासायणानां। तथा च यद्धच वाको न च च च प्रत्य-यार्यान्वयः स्मारत्वनायाजेजुः येघजामं स्मरिति मन्त्रस्य प्रतिरिपेयः। स्मारित। अनुयाजेजु येघजामं न कुर्यादिति। स च प्रासिपूर्वकं च प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-नि नामयाजेज्ञित्वादि। च च च प्रासिपूर्वकं एव प्राससौव प्रतिपिपेनां। प्रासिवश यजनिन्धु येघजामं च करोती-
पर्युदासस्यैव। इत्यां चानुयाज्ञानितिरितेशु यजनिषु येयजामहिन्मिति मन्तं कुर्या दिति वाक्यायिढ्योऽधः। नेनो च नुयाज्ञानितिरितेशु बान्धदिक्किलबान। एवं च न विकरः। अन्त च वाक्ये येयजामहिन्मिति न विधीयते यजनिषु येयजामहिन्म इत्यनेवै च प्राप्तवान्। किं तु सामान्यशास्त्रप्रात्येयामहि इत्यनुवादनेन तस्यानुयाज्ञानितिरितेशु विधीयते। यद्यनिषु येयजामहिन्म करोतीति तदनुयाज्ञानितिरितेशु वेति। नेनेवें सामान्यशास्त्रप्रात्येयामहि विशेषे संकोचनहुधारादुपंसंहरायुगुदासस्य भवेन न स्यादिति चेन्न। उपसंहारो च तन्माचसंकोचार्यः। यथा परोधां चनुदरां करोतीति समान्यप्रात्येयामहि चनुदरां करणां। आश्रयं चनुदरां करोतीति विशेषं वाग्नेयपुरोदाशमाने संकोचाणि। पर्युदासस्य तदन्माचसंकोचार्य इति तलो मेदान। कुन्त चित्त विक्रमप्रभाखण्यनयन्वयनाया प्रतिपेधायुगश्रयां। यथा नातिराचे पोडगिनं ग्रहातील्या। अन्त चि नातिराचे पोडगिनं ग्रहातीति मान्यप्राप्तपोडगिनं ग्रहातीति निषेधादिक्कप्रस्ताविन्य न पर्युदासश्रयां। चन्मंभवात। नेनो चि। यथा च पोडगिनं पदायन नख्यान्यन्यश्चललानातिराचे पोडगिनं ग्रहातीति प्रत्येकविधिविरोधान। वयं चतिराचे पोडगिनं ग्रहातीति प्रत्येकविधिविरोधान। यदि चतिराचे पदायनान्यन्यश्चलल्यानातिराचे पोडगिनं ग्रहातीति वाक्यायिढ्योऽधः। स्याम्बो दिपि न संभवति नदिक्किलबान। अन्तो ज्ञानन्यगत्या मान्यप्राप्तपोडगिनं ग्रहातीति निषेधिः। च विक्रमप्रस्ताविन्य नस्यायिढ्यो। इत्याद्रिश्च यदिक्किलध्वज मन्त्रः।
(२४)

विष्णु विम्बश्रमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। बिधिनिमित्तमृत्युस्मातृपि क्षणिकाः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। तत्र तु न विकल्पः प्राकृतिः रागति एव प्रतिविधिः पुनःप्रार्थः तत्र प्रतिविधिमानस्य नामः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। यथा न कल्पयः भक्त्योदय्यादीः कल्पयः भक्त्योदय्यादीः। तत्र भक्त्योदय्यात्रेव पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। न च दृष्टिः न दृष्टिः न जुःसङ्गोदय्यादृशीः प्राकृतिः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। वाच्यम्। कल्पयः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। वाच्यम्।

खतः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। वाच्यम्।

(१) निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव यथा क्षणः खतः खतः। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव।

प्राकृतिः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव।

निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव।

(१) निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव।

प्राकृतिः पञ्चमस्त्रापि क्षणिकाः। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव।

निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव। निमित्तात्रिकपापनिर्दित्तमीव।
स्यार्थवाच्चनिति वाचयम्। चालस्यादिविभाषादप्रवक्तामानस्य पुःः प्रत्येक्यादिनमनिलक्षेण नाहोधार्योपयोगात् । स पणवेधा।
नदुतः। विरोधी गुणवादः स्याटनुवादोऽवधारिते। भूतार्थवादस्तहानार्थवादविधिधा मत इति। अस्सर्थः। प्रमाणान्तरारोधे सत्यर्वादोऽगुणवादः। यथा क्षमक्षम्यो युध इत्यादि।
यथे अदित्यमेदस्य प्रत्येकाध्याथ्यायादित्यवदुपच्चाललखः। पंगुणोऽसनञ्जया प्रतिपादने। प्रमाणान्तरारग्यनाथवापोधोऽको नवादः। यथा विगतिनिमययो मधुरमत्त्वच हिमशिरोधिक्षामिनै। प्रवचनान्तरारग्यनाथवाधान्।
प्रमाणान्तरारिवरोधत्तप्रायः(१) रचिवनाथवापोधको वादो मनान्तवादः। रथेयो वत्राय वजुमृद-यक्षदित्यादि। एवं च यज्ञसंग्राम इत्यादि। निकंलब्धस्य सातारपरं पृथ्वी यामार्यम प्रतिपादकलं सिद्धम्।
सो इत्य धमी। यदुदिग्य विचिन्तसदुह्नेन क्रियमाणस्तहृः। इश्वरार्षस्य उपनुवुद्या क्रियमाणस्तु निर्बिष्ट्यमहृः। न च तदर्पणाभुजानुष्ठाने प्रमाणभावः। यत्करोपि यज्ञस्सारी यजूवार्शषे वटी।
यत्स्मिन् कैन्तेय तत्कुतर्य मद्दर्पकोऽनी भगवद्ध्रीनायासूतः। रेव प्रमाणवान्। चूतिचरणे तद्धार्यमयश्च भुतिमूलकक्षेण व्यवस्थापनादित्तिनिश्वम्॥

चाचानं घुच्छवीडाय भास्करेण चूमेध्यस।
रचिनो ययुः समासेन जैमिनीयार्थसंग्रहः॥
इति श्रीमहापाणियायनोगच्छस्करविरचितपूर्वमीमांसायार्थसंग्रहानं प्रकरणं समाप्तिमान्॥

(१) प्रमाणान्तरविरोधत: स्तुति इतिः पाठोऽयूः च पुस्तकयोः।
Reverence to Krishṇa.—

Having shown his reverence to Vāsudeva the husband of Ramā, Laugākshi—Bhāskara composes the Artha-Samgraha as an introduction to the doctrine of Jaimini.

The highly benevolent reverend Jaimini has composed a book in twelve adhyāyas for the discriminative knowledge of duty. At its beginning he speaks of the desire of knowing duty in the following aphorism "next therefore a desire to know duty". In this aphorism the word "next" expresses the immediate consecution (of the desire of knowing duty) on the reading of the Veda. The word "therefore" expresses the circumstance of the reading of the Veda having a visible purpose (and not merely tending to produce an unseen result as f.i. the performance of the sacrifices does), as the passage enjoining the reading of the Veda (viz. "one is to read the Veda") settles that this reading has for its visible purpose the knowledge of the sense of the Veda. (For a proper understanding of the aphorism quoted above) we have therefore to complement the aphorism as follows "Because the reading of the Veda has a visible purpose which consists in the knowledge of its sense, for this reason, after the reading of the Veda, the desire of knowing duty which latter is the purport of the Veda has to be entertained. The phrase "desire of knowing" implies the idea of enquiry, so that the aphorism actually refers to the beginning of the (Mīmāṁsā—) śāstra and means "this Śāstra whose matter is the enquiry into duty is to be begun." (1)

Here the question arises:—What is duty? what is its distinctive character (its definition)?—To this we reply: Sacrifices etc. only(2) are duty; and we define duty as that matter which has a

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(1) For a full discussion of the not very important question of the meaning of atha and atas see Jaim Nyāya M. V. pp. 11 12.

(2) The word "only" serves to exclude quasi—religious acts like the worship of chaityas which are not taught in the Veda.
purpose and is to be accomplished according to the Veda. The phrase "which has a purpose" serves to exclude from the things comprised in the definition matters which are themselves of the nature of a purpose (as f. i. the different results of the sacrifices viz. paradśc etc.). The phrase "which is to be accomplished according to the Veda" serves to exclude from the definition matters like the act of caring (which is performed not on the authority of the Veda but on the prompting of a natural instinct). The word "matter" (arthă: which includes the idea of goodness or usefulness) serves to exclude actions like the sacrifice called "Śyena", which are to be considered as bad things (anartha) on account of their having a bad result (viz. the death of some enemy, for the bringing about of which the sacrificer himself will have to go to hell). 

Here it might be objected that this definition of duty is in conflict with the definition given in the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras where it is said I. 2. 2. "Duty is that matter the distinctive character of which is instigation"; in which latter definition the word "instigation" denotes only that one part of the Veda which has the form of injunctions. —To this we reply that in reality the two definitions are not conflicting because in the Sūtra also the word "instigation" denotes the Veda in general as the whole Veda on account of its aiming at duty serves to express the accomplishment of duty.

If now we be asked to point out in detail the appropriateness of our definition of duty we proceed: Acts of duty as sacrifices etc. are enjoined with reference to man by vedic sentences (as f. i. "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice") in which paradise etc. is pointed out as the result. The particulars are as follows. The word yājya: "the may sacrifice" contains two constituent elements viz. the root yaj (yaji) and the suffix. The suffix again contains

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(1) Cf. Jaina Nryav. M. V. pp 14 15. But why then—mght it be asked—are Sacrifices of the nature of the Śyena taught in the Veda?—To this question the Sabara-bhāṣya thus answers (Katham puṣar anarthat kartavyatayopadhyate-uchvate)—nara śrīśākṣat kartveda vsthyaante—yo hi hamsatun mamaḥneti tasyāyam anūpyaśya—in tathām upadesan—śyenādhibhicharan yajeta iti he samāmananti—

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two elements as it expresses as well the property of a verb as the property of an optative. The property of expressing a verb is common to the suffixes of the ten moods and tenses (all of which when added to a root turn the latter into a verb); the property of expressing an optative exclusively belongs to the optative suffixes.—Both elements express a creative energy (bhāvanā) only.(1) By bhāvanā ("creative energy" or "productive energy" or "tendency to realize something") we understand the particular activity of some productive agent (bhāvayīti) which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to be (bhāvīti; which is capable of future existence). Such productive energy is twofold being either verbal (sābda) or actual (ārtha)—By "verbal bhāvanā" we understand the peculiar activity of some productive agent which tends to make a person act; it is expressed by the optative element (of words like "yajeta"); for if some person hears a verb with an optative termination there arises in his mind the exclusive notion "he (the speaker) instigates me to act; he is engaged in an energy tending to make me act." (In this explanation of the element which expresses the bhāvanā we proceed) according to the general rule that whatever is exclusively understood in consequence of some word being uttered is expressed by it (is the sense of the word); as, i.e., in the sentence "bring the cow" the general character of cow (gaua) is the sense of the word "cow." The peculiar activity (which has been mentioned above in the definition of bhāvanā) is in the case of a sentence belonging to ordinary worldly language some particular intention dwelling in the mind of a speaking person; in verse sentences on the other hand where there is no speaking person it resides only in the words characterized by optative terminations etc. For this reason this bhāvanā is called verbal bhāvanā.

This bhāvanā requires three constituent elements; the matter which is to be accomplished (the result: sādhyā); the means by which the result is effected (the instrument: sādhana); and the mode in which the result is effected (itikartavyatā); according to the three questions (suggested by each bhāvanā): what is to be ef-

(1) The word "only" is meant to exclude the agent (kartṛ) etc.

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fected? by what means is it to be effected? how is it to be effected?—
Here now the want of a result to be accomplished being felt there
steps in the actual bhávaná (ártthí bhávaná) with its three consti-
tuent elements which we shall explain further on and fills the place
of the wanted result, since here takes place a samánábbidhána-
śruti i. e. a direct statement of the intimate connexion of two mat-
ters by means of the two being expressed by the same word, (the
sábdí as well as the ártthí bhávaná being expressed by the one op-
tative form). (To supply the ártthí bhávaná—i. e. the peculiar
energy of a person to which the sábdí bhávaná instigates—as that
which is to be accomplished is more natural than to supply any-
thing else as f. i. the sacrifice itself, because the optative form of
words like “yajeta” expresses both bhávanás, from which circum-
stance the intimate connexion of the two is readily inferred).
It might perhaps be remarked by some one that other matters
too, as f. i. number (i. e. singular, dual, plural) and time (present
etc.) are expressed by the one optative affix and that therefore
number, time etc. likewise occupy the place of sádhya with
regard to the verbal bhávaná. But such an assumption would
be erroneous as number, time etc. are not fit to fill the place
of the thing to be accomplished.—If the want of an instrument
(of the verbal bhávaná) arises, the place of such a one is
filled by the knowledge of the optative form etc. The
instrumentality of the optative does not lie in its producing the
bhávaná—for the latter exists in the word even before the
knowledge (by some person) of the optative form—; but ra-
ther in the circumstance of the optative form expressing the
bhávaná or its tending to bring about the result to be effected by
the verbal bhávaná (which result as remarked above is the actual
bhávaná).—If finally the want of a mode (of the verbal bhávaná)
presents itself, the place of such a one is filled by the praise or glo-
ification (of the acts of duty) which is found in the arthaváda-
passages.

Actual (ártthí) bhávaná is to be defined as the peculiar energy (of
some person) which refers to some action (as f. i. a sacrifice) which
energy is engendered by the desire of some object. This actual
bhávaná is—in words like yajeta—expressed by that element of the
word which denotes the verb: for the verb in general (independent
of the different moods and tenses) expresses an energy.—This bhá-
avá too requires three constituent elements, the matter which is
to be accomplished,—the result; the means by which the result is
effected—the instrument; and the mode in which the result is ef-
fected; according to the three questions (suggested by the actual
bhávaná as well as the verbal bhávaná): what is to be effected? by
what means is it to be effected? how is it to be effected? If the
thing to be accomplished is asked for, results of the nature of para-
dise step in as the things to be accomplished; if the instrument is
asked for, actions like the sacrifice present themselves as the instru-
ments (by which the result is obtained); if the mode of action is
asked for, all the subsidiary matters as f. i. the prayájas (which
form a part of the sacrifice) present themselves and point out the
mode of action.

If now the question is asked "what is the Veda", we answer: sentences not produced by man. The Veda is fivefold, being either
injunction (vidhi) or sacrificial formula (mantra); or name
(namadhéya) or prohibition (nishedha) or explanatory statement
(arthaváda). That part of the Veda which intimates a thing not
known (by other means) is called "Injunction."

Injunction has a sense in consequence of its enjoining a matter
having a certain purpose in as far as it enjoins the matter as not es-
tablished by any other means of proof(1); as f. i. the vedic passage
"he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the agnihotra;" which
injunction enjoins an oblation having for its purpose (the attaining
of) paradise which is not settled by any other means of proof; so
that the sense conveyed by the passage is "he is to realize paradise
by means of the Agnihotra-oblation". When on the other hand
the (sacrificial) action is already settled by some other means of
proof, an injunction merely enjoins some secondary matter (guna)
with a view to that action. As is f. i. the case in the passage
"he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk." Here, the
oblation itself being already established by the injunction "he is to

(1) This appears a somewhat clumsy way of stating what is more clearly expressed in
the following words of the Ápadévi. Sa cha vidhihpryojanavadarthavidhmanártha-
ván sa chápraptam artham vidhatte
offer the Agnihotra, there is only enjoined sour milk with a view to the oblation (as the material to be used for the oblation); so that the sense is "he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk."—Where both things are non-established (i.e. in the case of neither the sacrifice nor any secondary matter pertaining to the sacrifice being established by a previous injunction), the injunction enjoins something particularized (or specialized; viśiṣṭa); as i.e. in the injunction "he is to sacrifice by means of soma"; here, the soma as well (which is the material of the sacrifice) as the sacrifice itself not being established (by any other injunction), there takes place the injunction of that sacrifice which is particularized by soma (as its material).—Nor is it to be objected that (the passage being interpreted in the aforesaid manner) there takes place a split of the sentence (vākyabheda) the word "somena" enjoining two things; for there are not enjoined two separate things, but only one particularized thing (viz. that particular sacrifice for which soma is used).—Nor again is it to be objected that the passage "somena yajata" merely enjoins soma as the material of that sacrifice which itself is already established by the other passage the who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice by means of the jyotishtoma so that the sense of the injunction would be "he is to realize the sacrifice the jyotishtoma) by means of soma": it being pleaded for this interpretation that it allows us to dispense with the assumption of possessive indication (matvartha-lakṣaṇa; by which term is understood the denoting a thing by something else connected with it, as a quality etc.; as when the word "soma" is made to denote a sacrifice in which soma is used). For the passage referring to the jyotishtoma is an injunction intimating a claim (adhiṣṭhāna-viḍhī) and this cannot be taken as an originative injunction (utpatti-viḍhī; if the passage about the jyotishtoma could be taken as the one containing the primary, original injunction of the soma-sacrifice, the passage "somena yajeta" might be taken as a gūra-viḍhī and thus "somena" would not have to be explained as meaning "somavatā yāgena; but as the purport of the passage about the jyotishtoma is not simply to enjoin the soma-sacrifice but to intimate the claim which the sacrificer, has to the fruit of the sacrifice, we are compelled to take "somena yajeta"
as the originative injunction of the soma-sacrifice and therefore to explain "somena" by "somavatā yāgena")—To this reasoning it might be objected that the passage about the jyotishtoma may be taken as comprising an originative injunction as well as an injunction intimating a claim as this is avowedly the case with other passages as f. i the passage "he who desires cattle is to sacrifice with the udābhid." But we answer: It is not so. In the apparently parallel case which you adduce (viz. the passage about the udābhid) we assume the double nature of the injunction because such an assumption is unavoidable, there being no other statement originative of the sacrifice (while in the case of the soma-sacrifice there are two injunctions; the instances are therefore not parallel).—

And moreover if we explain the passage about the jyotishtoma as containing two injunctions it would have to be taken as intimating the sacrifice itself and its connection with its fruit and this would be a manifest split of the sentence; better than which is the assumption of the passage enjoining something particularized (a sacrifice particularized by soma), by means of our attributing to the word soma the power of possessive indication.—

Injunction is of four different kinds, being either originative injunction (utpattividhi) or applicatory injunction (viniyogavidhi) or injunction of a claim (adhikāravidhi) or injunction of performance (prayogavidhi).

That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called originative injunction as f. i. the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation". In injunctions of this kind the sacrificial action itself occupies the place of the instrument, so that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the object of his desire by means of the agnihotra-oblation."—But, it may be objected, the two forms (aspects: rūpa) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation", in which neither of these two forms is mentioned be considered an originative injunction, the word "agnihotra" (which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice viz. agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of (the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it; (which
principle will be explained in the chapter on námaddhēya). To
this objection we reply: The passage is an originative injunction
although neither of the two forms of the sacrifice is mentioned in
it. Otherwise the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means
of sour milk" would have to be considered as the originative in-
junction (of the agnihotra) as it contains a statement of one of the
two forms (viz. the material) and then the passage "he is to offer
the agnihotra-oblation" would be purposeless.

That injunction which intimates the connexion of some subsidiary
matter with some principal matter is called applicatory injunction
(Showing how the subsidiary matter is to be applied to the
principal matter). As f.i. the passage "he is to perform the ob-
lation by means of sour milk" which enjoins the connexion, with
the oblation, of sour milk the subsidiary position of which is in-
timated by the third case-affix (the case-affix of dadhā showing
that sour milk is to be used as an instrument and therefore is
merely subsidiary to the action whose instrument it is). So that
the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the oblation by means
of sour milk". In injunctions of some secondary matter (guna) that
which is expressed by the root (as "juhoti" in the above ex-
ample) occupies the position of the object to be accomplished (so
that "juhoti" is properly explained by "homam bhāvayet". In an
upātti-vidhi and an adhākāravidhi on the the other hand the root
denotes the instrument: agnihotram juhoti = agnihotra-homena
ishṭam bhāvayet."

Sometimes the root expresses the abode of an action as f.i. "he
is to perform the oblation for him, who is desirous of strength of
the senses, by means of sour milk"; where the sense is "he is to
realize strength of the senses by the instrumentality of sour milk";
and if now the question arises "wherein does it (the instrumentali-
ty of sour milk) reside?" the oblation which is mentioned close by
steps in denoting the abode.

Injunctions of this kind are assisted by six means of proof, viz.
direct statement (Śruti); power (lińga); sentence or syntactical
connexion (vākya); interdependence (prakaraṇa); place or order
(-sthāna); name (-samākhya). Applicative injunctions assisted
by these six means of proof intimate subsidiary relation; the
subsidiary position of something consists in its being accomplished by the action of some agent engaged in the pursuit of some other result (so f. i. the prayájas are performed by a sacrificer offering the newmoon-sacrifice with a view to obtaining paradise); the same subsidiary position is expressed by the term “párráthya” “existing for the purpose of something else.”

(We now proceed to a detailed discussion of the above mentioned six means of proof).

Direct statement (śruti; literally “text”) we define as irrespective or independent words (words which intimate their sense directly without any intermediate steps of the nature of those required by the other means of proof). Direct statement is of three different kinds being either injunctive (vidhátrí) or denotive (abhidhátrí) or applicative (viniyoktrí). To the first class belong the direct statements contained in optative forms etc. (the optative form directly indicating the bhávaná). To the second class belong statements as those about the rice-grains (viz. sentences like “vrihiin avahanti” “vrihiin prok-hati” etc., where the word “rice-grains” directly produces the idea of the corresponding thing and its connexion with the bhávaná). If finally from the mere hearing (the mere statement) of a word a connexion (between some primary and some subsidiary matter) is understood, we have an applicatory śruti.

Śruti of this latter kind is again threefold, being either direct statement by means of case-affixes or direct statement by means of one denotive word (or element of a word) or direct statement by means of one pada (in the restricted grammatical sense). Direct statement by means of case-affixes expresses the relation of a subsidiary, as f. i. in the passage “he is to sacrifice by means of rice grains” where by the direct statement of the third case-affix the subsidiary relation of the rice-grains to the sacrifice is expressed. This subsidiary relation is here brought about by the rice-grains forming the original substance out of which the cake is made (which latter stands in direct subsidiary relation to the sacrifice); in the same way as the animal (offered in the animal sacrifice) stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrifice in consequence of its being the original substance from which the parts actually offered
viz. the heart etc. are taken.—In the passage "he is to buy the soma by means of a tawny, one year old (cow)" the quality of being tawny is by the direct enunciation of the third case suffix shown to stand in subsidiary relation to the act of buying; this subsidiary relation takes here place by (the quality's) defining a substance viz. the cow, not directly; the latter not being possible on account of the immateriality of a mere quality.—Again in the passage "he sprinkles the rice-grains with water" the sprinkling stands in subsidiary relation to the rice-grains, as appears from the direct enunciation of the second case suffix. And, it is to be observed, this sprinkling is not for the sake of the rice-grains considered in themselves as they would be perfect without the sprinkling, but has the purpose of bringing about the transcendental result (apūrva), which would not be brought about were the sacrifice performed without sprinkling the rice grains with water. In the same manner it is to be understood with reference to all subsidiaries that the subsidiary relation has the purpose of contributing towards bringing about the transcendental result.—Let us take another passage. "Thus I seized this bridle of the right; with these words he is to take hold of the bridle of the horse." Here the direct enunciation of the second case suffix shows the mantra to stand in a subsidiary relation to the bridle of the horse. (1)—Or another passage. "When he offers the oblation in the āhavaniya-fire." Here the seventh case suffix shows that the āhavaniya stands in auxiliary relation to the

(1) The above quoted example seems hardly to fall under the category of śrutis but rather under viśya; which opinion as we see from the commentary was actually held by some teachers. The commentary says "some teachers maintain that the application (of the mantra to the action of taking the bridle of the horse) is founded on viśya. Others however object to this assumption and maintain that, in consequence of hiṣga having greater force than viśya, hiṣga would settle the mantra's standing in subsidiary relation to a bridle in general before viśya could establish its exclusive relation to the bridle of the horse. Those however who suppose the application of the mantra to be founded on viśya defend their opinion by maintaining that the mantra does not point to a bridle in general but to the bridle of the right i.e., the horse which is an instrument to bring about the right and that therefore the mantra is to be applied to the taking of the horse's bridle in consequence of the viśya "āśvabhidhānam śīdattā" which is merely assisted by hiṣga. The author of the text (i.e. Landiksha-Bhāskara) however does not admit that a hiṣga in the mantra points to some peculiar kind of bridle (rather than to the bridle in general).
offering.—Thus in other cases too direct statement by means of case-affixes points out the proper application (of subsidiary matters).

(We now proceed to the two other kinds of viniyoktri śruti). In the sentence “paśuṇā yajeta” “he is to sacrifice by means of an animal” direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which singularity and masculinity stand to the kāraka; while again direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which the number expressed by the verbal termination of “yajeta” stands to the bhávanā. On the other hand direct statement by means of one pada points out that this number stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrificial action (for the sacrificial action as well as the singular number is expressed by the one pada “yajeta.”)

Nor is the following objection to be raised “how can the immaterial number stand in subsidiary relation to the bhávanā?”; for this is possible in consequence of the number defining an agent. This agent again is to be supplied by inference. For the verb expresses the bhávanā only; but the bhávanā can not take place without an agent and therefore it leads to the inference of the latter.

Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestive power (liṅga) and the other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to another); for in cases where the subsidiary relation is established by suggestive power there is no verbal statement to be found which would directly teach the application (of a secondary matter to a primary one), but such a statement has to be formed (viz. from the sentence containing the liṅga); and in as far as in the latter case an applicatory injunction has to be assumed while in the case of direct enunciation such a one is already actually existing, the power of liṅga etc. which is founded on an assumption is set aside by the power of the direct enunciation. For this reason we do not conclude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (apparently) addressed to Indra (i.e. a verse containing a mention of Indra’s name or one of his attributes etc.) is really to be used for addressing Indra; but rather decide if we find at the same time a direct enunciation as f. i. “with a verse bearing Indra’s mark he addresses the Gārhapatya” that in consequence of the direct enun-
cation of the second case termination (gāhapaṭayam) the verse is subsidiary to the act of addressing the Gāhapaṭayya-fire.(1)

Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote or point out something) is called liṅga. As it is said “the power of all words is named liṅga”. By power the same thing is understood as by the technical term ruḍhi (conventional meaning; i.e. a word has the power of denoting that thing as whose name it has been settled by convention and tradition) and it can therefore not be said that liṅga does not differ from samākhyā (name); for liṅga which bases altogether on conventional meaning is different from name (samākhyā) which consists in words the meaning of which is to be made out from the meaning of their constituent parts. Therefore the mantra “I cut grass for the seat of the gods” can only be taken as being subsidiary to the cutting of kuśa-grass and not to the cutting of ulapa-grass and other kinds of grass since from the power residing in the words “I cut etc.” it appears that the mantra is able to declare the cutting of kuśa-grass only.(2)

In the same manner in other places too the application of a subsidiary matter is to be learned from suggestive power.

Power (liṅga) has greater force than syntactical connexion (vākyya) and the following means of proof. Let us take for an example the following mantra “I make a pleasant seat for thee. I make it very lovely with a stream of ghee; on this, the immortal one, sit down, repose on it propitiously minded o marrow of the rice-grains”. Here the first half of the mantra (I make a pleasant seat—ghee) is to be considered as subsidiary to the act of making

(1) The quoted pk is “sometimes thou art not bauta, Indra, but comest to the worshipper” etc.; a verse which as mentioning Indra would be considered as connected with the worship of India, were it not for the direct statement referring it to the adoration of the Gāhapaṭayya. The decision in favour of liṅga as possessing greater force than liṅga rests on the principle that on the basis of liṅga an injunction may be constructed containing a direct statement in the above case amṛtamante pramāṇam (a gāhapaṭayya upānśipta), that however a direct statement actually found in the text (amṛtyām gāhapaṭayya upānśipta) has greater force than one constructed.

(2) The example of liṅga given in the text does not come in very appropriately after the remark on the difference of liṅga and samākhyā as samākhyā has nothing whatever to do with it. The passage is discussed as giving rise to a doubt in the Man Śuṣtra; but the doubt is whether words like bauta are to be taken in their mukhya (primary) sense only or also in their gāmṇa (secondary) or derived sense.
a seat for the sacrificial cake, on account of the power of the words 'I make a seat', and (the decision to what act the different parts of the mantra are subsidiary) is not to be made according to syntactical connexion (In the above mantra the two halves form one syntactical whole, the connexion being effected by the word ‘tasmin’ (on this) beginning the second half. It might therefore be maintained that the whole undivided mantra is subsidiary to one act, either the making of a seat for the cake or the placing of the cake on the seat; or else that both acts are to be accompanied by the whole mantra. But here linga steps in and shows that one half belongs to the preparation of a seat and the other half to the placing of the cake).

By sentence or syntactical connexion (vákyya) we understand common employment and by this term we understand the connected enunciation of two words denoting two things which in reality stand to each other in the relation of principal and subsidiary although this is not indicated by second case affixes etc. directly indicating the one of the two things to be the thing to be accomplished by the other etc. (which relations are directly indicated by vi-bhakti-sruti etc.) Take f. i. the passage ‘he whose sacrificial ladle is made of paraṇa-wood hears no evil sound.” Here we see from the connected enunciation of the quality of consisting of paraṇa-wood and the ladle that the former stands in subsidiary relation to the latter. Nor is it to be said that the circumstance of being made of paraṇa-wood is purposeless as the ladle could be made also in a different way (i.e. from some other kind of wood). For the word ladle intimates at the same time the peculiar transcendental result to be accomplished by it (by a ladle made of paraṇa-wood). So that the sense of the passage is “By its being made of paraṇa-wood he is to realize the peculiar transcendental result connected with the ladle by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel (by avadāna). As it thus appears that if the ladle is made of paraṇa-wood then the transcendental result to be brought about by it ensues and not in any other case the circumstance of its consisting of paraṇa-wood is not purposeless. The phrase “by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel by avadāna” (i.e. the
last clause of this phrase) is necessarily to be used as otherwise the quality of being made of pāṇa-wood might be extended to srava, sruk etc also (for these implements also might be denoted by the word “jhuū”--explained as a yaugika “hūyate’nayā”--and in them also the oblation is carried, but not when it has been taken out of the vessel in the manner called avadāna).

This quality of the ladle of being made of pāṇa-wood although it is given in the text in a detached rule (anārabhyādhīta; a rule which stands by itself, out of connexion with some particular sacrifice to which it might be referred; so that it must be considered as a general rule) is to be referred only to all the fundamental forms of the sacrifice prakṛiti) not to their modifications (vikṛiti); for with regard to the latter it is already settled by an express rule (viz. by the general principle that a modification is to be performed in the same way as the fundamental form of which it is a modification) and thus there would be a useless repetition (if we directly referred the statement about the ladle having to be made of pāṇa-wood to the modifications also).

A fundamental form of the sacrifice (prakṛiti) is that one where we find a set of direct rules extending over all the subsidiary things (requisite for the sacrifice). Of this nature is f. i. the darsāpāramanā-asa sacrifice, in immediate connexion with which we find all the requisite subsidiary matters stated in the text—A mere modification (vikṛiti) on the other hand is that form of sacrifice where there are no direct rules with regard to the subsidiary matters, as f. i. the oblation made to Sūrya (sauryam charum mur-vāpēt; there some of the subsidiaries are settled (not by direct rules given for this special sacrifice but) by transfer (atideśa; by transferring or extending the rules given for the fundamental form to the modification). Detached injunctions are injunctions of general validity (while rules which are not detached but under the influence of some prakaraṇa refer to that particular sacrifice only with which the prakaraṇa connects them).

Syntactical connexion as a means of settling subsidiary relation is of greater weight than prakaraṇa and the rest. Thus f. i. with regard to the mantra (forming a part of the sūktavāka) “o Indrāgni you accepted this offering etc”. This whole mantra is on ac-
count of its forming one syntactical whole to be taken as subsidiary to the newmoon-sacrifice only and not, on account of prakaraṇa, as subsidiary to the fullmoon-sacrifice as well. (The sūktavāka belongs by prakaraṇa to the darśa-sacrifice as well as to the pūrṇa-māsa-sacrifice. It however contains mantras which by their liṅga are marked as belonging to either of these two sacrifices exclusively; so f. i. the mantra “indrāgni idam havir ajushtēm atīrīdhe-tām maho jyāvo’krātām” which by the word “indrāgni” is shown not to be applicable to the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice. It might however be maintained that it is sufficient to leave out the one word “indrāgni” and that then the remainder of the mantra is to be used at the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice too, with which it is connected by prakaraṇa. This opinion however is impugned by the Mīmāṁsists who maintain that the syntactical connexion binding “indrāgni” to the remainder of the mantra is stronger than prakaraṇa and that consequently the whole mantra has to be left out at the pūrṇa-māsa-sacrifice.)

Prakaraṇa means interdependence (ubhayākāṅkṣā; mutual desire; mutual want of a complement). An example is afforded by the following passage connected with the prayājas “he is to offer the samidh”. As in this passage no special fruit (of the offering) is mentioned, the sense merely being “he is to realize by means of offering the samidh”, there arises the question “what (is he to realize?)” originating in the want of something to which the offering of the samidh might contribute. And again after the passage about the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice has given rise to the idea “he is to realize paradise by means of the darśapūrṇamāsa” there arises the question “how (is he to realize paradise?)” originating in the want of something which may contribute towards bringing about the desired result. And thus by mutual interdependence the subsidiary relation in which the prayājas stand to the darśapūrṇamāsa is established.—This prakaraṇa is of two kinds, great prakaraṇa (mahāprakaraṇa) and included prakaraṇa (avāntara-prakaraṇa). By the former is to be understood that kind of prakaraṇa which refers to the principal bhāvanā (i.e. the energy productive of the fruit of the entire sacrificial action). This great prakaraṇa establishes f.i. the subsidiary relation in which the prayājas etc.
stand to the daśapūrṇamāsa. Great prakāraṇa takes place with reference to the fundamental forms (prakriti) of the sacrifice only, as there only the relation of interdependence or mutual want is found (viz. if a fundamental form of the sacrifice is enjoined there arises at once the want of subsidiaries by means of which the sacrifice can be accomplished; at the same time statements regarding subsidiaries give rise to the question to what sacrifice these subsidiaries belong). The case is different with regard to the modifications (of the fundamental forms). For there, by the principle of transfer expressed in the words "a modification is to be carried out in the same manner as its fundamental form" the want of something indicating how the action is to be performed is already satisfied and it is therefore impossible that the proper application of the new subsidiaries should be settled by interdependence (there being in this case no mutual want, but a want on one side only viz. on the side of the subsidiaries). Therefore the application of the new subsidiaries is in the case of a modification settled by place (stāma) only, not by prakāraṇa.—By included prakāraṇa is to be understood prakāraṇa connected with the creative energy belonging to the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice. Included prakāraṇa i.e. establishes the subsidiary relation in which the act of stepping forward (abhidhānaṇa) stands to the oblations called praṇājas. Prakāraṇa of this kind is only known by the circumstance of an injunction being inserted in the middle of two others (sandamśa; the inserted injunction being grasped as it were by the two encompassing injunctions as by the two limbs of a pair of tongs). For if the position or position is not found all the subsidiaries mentioned (among them the stepping forward) would be taken as expressing the mode of action of the energy productive of the general result (of the sacrifice) and would then be subsidiary to the principal action (as the praṇājas are). By the term sandamśa is to be understood the position of an injunction between two subsidiaries enjoined with reference to one subsidiary. An example is furnished by the act of advancing (towards the āhavanīya; which forms a part of the sacrificial action of offering the praṇājas). For

(. Atāśva in this context means simply "new", the subsidiaries which do not belong to the prakṛti but to the vikṛti only.)
there at first a matter subsidiary to the prâyâjas is mentioned in the words "he is to pour (the butter) out of the upabhrit (into the jhûhû); for splendour etc."; (after that comes the passage "he for whom knowing this the prâyâjas are offered pushes his enemies out of these worlds; stepping forward he is to offer them for victory"); and after this passage again a matter subsidiary to the prâyâjas is enjoined in the words "he who knows the coupling of the prâyâjas etc". For this reason the stepping forward which is mentioned in the middle of two things subsidiary to the prâyâjas is to be considered as itself subsidiary to the latter.\(^{(1)}\) For after the idea has arisen that a contribution towards the sacrifice is to be made by means of bringing about a transcendental result by the prâyâjas, there arises the question "how is the transcendental result to be brought about by means of the prâyâjas?" and this want of something teaching the mode of action is satisfied by the stepping forward etc which actions are enjoined in the middle of matters subsidiary to the prâyâjas. Nor can the objection be raised that the productive energy connected with the subsidiaries does not stand in need of a mode of action being pointed out; for such a need actually exists this particular kind of productive energy participating in the general nature of productive energy.

Prakarṣaṇa directly teaches the application of actions only, and only by means of the latter the application of materials, qualities (which are connected with the actions). When e.g. with regard to the energy tending towards the realization of a certain fruit expressed in the passage "he who desires paradise is to sacrifice" the want of some mode how to bring about the result arises we have to take the set of actions which are mentioned in the sacred text in proximity to the above passage and with regard to which no fruit is mentioned (for if some special fruit were mentioned the set of actions could no longer be considered subsidiary to some other action); this set of actions which stands itself in need of something towards which it might contribute is to be connected with the above passage as indicating the mode of action.

\(^{(1)}\) For a different argumentation with regard to the same passage see J. N. M. V., p. 100.—The practical issue of the decision is that only the person concerned with the prâyâjas has to step forward and not all those engaged in the daśāpāṇamāśa.
That actions only can satisfy the want of the mode of procedure is a matter of common experience. For if with regard to sentences like "the hand is to cleave by means of the axe" the question is asked "how is the cleeving performed?" the proper answer does not lie in the word "hand" although enunciated, but rather in the raising and lowering of the axe, the sense being "he is to cleeve by raising and lowering the axe by means of the hand"; and thus the hand is connected with the act of cleeving only by means of the raising and lowering as is known to every body.

Prakaraṇa has greater weight than position (sthāna) and the following means of proof. For this reason the acts like diceing etc., which are enjoined in the passage "he is to play at dice with a Rājanya" are, although they are read in the holy text in proximity to the abhishekaṇa-ceremony and therefore would on the ground of position be subsidiary to the latter, in reality subsidiary to the rājasāya-sacrifice on the ground of prakaraṇa.

By position (sthāna) is to be understood equality of place. It is of two kinds, being either equality of place according to the text (pāthasādeśya) or equality of place according to the performance (anuśthāṇa-sādeśya). The term "krama" (order of succession) has the same meaning as sthāna (position).

Equality of place according to the text again is of two different kinds, being either text according to number or else text according to proximity.

An example of text according to number is offered by the following passages: "he spreads a cake on eleven potsherds to Indrāgni" and "he spreads a cake on twelve potsherds to Vrīvānara". With regard to these passages which are found in the text in the given order the application of the vājya and anuvākya mantras (indrāgni rochana-dīvah etc.) is settled according to "text according to number" i.e. the first mantra is applied to the first sacrificial action, the second mantra to the second action. For if with regard to the mantra read in the first place the question arises "to what purpose does it serve?", the sacrificial action enjoined in the first place presents itself first as they both occupy corresponding places. And so with regard to the second mantra also.—That things subsidiary to a modification, which things are enjoined with refer-
ence to subsidiaries of a fundamental form and stand in the middle of two injunctions, belong to the modification is to be concluded from "text according to proximity." So f. i. in the case of the oblations called ámanahomas (Taitt. S. II. 3. 9). For as with regard to them the want of something to which they may refer arises, the transcendental result consequent on a certain modified form of the sacrifice naturally connects itself as fruit (with these oblations), because this modified form readily presents itself (the modified form of the sacrifice which is mentioned in the holy text close by the ámanahomas is the kánvyeshtī the originate injunction of which is contained in the words "vaiśvadeviṁ sāṅgrahānīṁ nirvaped grāmakāmāh").—If on the other hand (instead of the named oblations being considered subsidiary to a certain modification) an independent fruit were assumed for them (they being considered to produce a special apūrya of their own) their being mentioned in the sacred text in immediate proximity to some modified form would be purposeless—

Equality of place according to the performance shows f. i. that the different details stated with regard to the sacrificial animal refer to the animal sacrificed to Agniḥomanau: for the sacrifice of the animal offered to Agniḥomanau is performed on the anuvasa-thya day and on the same day (i.e. among the description of the ceremonies to be performed on that day) the details concerning the animal sacrifice are stated. And as now there arises the want of something towards which these details might contribute the transcendental result produced by the animal sacrifice which presents itself as something to be achieved naturally connects itself as that which is to be realized (by means of these details).—Position (sthāna) is of greater weight than samākhya (name). For this reason the mantra about purification (śundhadhyām daivyāya karmāṇe etc.) stands in subsidiary relation to the sāmāvyā-vessel only as it is read in proximity to these vessels, and does not on account of the title "pauroḍāśikam" (i.e. referring to the sacrificial cake; the name of that chapter which treats of the offering of the sacrificial cake) stand in subsidiary relation to all the vessels connected with the sacrificial cake.

By "name" (samākhya) are to be understood words the meaning of
which is found by decomposing them into their elements (yangikah šabdaḥ).—It is of two kinds belonging either to the language of the Veda or to common language. An example of the former kind is furnished by the vedic term “hotrichamasah”, from which we conclude that the hotri stands in subsidiary relation to the drinking of (the contents of) the cup called chamasa. (The term “chamasa” which has to be derived from the root cham “to sip” and signifies the cup from which the soma is drunk shows that the soma contained in the cup is to be drunk by the hotri; for which circumstance a more direct rule is not given). The word “ādhvaryava” on the other hand which belongs to common language points out that the adhvaryu stands in subsidiary relation to different things (mentioned in the adhvaryava kāṇḍa.)\(^{(1)}\) This is a short statement of the power of samākhya.

Thus we have shortly explained the six means of proof, direct enunciation etc., assisted by which injunctions of application—as f. i. he is to offer the darsapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice contributing towards it with the samidhis etc.—teach the proper application of subsidiary matters. These subsidiaries are of two kinds being either accomplished things or actions. By accomplished things we understand species (jāti), substances (dravya), numbers (samkhya) etc.\(^{(2)}\) All these have a visible purpose only. Subsidiary actions are again of two different kinds, being either secondary (guṇakarma) or primary (pradhānakarma). These same two classes of actions are also called actions contributing (towards the general result of the sacrifice) through an intermediate step (sammipatyopakāraka) and actions contributing (towards the general result) immediately or directly (ārādupakāraka). By actions of the former kind we understand actions enjoined with reference to some substance etc. which latter is itself subsidiary to some other action. Of this kind are f. i. the beating of the rice-grains (in order to detach them from the husks), sprinkling with water etc. These actions

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\(^{(1)}\) By “common language” we have to understand the technical terms used by the yajnikas, in so far as they are not found in the text of the Veda itself.

\(^{(2)}\) Species as f. i. the generic character of an animal which is offered as a sacrifice; substances like rice-grains etc.; number as f. i. the singularity, duality etc. of the things used for the sacrifice—All these contribute towards the accomplishment of the svaṟūpa, the outward form of the sacrifice.
are either such as have a seen effect or such as have an unseen effect or such as have a seen as well as an unseen effect. To the first class belongs f. i. the beating of the rice-grains (the effect of which is their being detached from the husks); to the second class belongs f. i. the sprinkling with water (which does not produce a visible effect on the rice-grains); to the third class belong (the actions referring to) the animal, the sacrificial cake etc., for these actions produce an unseen result in as far as they comprise the offering of a certain material (viz. the material offered in the sacrifice), while at the same time in as far as they are performed with regard to a certain divinity they produce a visible result viz. the remembrance of the divinity.(1) By an action contributing directly (ārādupakāraka) we understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc. As f. i. the prayājas. Such actions are of use only in originating the highest transcendental result (paramāpūrva; the transcendental result produced by the sacrificial action in its totality); while the actions contributing through an intermediate step are of use also for the outward form of the sacrifice by means of their producing a modification (samskāra) of the material of the sacrifice and of the divinity (whereby they produce the so-called utpatty-apūrva).(2) The same kind of actions are also called inherent actions (āśrayikarma; viz. inherent in some substance, divinity etc.).—Herewith we have given a short account of the injunctions of application.

Prayoga-vidhi, injunction of performance, is that injunction which intimates speediness of performance. This kind of injunction (is not a separate one, there being no passages which are merely prayogavidhi and nothing else but) consists simply in the injunction of the main sacrificial action (as f. i. “he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the dāśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice”)

(1) For the sacrifice is the parting with a certain substance (dravyayāca) with a view to—or aiming at—a certain divinity (devatoddēśeṇa).—Regarding the relation of the different kinds of actions to the apūrva cp. J. N. M. V. p. 57.

(2) On the different kinds of apūrva see—in addition to J. N. M. V. p. 57—the instructive article अपृव्य in Goldstücker’s Sanskrit Dictionary. It is however hardly correct to render “apūrva”, as G. does, by “the unseen or transcendental power of a religious or sacrificial act which produces the desired result at another time etc.”; for apūrva is not the power of producing a result but a result itself.
which forms one syntactical whole with the sentences enjoining subsidiary things (the prayājas etc.); for this (injunction of the main action etc.) causing the execution of the main action with all its subsidiaries enjoins speediness of the performance which latter expression means as much as absence of delay (or pause), as there is no special means of proof for delay. Nor must it be objected that there also is no special means of proof for the absence of delay. For if (the things enjoined in the different injunctions were to be done) with delay, they could not be done connectedly (together; saha) and that they are to be done connectedly is understood from the circumstance of the injunctions referring to the chief action and its subsidiaries forming one syntactical whole. Just as we see that in common life two things which are done with delay (as f. i. the one thing to-day the other to-morrow) are never said to be done “together” (or “connectedly”). This absence of delay is obtained when a fixed order is followed: for otherwise there arise doubts regarding the order of consecution of the different actions and the whole performance is spoiled. Therefore an injunction of performance enjoins, for the purpose of bringing about speediness of the performance of what it enjoins, at the same time a fixed order which order is to be taken as a special attribute of the things enjoined (if it were not taken as a mere attribute of the things enjoined but as an independent thing the prayogavidhi would be open to the reproach of vākyabheda). For this reason “injunction of performance” is also defined as that injunction which teaches the order of the subsidiaries. By “order” (krama) we understand a particular kind of extension or rather (extension being applicable to coexistent things too) the relation of (different things) being earlier and later with regard to each other. For settling this order of succession (of different actions) we have six means of proof, viz direct enunciation (sruti), sense (artha), text (pātha), position (sthāna), principal matter (mukhya), procedure (pravṛtti). By direct enunciation (sruti) we understand any passage whose purport it is to intimate order of succession. It is of two kinds, having either the purport of intimating merely order of succession or the purport of intimating something particulariz-
ed by order of succession. An example of the former kind is the passage “having prepared the veda he is to prepare the vedi”; this passage merely has the purport of intimating an order of succession; for the preparation of the vedi is already taught by another passage. (The śruti in the above quoted passage is contained in the suffix kṛvā of kṛitvā—vedam kṛitvā vedim karoti. The passage contains the statement of the relative order of preparation of veda and vedi, in the way of anuvāda to those other passages which have the purpose of enjoining the preparation of the two mentioned things independent of their relative order in time). On the other hand the passage “the first draught belongs to the Vashaṭ-karṭṛ” has the purpose of enjoining a thing (viz. drinking) particularized by a certain order; for it can not be taken as enjoining order only with reference to the drinking because this would involve a break of the unity of syntactical construction. (The passage must be taken as containing information of a double nature as there is no other passage enjoining the act of drinking by the vashaṭ-karṭṛ. It might now be maintained that it enjoins two altogether different things, firstly the drinking, secondly the place of this act with regard to other acts. But as this assumption would involve vákyabheda, it is thought more proper to declare that the passage enjoins only one thing particularized by a second one.—Cp. the analogous case of “somena yajeta”). Direct enunciation has greater weight than the other means of proof, because the latter obtain their authority only by means of a direct statement founded on them being constructed. For this reason the cup devoted to the āśvinan is offered in the tenth place (among the cups offered during the Jyotishṭoma) because there is the direct statement “the cup for the Āśvinan is to be offered as the tenth”; although one might think that is to be offered as the third according to the order in which the cups are mentioned in the sacred text. (Starting from the aindraváyava graha we find the āśvina graha mentioned in the third place, Taitt. S. 1. 4. 6: VI. 4. 9, so that according to pátha it ought to be offered in the third place; but the direct statement contained in the word “tenth” of the passage quoted above is stronger than pátha and settles the order of performance.—The
principle according to which the order of precedence of the different means of proof is determined in the case of krama is the same as the one followed in the case of means of proof assisting vinyoga-vidhi. In the present example f. i. we might, on the ground of the aśvina graha being mentioned in the text in the third place, construct an injunction containing a śrutī viz. "he is to offer the aśvina graha in the third place", the silent presumption being that such an arrangement would not be impossible, not against artha, which latter must be satisfied before we can pass from pātha to śrutī. But this constructed injunction would be met and invalidated by an injunction found ready in the holy text viz. "the cup for the aśvinau is offered in the tenth place"). That order of succession which is settled according to the demands of the purpose (for which different actions are performed) is called order according to the sense. As f. i. the relative order of the agnihotra-offering and the cooking of rice-gruel; to which actions the two passages "he is to offer the agnihotra" and "he is to cook the rice-gruel" refer. For as the rice-gruel serves the purpose of the agnihotra its cooking, according to the demands of the purpose, is to be accomplished first.—This order of succession according to the sense is stronger than order of succession according to the text. For if, the purpose as a means whereby to settle order of succession being set aside, the actions were performed according to the order of the text the cooking of the rice-gruel could merely have an unseen purpose, for if done after the oblation it could not serve any visible purpose. (But this would run counter to the general principle of never assuming an unseen purpose when a visible one can be established; hence the decision. —The order of succession of sentences which intimate certain things is called order of succession according to the text and according to it the order of succession of the things themselves is settled. For the sentences following upon each other in the text in a certain order produce when being read the ideas of the things (of which they treat) in the same order and according to the order of the ideas the order of the execution of the things is settled.—This text (pātha) is twofold, text of the mantras and text of the Brāhmaṇa-passages. The order f. i.
which is settled for the cake offered to Agni and the cake offered to Agnishomaṇi by means of the order in which the yājya and anuvākyya mantras are read in the text, is founded upon mantra-text. (The injunction referring to the agnīshomīya-cake is found in the second anuvāka of the Taṅtirīya-brāhmaṇa, while the passage enjoining the āgneya cake occurs in the third anuvāka. From this it might be concluded that at the fullmoon-sacrifice the agnīshomīya cake is to be offered before the āgneya cake. The order however of the mantras accompanying the two offerings, as found in the mantra-kāṇḍa, establishes the contrary.) Mantra-text is of greater weight than brāhmaṇa-text, because the mantra text is more intimately connected with the actual performance of the sacrifice than the brāhmaṇa-text. For the latter gives to understand that such and such a thing is to be done, outside of the sacrifice (during which the brāhmaṇa-text is not itself of actual use) and has thereby accomplished its purpose. The mantras on the other hand are actually employed at the time of the performance of the sacrifice the order of the performance depending on the order in which the single parts of the performance are remembered and as the order of remembrance again depends on the order of the mantras (whose property it is to remind one), the mantra-text forms an essential part of the performance of the sacrifice.—The order of succession of the prayājas which is derived from the order of the text of certain injunctions (viz. “he offers the samidhs” “he offers tanunapāt” etc.) is based on the order of the brāhmaṇa-text. For although the brāhmaṇa-pasages may be said to have fulfilled their purpose by enjoining a certain thing, nevertheless—in the absence of some other passage pointing out the order of succession of the prayājas etc., the same brāhmaṇa-pasages are to be accepted as pointing out the order of the succession as well. (1)—By “position” (sthāna) is to be understood presentation, presenting one’s self (upasthiti) for if at the place of something (as f. i. in the example given below at the place of the savanīya) something else is performed (as f. i. the ag-

(1) The commentary here takes a different view and maintains, as it appears rightly, that the order of succession of the prayājas is founded on mantra-text, not brāhmaṇa-text.
nishomīya and ānubandhyā in the sacrifice called sādyaskra), that mentioned something (i.e. the savanīya) presents itself first after the thing by which it is regularly preceded (i.e. the āśvinagrahaṇa) has been performed and it is therefore proper that it should be performed first. For this reason in the soma-sacrifice called sādyaskra where the three animal sacrifices viz. the agnīshomīya, the savanīya and the ānubandhyā have to be performed together (i.e. in immediate consecration) in the place of the savanīya (i.e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the fundamental form—the agnīśṭoma—the savanīya alone is offered) the savanīya animal has to be offered first, the two others afterwards, as in that place after the offering of the āśvina cup the savanīya first presents itself to the mind. For to the jyotishṭoma (of which the sādyaskra is a modification) belong three animal sacrifices, the agnīshomīya, the savanīya and the ānubandhyā. These three have different places, the agnīshomīya being offered on the upavasatha-day, the savanīya at the time of the pressing of the soma and the ānubandhyā at the end of the sacrifice. Sādyaskra now is the name of a particular somasacrifice which on account of its indefiniteness (i.e. on account of no special divinity being mentioned with regard to it) is to be considered as a mere modification of the jyotishṭoma. Therefore the three animal sacrifices are established for the sādyaskra also by the original injunction (which establishes them for the prakṛiti-form i.e. the agnīśṭoma and which has to be transferred to the different vikṛitis also). That there they have to be performed together (not on different days) is seen from the direct statement “he offers the animals together.” This common sacrifice of the three animals has to be performed at the place of the savanīya (i.e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the case of the agnīśṭoma the savanīya alone is offered) since that place is near to the principal sacrificial action (of all somasacrifices viz. the pressing of the soma) and since the fault of some of the animal sacrifices being removed from their proper places is the same (on whatever day they may be performed together). For if the three sacrifices are performed at the place of the savanīya, only the agnīshomīya and the ānubandhyā are removed from their proper places; while in the case of the three sacrifices being performed
either on the day of the agníshomîya or on the day of the ánubandhyya all three are removed from their proper places (for if they are performed on the day of the agníshomîya paśu the latter itself can not be said to have its proper place as it thereby is removed from the pressing of the soma proximity to which becomes indispensable as soon as the injunction of all the three sacrifices having to be performed together is observed; the same reasoning if applied to the ánubandhyya-paśu shows that the ánubandhyya-day is not the proper one).\(^{(1)}\) As we now read in the description of the fundamental form (of the sādyaskra i. e. the jyotishtoma) “having done the áśvîna cup and having tied round the sacrificial post with a thrice-twisted string he leads on the savaniya paśu” and thereby see that the sacrifice of the savaniya paśu is enjoined after the taking of the áśvîna cup, the savaniya presents itself to the mind also in the sādyaskra immediately after the taking of the áśvîna cup and thus, according to position (sthāna) it is proper that it should be performed first. The two other animal sacrifices have to be performed after the savaniya in the manner explained (viz. in the first pāda of Adhy. V of the Mīmāṃsā, where the commentators state that the agníshomîya has to precede the ánubandhyya).—By order founded on the principal matter (mukhya) we understand the order of the subsidiary matters belonging to some performance in as far as it is settled by the order of the principal matters. For in whatever order the principal matters are performed in the same order the subsidiary matters belonging to them are performed, since in this manner all subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matters in the same degree. If on the contrary the subsidiary matters were performed in an inverse order (compared with the order of the principal matters) the consequence would be that some subsidiary matters would be

\(^{(1)}\) For the details of the lengthy and unimportant discussion referring to the śṭhānātikramasānyya see the commentary on the Arthasaṃgraha in the lithographed Benares edition (It is to be remarked that the text of the maṇḍ of the passage is very incorrect in the lithographed edition a piece of the commentary having got mixed up with it)—In the Jaun. N. M V. the pradhānasmapratyātmta is the only—and quite sufficient—reason for the three animals being sacrificed on the savyā-day.—In Goistucker’s edition of J. N. M V. p. 224 l. 3 read 'कामान् | तेष.
as near as possible to their principal matters and others again as far away as possible; and this would of course be improper, as it would interfere with the connectedness of actions intimated by the injunction of performance. Therefore the order of succession of the principal things determines the order of the subsidiaries as well. Thus f. i. a part of the (ghee which is the) remainder of the prayājas is at first poured over the oblation to Agni and after that another portion over the sour milk offered to Indra, because the sacrifice to Agni precedes in time the sacrifice to Indra. In this manner the two acts of pouring ghee are separated from the principal actions to which they belong (viz. the offering of the two oblations) in the same manner viz. by one intervening act (1. pouring of ghee on the āgneya oblation 2. pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation 3. offering of the āgneya 4. offering of the aindra); while in the case of the reverse order being adopted for the pouring of ghee the pouring of ghee on the āgneya and the offering of the āgneya would follow on each other immediately and on the other hand the pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation and the offering of the aindra oblation would be separated from each other by two intervening acts (viz. the pouring of ghee on the āgneya and the offering of the āgneya); and this, as already remarked, would be improper. Order founded on the principal matter is weaker than order according to the text (pāṭhakrama); for the former determines the order (of the sacrificial acts) in a retarded manner only because it depends on the determination of the order of the principal actions which determination itself depends on some other means of proof. Order according to the text on the other hand is of a different kind as it merely depends on the order of the text as it is found in the Veda, which latter order is independent of anything else; it is therefore of greater weight.—On the other hand it is of greater authority than order founded on procedure (pravṛitti); for in the case of order founded on procedure many subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matter while they are near to it in the case of mukhya krama (about pravṛitti-krama see further on).

If in the case of several principal matters (or actions) being performed together and the subsidiary actions connected with
them having to be performed seriatim, the order of succession of the second, third etc. subsidiary actions is regulated according to the order of the subsidiary action performed first, that order of succession is called order according to procedure (pravṛtti). So f. i. in the case of the subsidiary actions connected with the animal sacrifices offered to Prajāpati (during the vājapeya where seventeen animals are offered to Prajāpati), with regard to which we read "having offered the vaiśvadeva oblation they proceed with the animals for Prajāpati". In this sentence the animals meant for Prajāpati are, as pointed out by the third case termination, enjoined, together with the actions constituting the mode of procedure, as having to be offered at one time. Consequently they (the sacrifices of the animals) as well as the subsidiary actions connected therewith as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. (of the victims) have to be performed together (or connectedly, saha). This performing together becomes, with regard to (the actual sacrifice of) the prajāpatya animals, possible by performing the actual sacrifice (of all of them) at the same time as one divinity (viz. Prajāpati) is fixed (for all of them).(1) On the other hand it is impossible to perform all the subsidiary actions as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. at the same time and the only method of performing them together is therefore to perform them in such a manner as to separate the subsidiary actions to the least possible degree from the principal actions. For this end one performs at first the leading on of one animal and after that the leading on of the second and follows the same order with regard to the tying to the post etc. And thus selecting from among the animals about to be offered to Prajāpati a certain one, one begins with it and performs the same subsidiary action with regard to all animals; after this one performs the second subsidiary action on the same animal on which the first one had been performed and again proceeds following the same order with regard to all other animals. The order of succession determined according to this principle is called order of succession according

(1) The Comm. remarks that another reading is "sampratipanna-devavatikālatvena", and that the time meant is the time after the performance of the vaiśvadevi while the divinity is Prajāpati.
to procedure. It is of less weight than order of succession found-
ed on direct statement etc.—Herewith we have given a short ac-
count of injunction of performance by defining the six different
kinds of order of succession.

By injunction of claim or qualification (adhibhūravidhi) we un-
derstand that kind of injunction which intimates the ownership
with regard to some result which is brought about by some action.
By "ownership" we understand the position of one who enjoys the
result.—To this class of injunctions belongs f. i. the passage "he
who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice"; which passage while
it enjoins the sacrifice with regard to paradise intimates the state
of enjoyment of the result consequent on the sacrificial action by
him who is desirous of paradise.—Another example is the passage
"he whose houses Agni should burn down after he has construct-
ed the holy fires, is to offer to the merciful Agni a cake on eight
potsherds." This passage enjoining a certain sacrificial action on
the occasion of a conflagration etc. intimates the ownership of
him who acts on the mentioned occasion with regard to a result
which consists in averting a calamity and which is produced by the
sacrificial action.—In the same way the passage "he is daily to
perform the sandhyā" intimates the ownership of him who leads
a pure life, observing the proper times for all his duties, with regard
to a fruit viz. the avoidance of disaster which ensues on the proper
performance of the sandhyā.

This kind of ownership with regard to some result belongs
to him only who is distinguished by the necessary qualifica-
tion (adhibhūra). By qualification we understand that which,
in the passages containing injunctions, is mentioned as a dis-
tinguishing attribute of the person (whom the injunction con-
cerns). This is, in the case of those sacrifices which are per-
formed for the fulfillment of a certain wish, the wish for the
particular result; in the case of the sacrifices performed on a
special occasion the ascertainment of the occasion; in the case of
acts of permanent obligation as f. i. the performance of the san-
dhyā the circumstance of the man leading a pure life and observing
the proper times for all his duties. For this reason too the pass-
age "a king who is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world
is to perform the rājasūya-sacrifice” notwithstanding its enjoin-
ing (the rājasūya) with a view to the kingship of the heavenly
world does not intimate that the enjoyment of the result will be
obtained by any one who desires the kingship of the heavenly
world, but only by him who being at the same time a king is de-
sirous of the kingship of the heavenly world; for the passage con-
tains a clear statement of the kingly dignity being a necessary at-
tribute of the qualified person.—Sometimes a necessary attribute
of the qualified person is to be understood although it may not be
directly stated as an attribute of the person. This is the case f. i.
with regard to the knowledge dependent on the injunction enforce-
ing the study of the Veda. (This knowledge is a necessary quali-
fication for any one who wishes to perform sacrifices,) since all
the injunctions of sacrifices as they require a knowledge of the
matters (used in the sacrifice) are given for those only who have
acquired a knowledge of these matters in consequence of comply-
ing with the injunction inculcating the study of the Veda. In the
same manner the quality of being provided with the sacred fires—
which quality is obtained by the first construction of the fires—is
a necessary qualification for all sacrificial acts which are to be
effected by means of the holy fires; for as all these sacrifices can
not be performed without the fires the injunctions prescribing
them can be given for those only who by the construction of the
fires have acquired the attribute of being owners of the sacred
fires. In the same manner capability (to perform the duty is an
understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those
who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power
etc.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the
words “power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-
operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense” (the verbs al-
though possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not
able to understand it.)—Herewith we close the discussion of that
part of the Veda which is denoted by the name “Injunction”.

“Mantras” serve to recall to memory the matters connected with
the sacrificial performance. By this their property of recalling to
memory the matters mentioned they have a purpose and it is not
to be supposed that their enunciation merely tends to produce
some unseen result, as it would be improper to assume merely an unseen result while a visible result (in this case the circumstance of the performer of the sacrifice being reminded of certain things) exists. Nor can it be maintained that the recitation of the mantras is purposeless because the visible end of reminding one of certain things can be obtained by other means also (as f. i. by the brâhmana-passages of the Veda which would point out the divinities etc. of the sacrifice even without being combined with the mantra-passages); for (the exclusive use of the mantras for the purpose) is founded on an injunction of a necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi) according to which the mentioned matters are to be recalled to memory by means of the mantras only (not by any other means). By an injunction of necessary arrangement is to be understood an injunction which, in the case of one particular instrument being established (by some other means of proof) with regard to an action which can be performed by various instruments, establishes the use of some other instrument which is not yet established (by other means of proof). As it is said “An injunction takes place when something is absolutely non-established; an injunction of necessary arrangement when one alternative is already established; when both alternatives are already established, (the injunction required) is called limitation (parisamkhya).” The sense of this passage is as follows.—That kind of injunction which establishes something not established by any other means of proof is called an injunction of something new (apurva-vidhi) (or simply “injunction” as in the quoted sloka). Such an injunction is contained f. i. in the passage “he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice”; for it enjoins a sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining paradise which is not established by any other means of proof.—That kind of injunction which establishes something that is partially (i.e. on certain occasions) non-established is called an injunction of necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi); as f. i. the passage “he is to beat the rice-grains.” If it is asked how this passage can be said to establish something partially non-established, we answer: in the following manner. The passage does not intimate that the beating of the rice-grains has the effect of clearing them from the husks; (for a special passage intimating this would be altogether unnecessary)
as that circumstance is well known from positive and negative instances (it being a matter of common observation that the rice-grains if beaten are freed from their husks while the husks remain attached to the grains when the latter are not beaten). But the passage has the purpose of a niyama whereby is to be understood the supplying of a part (hitherto) non-established. For as the freeing of the grains from the husks can be effected by more than one means, one might leave aside the beating and begin to make use of some other means (f. i. of the finger-nails); for this case now the beating being non-established the above quoted injunction effects the supplying of the non-established part, viz. the injunction of the beating. Thus in a so-called injunction of niyama the purport of the sentence is a necessary arrangement which consists in a non-established part being supplied. And this (in the quoted example) means as much as the injunction of the partially non-established beating of the rice-grains.—That kind of injunction which has the purpose of excluding one of two alternatives both of which are established by some other means is called injunction of limitation (parisamkhya-vidhi). As f. i. the passage "five animals from among the animals having five nails may be eaten (are lawful for food)" This passage has not the purpose of establishing the eating of animals having five nails (is therefore not an apúrva-vidhi), as their being used for food is already established (without any special rule) by the natural appetite of man. Nor has it the purpose of a necessary arrangement, as the eating of animals having five nails and the eating of animals not having five nails is established simultaneously (the two not excluding each other) and it can therefore not be said that the eating of animals having five nails is partially non-established. For these reasons the purpose of the passage must be to exclude the eating of animals not having five nails and it therefore is an injunction of limitation. Injunctions of this kind are of two different kinds, the limitation being either directly stated (śranta) or implied (lákshānīka). An example of the former kind is afforded by the passage "for there only they sing"; for here the (directly enunciated) word "only" intimates the exclusion of all stotras except the pavaná. An example of implied limitation is afforded by the mentioned
passage "five animals having five nails may be eaten"; for this passage does not contain any word which directly expresses the exclusion of other animals. For this reason merely implied limitation must be admitted to be affected with three different imperfections. These are firstly, setting aside of what is directly mentioned (in favour of something implied only), secondly assumption of something which is not directly stated and thirdly rejection of something already established (by other means). As is said in the śloka "on account of setting aside the matter directly stated and assuming a matter not directly stated and rejecting something established limitation is affected with three vices." (In the quoted passage the details of the three shortcomings are as follows). The thing directly stated which is to be set aside is the eating of animals with five nails. The matter not directly stated which is to be assumed is the exclusion of the eating of animals not having five nails. And the matter already established which is rejected is the eating of animals not having five nails (the means by which it is established being man's natural appetite). Two of these three imperfections lie merely in the words while the rejection of something established lies in the matter itself.

(Finally it must be remarked that) Those mantras which do not possess the power of reminding one of the things connected with the sacrificial performance must, since no other alternative is left, be assumed to contribute towards the unseen result by the mere circumstance of their being uttered and they are therefore not purposeless.

"Names" (as forming one of the constituent parts of the Veda) have a purpose by their defining (or limiting) the matter enjoined. So f. i. the word "uddhidā" in the passage "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhīd (i. e. is to perform the sacrifice called udbhīd)." In this passage the word "uddhidā" is the name of a sacrifice and effects the limitation of the matter (the sacrifice) enjoined. This is to be understood as follows. The passage by pointing out a certain result enjoins a sacrifice not established elsewhere. As it does not enjoin sacrifices in general (that it does not do this is shown by the fact of a special result being mentioned) it must be assumed to enjoin a special sacrifice. If now the
question arises what special sacrifice is meant, we learn from the word “udbhid” that the sacrifice called udbhid is intended. Udbhidá taken as a name fits into the sentence by means of the relation of inhering in the same abode or coordination (sámánádhikar-anya), the sense of the whole passage being “he is to realize cattle by means of udbhid the sacrifice” (in which sentence the two words “udbhidá” and “yágena” are coordinate).—That certain words found in the Veda have to be considered as names appears from one or the other of four reasons 1. from the danger of possessive indication 2. from the danger of split of the sentence 3. on account of another scriptural passage declaring it 4. on account of the comparison with it (for the details of which reasons see the following).

In the passage already quoted viz. “he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid” the word “udbhidá” must be assumed to be the name of a sacrifice on account of the danger of possessive indication. This appears from the following reasoning. (If udbhid did not denote a particular sacrifice, the only other alternative would be to assume that it denotes a certain instrument by means of which the sacrifice is performed; an explanation which might appear to be founded on the etymology of the word.—But then the following difficulties present themselves) in the first place it is not proper to suppose that the passage contains the injunction of the sacrifice with a view to the result and at the same time the injunction of some secondary matter (an instrument) with a view to the sacrifice; for this assumption would involve a split of the sentence (two different matters being enjoined in one sentence). In the second place (if somebody should propose an other explanation free from the mentioned defect) if the word “udbhidá” is supposed to express merely a secondary matter (an instrument) it would have to be said—as the sacrifice itself is not established by any other passage—that the passage enjoins a sacrificial action distinguished by a certain secondary matter, so that the sense would be “he is to realize cattle by means of a sacrifice distinguished by the udbhid.” But in all such injunctions of sacrifices distinguished by some secondary matter the assumption of possessive indication has to be made, as already explained. (It is therefore preferable to take udbhid as the name of a certain sacrifice).
sacrifices (not as denoting secondary matters) on account of another scriptural passage declaratory of it.

In the passage "he is to sacrifice attacking with the śyena" the word śyena is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice (and not as denoting the material of the sacrifice) on account of "the comparison with it (on account of the comparison of the sacrificial act with a falcon, which comparison is contained in an arthavāda-passage) as this comparison can not take place in any other way (but on the assumption of śyena denoting a certain sacrifice). This appears from the following reasoning. Whatever is enjoined (in an injunction) is glorified (in the corresponding arthavāda-passage). If now the injunction was meant to enjoin the falcon (as the material of the sacrifice), the arthavāda-passages would have to contain a praise of the falcon. But the arthavāda-passage "for as the falcon swooping down seizes his prey thus he (the sacrificer) swooping down seizes his hating enemy" can not be used as a praise of the falcon as it clearly effects the praise of something else by means of comparing it to a falcon. Nor can the falcon be praised by its being compared to itself, as in each comparison the quality of being that to which something is compared and the quality of being that which is compared to something reside in different things.—If on the contrary the passage enjoins a sacrifice named śyena then the arthavāda-passage is able to effect the praise of the sacrifice by comparing it to a falcon. Thus the word śyena must be taken as denoting a sacrifice on account of the "comparison with it."

(In addition to these four determining reasons which oblige us to explain certain words as names of sacrifices) Some assume a fifth determining reason of this kind viz. the greater weight of the secondary matter as taught in the originative injunction (utpatti). As an example of this they quote the passage "he is to sacrifice with the vaiśvadeva" and declare that the word "vaiśvadeva" is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice and is not meant to enjoin the Viśve-devas as the divinities of the sacrifice, on account of the greater weight of the divinities Agni etc., which are already enjoined by the originative injunctions referring to this sacrifice (which are contained in the passage "āgneyam asḥatakāpālam nir-
vapati, sanmyam charum etc").—But in reality (it is unnecessary to assume this fifth determining reason) as the circumstance of “vaśvadeva” being a name already follows from the third of the four reasons detailed above. For with regard to the sacrifice under consideration there is found a statement, in the shape of an artha-váda which establishes the Viśvedevas as a secondary matter, viz. “that all the gods (viśvedevás) sacrificed together that is the viśvedeva-quality of the vaśvadeva.” (It therefore appears that the passage quoted above has not the purpose of pointing out the Viśvedevas as the divinity of the sacrifice and consequently the word “vaśvadeva” is to be taken as a name).

By prohibition (nishedha) we understand sentences turning off man (from some action); for the purpose of sentences of prohibition lies exclusively in their effecting (man’s) turning away from actions which would be the cause of some disadvantage. The details are as follows. In the same manner as an injunction conveying an instigation in order to give effect to its instigatory power intimates that the thing enjoined f. i. the sacrifice is the instrument for obtaining some desired result and thereby instigates the person towards it, in the same manner a prohibitory passage as f. i. “he is not to eat kalanāja” conveying the idea of turning off (from some action) in order to give effect to its power of turning off intimates that the thing prohibited as f. i. the eating of kalanāja is the instrument of bringing about some highly undesirable result and thereby turns man off from it. If it is now asked how a prohibitory sentence conveys the idea of turning off from something, we answer as follows. The sense of the word “not” is not connected with the sense of the root (of the verb in the prohibitory passage); for although the two words stand in immediate proximity the sense of the root presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the actual creative energy (árthi bhávaná) which is expressed by the suffix (of words like bhakshayet). For something which presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to one thing can not be connected with something else. Otherwise in the sentence “bring the king’s man” (lit. the king-man, rájapurusha) the king himself would enter into relation with the action (while in reality the king only stands in relation to his servant, the
latter in his turn being the object of the action expressed by "bring"). Therefore the sense of the word "not" stands in relation to the sense of the suffix only and here again not to the árthi bhávaná which is expressed by that element (of the suffix) which denotes the verb—for the árthi bhávaná presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the instigation expressed by that element which denotes the optative—but to the verbal bhávaná denoted by the optative element of the suffix, the verbal bhávaná occupying the chief position of all. Thus the nature of the word "not" is to intimate the thing opposite to the thing with which it (the word "not")) is logically connected. As in the sentence "the jar is not" the word "not" standing in connexion with the word "is" intimates the non-existence of the jar which is the opposite to the jar's existence, in the same way here (in prohibitory passages) the word "not" standing in connexion with the optative exclusively intimates the turning-off (from some action) which is the opposite to an instigation towards what is expressed by the optative. For as on hearing an injunctive sentence a person has the idea "that one (the speaker) instigates me", a person on hearing a prohibitory sentence has the conception of a turning off i.e. of an energy tending to produce in him (the hearer) a cessation of activity; which idea may be expressed in the sentence "he is turning me off." Therefore in the case of a prohibitory sentence the exclusive sense of the passage is a turning off.

Where there is however an obstacle in the way of the word "not" being connected with what is expressed by the verbal suffix, it is connected exclusively with what is expressed by the root itself. Such obstacles are of two kinds 1. the beginning with the phrase "his vowed observances are as follows" and 2. the contingent probability of a vikalpa (option).

An example of the former kind is f. i found in the following passage "he is not to look at the rising Sun" as this sentence is read after a commencement has been made with the words "his vowed observances are as follows." For this reason a paryudáśa (not a pratisedhá) is to be assumed here. For as the word...

(1) In the case of "not" being connected with the kriyá the sentence is called a pratisedhá, while it is termed a paryudáśa if the "not" negatives a náman or the
“vrata” (vow or vowed observance) has the settled meaning of something which is to be done, the clause “his vowed observances are as follows” begins the enumeration of the vowed observances of the Snātaka as things to be done. If now the question arises “what are the things to be done?”, sentences like “he is not to look at the rising sun” must be taken as intimating something to be done. Otherwise the syntactical unity of the former and latter sentences would be destroyed. Thus the sense of the verbal suffix is not to be considered as connected with the sense of the word “not”, as in that case the passage could not be understood as expressing a thing to be done. For a “not” of that kind (i.e. a “not” connected with the sense of the verbal suffix) would express only a turning away (from some action) which is the contrary of the instigation conveyed by an injunction; and such a turning away does not express something to be done. Therefore in the sentence “he is not to look at the rising sun” the word “not” expresses by indication (lakṣāṇā) the vow of not-looking which is the opposite of what is expressed by the root (in īkṣṣeta); for not-looking may be taken as something to be done. So that the whole sentence has to be explained as follows “he is to effect (bhāvayet) by means of the resolution of not-looking which (resolution) has for its object the sun. And if it is asked “what is he to effect thereby?” the destruction of evil which is intimated by the complementary sentence “from so much sin he becomes separated” connects itself (with the bhāvanā) as the thing to be effected. And in this manner the syntactical unity of the former and the latter sentences (which was spoken of above) is established.—Nor must here the objection be raised that there is no reason for the resolution of not-looking only being connected with the bhāvanā as there are different other things which are opposite to the sense of the root; for these different other things are not things (or “the things”) to be done and can therefore in the case under consideration not be connected with the bhāvanā.\(^{(1)}\)

dhātvartha, in which cases the “na” might be replaced by the “a” of a compound word as “abhrīhama.

\(^{(1)}\) The commentary on this passage runs as follows: But as many things might be done contrary to the looking which is the sense of the root how is it that with regard
The second (kind of obstacle to the negative particle being connected with the verb) applies to passages as the following one "he is to say ye yajámahe at (the beginning of) all vájyás, not at the anyújášas." For here too we must assume a prohibition of the kind called paryudása as otherwise there would be the probability of an option (optional procedure, vikalpa). The reason for this is as follows. If in the quoted passage the verbal suffix were connected with what is expressed by the particle "not", the mantra "ye yajámahe" would be prohibited in the case of the anyújášas, the sense being "at the anyújášas he is not to say ye yajámahe." But a prohibition (pratishectha) must be preceded by an establishment (by some means or other, of what is prohibited) as only a matter previously established can be prohibited. This establishment can only be found in the scriptural passage "he is to say ye yajámahe at the vájyás" (for there is no other means by which the employment of this mantra could be established). But if something previously established by a scriptural passage is prohibited, (by another scriptural passage) only option (vikalpa) can take place and not complete sublation (bádha) (of the former passage by the latter) because the scriptural passage on which it (i.e. the employment of the mantra) bases is not capable of complete sublation by means of another scriptural passage as this is the case with passion forming the base of the establishment (of some act).—Passion may instigate a man to the murder of a Bráhmana which latter act is therefore said to be established by passion; here however scriptural passages like "a bráhmana is not to be killed" step in
and by their superior authority completely sublate the dictates of passion. On the other hand one scriptural passage can not completely sublate another as it has no claims to superior authority).—Nor must it be objected that as the general scriptural passage "the oblation is made into the áhavanīya-fire" is sublated by the special passage "he is to make the oblation on the foot-print", in the same way the passage "not at the anuyājas" sublates the preceding passage "he says ye yajámahe at the yájyás"; for only such scriptural passages as are independent of each other stand in the relation of that which is sublated and that which sublates. For the quoted passage about the homa to be made on the footprint does not, in order to enjoin its purport, stand in need of the passage about the áhavanīya and is therefore independent. But in the case under consideration the prohibitory passage (na anuyájeshu) stands, in order that the thing to be prohibited may be established, in need of the preceding passage "he is to say the ye yajámahe at the yájyás" and is therefore not independent. For this reason in the case of a thing enjoined by one scriptural passage being prohibited by another only option (vikalpa) is possible (and not complete sublation of one rule by another). But to assume option is not proper, because its consequence is the partial non-authoritative of scriptural passages. For if the ye-yajámahe is employed with the anuyájas the authoritative of the clause "not with the anuyájas" is not upheld, in the same way as the authoritative of the passage enjoining the use of barley for the sacrifice is not upheld when the sacrifice is performed with rice. Moreover the assumption of vikalpa would involve the assumption of a double unseen result as the injunction as well as the prohibition are for the benefit of man (purushártha.—The employment or non-employment of the ye-yajámahe do not contribute anything towards the svarúpa of the sacrifice, are not kratvartha; an adrishta has therefore to be assumed as the result of each). For these reasons the passage under consideration can not be explained as containing a pratiishedha (where "not" negatives the verb) but we must consider "na" as connected with the word "anuyájas" and take the passage as a paryudása. So that the proper understanding of the sense of the passage is as follows "he is to use the
mantra ye-yajámahe with the yájvás other than anuyájas”, as the particle “na” conveys by indication the notion of (those yájvás) which are different from the anuyájas. And thus option has not to be admitted. And this sentence (i. e. the sentence constructed out of the words na anuyájeshu viz. “he is to use the ye-yajámahe with the yájvás other than anuyájas”) does not enjoin the use of the ye-yajámahe as the latter is already established by the preceding clause, viz. “he is to use the ye-yajámahe with the yájvás”, but merely enjoins with reference to (as an anuváda to) the ye-yajámahe already established by a general text its (the ye-yajámahe’s) belonging to those yájvás which are other than anuyájas. So that the sense of the sentence is “the ye-yajámahe which is uttered with the yájvás is to be uttered with those only which are other than anuyájas.” But—it might be objected—according to the above explanation a paryudása-prohibition would not be different from a so-called upasamhára whose purport is to restrict to some particular case something established by a scriptural passage of general application.—To this we reply that it is not so. For an upasamhára has the purport of restricting to that only (i. e. to that which is mentioned in the upasamhára-passage); as f. i. the fourfold division (of the sacrificial cake) which is established by the general text “he is to divide the cake into four parts” is restricted to the ágreya purodása exclusively by the special text “he is to divide the ágreya purodása into four parts.” A paryudása on the other hand has the purport of restricting something generally established exclusively to what is different from the special thing (mentioned in the paryudása) Therefore it appears that paryudása and upasamhára are different.—Sometimes, no other possibility being left, a simple pratiśhédha has to be accepted although thereby the probability of a vikalpa arises. Thus f. i. although from the prohibition of the taking of the shoḍaśin-cup which (prohibition) is established by the passage “at the atirátra he is not to take the shoḍaśin-cup” the probability of a vikalpa arises (i. e. the optional taking or not-taking of the shoḍaśin-cup at the atirátra), nevertheless the passage can not be taken as a paryudása (whereby option would be precluded) because this is impossible. For the following reasons. If the word “not” were connected
with the word "the shoḍaṣin-cup", the sense of the passage would be "at the atirātra he is to take the cups other than the shoḍaṣin"; but such an interpretation is impossible as it would be in open conflict with the express injunction contained in the other passage "at the atirātra he is to take the shoḍaṣin." If on the other hand the word "not" were connected with the atirātra the sense of the passage would be "he is to take the shoḍaṣin at the sacrifices other than the atirātra" and this explanation again is impossible as it would be in conflict with the injunction of the shoḍaṣin (for the atirātra). For these reasons, no other possibility being left, the passage can only be explained as a prohibition of the taking of the shoḍaṣin-cup which is established by another scriptural passage. And to this explanation it must not be objected that it involves a vikalpa, because a vikalpa too is to be acknowledged (under certain circumstances). The following difference (between the several cases where a pratiṣheṭha has to be acknowledged) is however to be noted. In the case of a pratiṣheṭha of one thing arising from vikalpa (in the case of one thing established by some scriptural passage being prohibited by some other scriptural passage enjoining the contrary) the thing prohibited is not the cause of any disadvantage (anarthā) because in that case the injunction as well as the prohibition are merely for the sacrifice's sake (kratvartha; not purushārtha.—In the example given above the taking as well as the not taking of the shoḍaṣin are kratvartha, contribute to the outward form of the sacrifice). On the other hand in those cases where there is no vikalpa and the establishment (of what is subsequently prohibited by a scriptural passage) bases on the natural passion of man only, and the prohibition is for the sake of man, there the thing prohibited is the cause of disadvantage as f. i. the eating of kalanīja which is prohibited by the passage "he is not to eat kalanīja"; for here only the prohibition of eating is for the sake of man.—Nor is it to be objected that in the same way a vikalpa would result from the prohibition of things established by scripture as giving, making offerings etc. which prohibition is contained in the passage "the man who has undergone initiation is not to give, not to make offerings etc."; for in this case although the prohibition of giving, offering etc. which things are of their own
nature for the purpose of man is not for the purpose of man the forbidden thing is the cause of disadvantage to man. The reason of this is that the prohibition of these things being for the purpose of the sacrifice they (i.e. giving, offering etc. if done by the dıkṣhita) would destroy the power of the sacrifice. An analogous case is presented by the prohibition of approaching one’s wife at the proper season (approaching one’s wife at the rītu is generally enjoined but would in spite of that be a cause of disadvantage to the dıkṣhita because it would destroy the efficacy of the sacrifice). (The result of which is that in the two last mentioned cases there is no opening for vikalpa).

Sentences whose purport is either praise (glorification) or blame are called arthavāda. Such sentences effect a matter with a purpose by indication (lakṣaṇaḥ: the sentences taken by themselves not being able to effect any purpose). For the arthavāda-sentences, there being no purpose in their conveying merely their own sense, by indication convey praise or blame of matters to be enjoined or prohibited, as they would be open to the reproach of purposelessness if their only object were (to convey) their own sense. (This latter statement is based on the sūtra I. 2. 1.) “on account of the (whole) veda referring to actions” (if the arthavāda-passages were taken as merely intimating their own sense without being connected with the passages expressive of injunctions and prohibitions they would be purposeless as the whole Veda avowedly refers to actions, things to be done. The arthavādas are therefore to be taken as containing praise or blame of the actions enjoined or prohibited in the vidhi-and nishedha-passages). Nor is it possible to assume purposelessness (of the arthavāda-passages), as the latter is rendered impossible by the arthavādas being comprised in the injunction of study contained in the passage “śādhyāyō dhye-
tavyah” which gives to understand that the whole Veda is to be studied and notifies the whole veda’s effecting matters having a purpose.

Arthavāda-passages are of two different kinds being either complements of vidhi-passages or complements of nishedha-passages. Thus the passage “Vāyu indeed is the swiftest divinity etc.”—which forms a complement of the injunctive passage “he who is desirous of prosperity is to offer a white animal to Vāyu
etc."—has the purpose of intimating a glorification of the matter enjoined. On the other hand the passage "he howled; that he howled (arodít) that is Rudra’s Rudratva etc."—which forms a complement to the prohibitory passage “silver is not to be given on the sacrificial grass etc.”—has a purpose by intimating the blame-worthiness of the matter prohibited.—Nor must one raise the objection that the arthaváda-passages are (nevertheless) purposeless because the idea of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness is of no practical use. For these ideas have a decided use because they promote the activity of man who from laziness or other reasons does not set to work (to perform what is enjoined in the vidhi-passages).

Again arthaváda is of three different kinds as it is said in the śloka “in case of contradiction it is guṇaváda; in case of asseveration it is anuváda; in case of the absence of both it is bhútárthaváda; thus arthaváda is of three different kinds.” The sense of this śloka is as follows. An arthaváda is guṇaváda i.e. statement of some quality, if it contradicts some other means of proof. As f. i. the passage “Xditya (the sun) is yúpa (the sacrificial post).” There as the sameness of the yúpa and the sun is contradicted by perception, the passage establishes by indication (lakshana) the quality (of the yúpa) being shining like the sun.—Arthaváda if conveying a sense already established by another means of proof is called anuváda, reiterative statement. As f. i. the passage “Agni (the fire) is a remedy against cold” for here the quality of fire being opposite to cold is already known from sensual perception.—A statement conveying something which is neither established by another means of proof nor in conflict with such a one is called a bhútárthaváda, a statement regarding something which has happened. As f. i. the passage “Indra raised the thunderbolt against Vṛitra.”

Thus we have established that the entire veda which consists of sentences like “he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice etc.” immediately or mediately effects duty (dharma) consisting in sacrifices etc. Such (acts of) duty if done with a view to that (result) with a view to which they are enjoined are the cause of that particular result, if done with the intention of making of them an offering to God (Īśvara) they are the cause of the highest beatitude.
Nor can it be said that there is no authority for performing such acts with the intention of making of them an offering to God; for the following passage of the Bhagavadgītā furnishes the required authority “whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you sacrifice, whatever you give, whatever you do in way of penance, Kaunteya, do it all as an offering to me.” And the authoritativeness of Śrīpiṭi is established in the pāda treating of Śrīpitī (I. 3.) by the argument of its being based on Śruti.

For the easy understanding of young students the wise Bhāskara has composed this succinct compendium of the subjects treated in the Jainimīya-Śāstra.

Herewith is finished the compendium of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā which is entitled “Artha-saṅgraha” and which was composed by Mahopādhyāya Ṭangākshi Bhāskara.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

Transl. p. 1. l. 22: so that the beginning aphorism (i.e. the first aphorism of the Mīmāṃsā-darśana) means etc.

P. 6. l. 12 after "material" add: so that, by means of the possessive indication contained in the word soma, the sense of the sentence is "he is to effect the desired result by means of the sacrifice distinguished by soma."

P. 48, l. 10: succinect.
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गुरुसारणी .... 0 2 0
श्रुतबोध .... 0 2 0

इन से अधिक संस्कृत अंग्रेजी आदि पुस्तकों का सूचीपत्र पृष्ठभंडारित हुआ है जिन की अप्रेलित हो इमारि पास भेजिए।

ब्रजभूषणदास और कमनी भारती चौक के उत्तर नई डकोट स्थिर है।
अर्थसंप्रहः।

श्रुतम् पत्तमप्याधिकारिविशेषणम्। यथाध्ययनविविधिसिद्धा विवाह, क्रतुविधीनामर्थयानापेशायत्वेनाध्ययनविविधिसिद्धार्थाद्वानवत् प्र-

च्ये नतु राज्यसंविद्धात्रे तदन्योभ्य। तेन कृत्त्रिया राजसूयेव धिका को नतु तदन्यय भ्राह्मणादेविस्न्य विस्तर इति भावः।

इत्यद्रमात् चिन्यते—‘दर्शीनागमासाध्यायं सर्गकामो यजेतेन्ति श्रृष्टे तु। तत्र कियानिषादकलं कर्तृं वर्षेक्षुकं या नामिकार्यको स्वामित्वमाधिकारः ताश्रेणीमाधिकारे यागकृतांति। कुतः। फलभोगमामावतः। तथाहि यजेतेन्त्राक्ष्यातेन भावनामधिश्यते। तस्यं च धालों भावः, एकपदोपालावतः। सर्गस्तु पदान्तेपोपालावताश्रयेन भावतपावनेतवतः। तब वाक्यमेकपद्रुपया श्रुता बाध्ये। सर्गस्तु भावतपावनाचे सति गुणममयम्यूः। सर्गास्त्रदो नात्र सुखाची कितु सुखासन चन्द्रादिद्वायं श्रृः। छोके तथा वचवहारात्। तत्र कामपत्रुं योगम्। तेन द्र्येन विना यागानिष्यते।।

तस्मादरमाश्र्येन पदान्तेन द्र्यागमामवालुक्तयं कर्तुवेस्त नतान्तिकारे इ-लक्षिकारक्षणं नार्याविमिति प्राप्ते भूमी—यजेतेन्त्र प्रयास्य केदारमाक्ष्यातरुपमवेति नच मन्तः, कितु विन्दुव्यवस्थेन विद्विरुपलमयस्ति तत्रआयातवाक्षरे भावानाचारेइ, विघFaकारण पुरुष प्रवत्तन्तिक, पुरुषां वस्मित्रमञ्चमन्तरेन न प्रवत्ते इति तदपेक्ष पुरुषोष्मान् भावत्य विद्विन्दुपादते। सर्गास्त्रस्त्रात्तकुं छुः रूठः। इत्येव तु लक्षणिकः। प्रकाशसब्ज भावतस्य नावां भविष्यस्य विद्विन्दुश्चिद्वृः। धार्य्यस्य तु भावासंकेतेन प्रतीयमानैव प्रमेयमाण सति नावयस्ते, कितु प्रक्षेत्राः। तथाति सर्गेनां भावथस्थायिन्यां प्रभावासमंकेतैव विद्विरुपणास्यतेनावामाक्षणिमोगादपि श्रवणेव भावाः। तस्मादरमाश्र्येन कर्तृविधिकारेऽस्तीविधाकारक्षणं प्रयास्य विमिति विघFaकारे श्रवणांसिद्धां विकारिकारकानिश्चिपणनान्यात्वादिन्यापरथा त-लमायाश्रयेन व्यवहारोपपतिरिक्ष्याश्रयैनाह—क्षेत्रैनिधि।

तशोदाहरणां: पदचिन्तित।

तत्रेण ग्रन्धाकर—यथेति। विध्यान्त्र विघFaकारेः। श्रवणांसिद्धां विकारिकारकानिश्चिपणनान्यात्वादिन्यापरथा त-लमायाश्रयेन व्यवहारोपपतिरिक्ष्याश्रयैनाह—के शेषः। तत्र हेतुमाह—क्षेत्रियत्वादिना। तत्त्रेण ग्रन्धाकरां: पदचिन्तित।
कौमुदीकार्यम् नान्दिनामाधुनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिनिरोक्तां

महोमदानां स्वातिरिति पशिसमसास्य तैरथिनिको संभवान्।

तस्य द्वारातीदेवेन बिवासंभवालेति प्रायो नमः—निषादशासी स्वपनिवेशेन कर्मधारयसमास्य सुमहलान पशिसमसास्य तैरथिनिको निषादस्पष्टि-शिर्बार्यं। पशिसमसासै संस्कृतीजातितिरियोशवाचिना निषादशान्देव तत्सं-वन उपविष्टेत्। नवयं कर्मधारयं दोषोडङ्कित। तस्मात् तात्कालिकाचा-योध्यादेशादिनां विद्या संपाच्छ धनिको निपादे रौंदे यांगु कुग्यूदेधि राजस्तान्।

अध्ययनविद्विश्वविद्यालयकुलशास्त्रायक्रमः विद्विश्वाशुक्तमप्यिकारि-
एवं सामथर्यमापि 'आङ्कयातानामध्ये श्रवत्ता शक्ति: सहक्षरिणी'ति
विशेषणनिर्दाहकः—एवमिति। सामथर्यमिति। आज्ञावेक्षणादिकं धोकिकपुसामथर्यमिति:। वेदिकासामथर्यमाध्यमनिर्धारितविद्वारस्योऽयंक्ष्टादिकत्वं। बृहोक्तम्यायं विनिमयं समुदाहरणं तत्र हेतुमाह्—आङ्कयातानामिति। अनेन च विशेषणनिर्णयदेवसनिधिकरो ध्वनितः। इदमस्मि विचार्यते—अन्धः पृष्टानार्थि सूक्ष्मो गवाधथाज्ञकं तिर्थ्यं इत्यद्विनां चेतनन्देव निरतिश्यायुस्मापि शर्मकास्मां संभवति। अयोध्येति केतुचिद्रेषु तेषां शक्तिनिस्ति। तथाहि—अन्धो नायममेवद्वं कृष्णः, पृष्टानार्थिः ह्यशक्ति:। विधिमो नायांपूर्वा व्यूहो शर्मवति। तथा च 'कृतीर्वचयात्रीतिः विहितस्यास्तु न सिद्धेत्। मूकस्तुनमस्त्रावतास्यदेवमेवः। विद्याव्यासयशस्यामेव इति तत्र। यथाशक्तिानानमेवदेवलात्। 'शर्मकास्मात्रज्ञेत्' व्यपन्न प्रथानवास्येन सर्वार्थिकार: प्रतीतिः। सचाज्ञावेक्षणाच्याज्ञानवास्यास्तु न संकोचित्वं युक्तः। किकु प्रथानानुसारानानानं मेव तकोक्षित्वं युक्तः, तस्मादन्विद्यातिशिकार इति प्राप्ते ग्रहः—यदाज्ञावेक्षणादिः सुप्रहार्थतया विधीयेनून तद्यद्योपमितु: क्रोष्टिक्रमाः, इति त्वृत्तज्ञतया ते विहिता इति तद्रोपे क्लोरे न निष्प्रये, तस्मादसंस्कृतम नायायिकार इति सिद्धा। किंच ज्योतिषीयें शून्ये—यदुस्तानामेवप्राप्तिक्षेत्रादिक्षणो यथा: संस्कारंस्थायाः
श्राहत्व्यस्त्र तत्तद्यायत्त्वातीसिद्धान्तस्यात् यदि प्रतिहार्प्रचिन्चित्रे सर्वेत् द्वाराधिर्। अस्यायमर्त:—प्राप्त:सवने बहिःप्राक्षमानेन स्थाप्यनुवा युक्तिः—शात्याविश्वदेवभि: प्रसर्पिति तदनिमित्तव्य; पुष्टोत्तोत्वय इत्यें रिपीलिकाविधुषातिस्वरूपेण गान्तव्याः। तत्र गुरुतो गान्त: कछु गृहीतवै गृहीतकु त्तोत्वयो गान्तव्याः। एवं सति यदि प्रभाददुमारात्त्वात् गृहीतकु कछु मुखेवदाद दक्षिणानमेव द्वारा प्रकाशात् यथा: समापनीयः। तं समाप्य पुनरतिः स यथा: प्रयोक्तवत:। तस्मिन्यप्रयोगे ध्वनि यद्रस्तं द्वयं तद्वारात्। यदा प्रतिहारात् तपस्वेत तदा तस्मिन्यप्रयोगे सर्वं द्वाराधिति। तत् यदुस्तानामेवप्रतिवृत्तेऽरूपृपपत्तमुखेवतात् तदन्योक्त क्रियाविश्वासिनित्वं विनिहेत्। एकवर्त्कोऽपि निमित्तव्येन श्रुत: अर्थं तुम्वादकत्त्वातिकृतके व्यपदेभु शक्येत्, तस्मात्त्वायमाण्य निमित्ते—
तस्य विहितवाच्यानि प्रायश्चित्तमिति प्रासे ब्रूमः—द्वारे ब्रजाप्फेढळे तयोरे-केकात्रैयैः एव कतेति निमित्तस्य नाति विचारः कालत्मक्ष प्रक्रियाप्फेढळे
द्वारतिः तस्मात्निमितवत्तातिबाधाविद्थति प्रायश्चित्तमः। फिंच अद्वितिन्तः
सर्वसद्धिग्नितः चतुः यत्राप्रायश्चित्तमः निमित्तमदेन श्रुतं तत्त्वमिद्यसंसाधा
पते सेमवेशत्वमः, यदविद्धृतसर्वसद्धिग्नितः योगुप्तविनिरेक्षितस्ताहि प्रयोगमदेन
व्यवस्थापनस्तहि, अप्प्रक्ष्युन्ते प्रथमपयोगे दक्षिणा न दात्विसु उत्तरपयोगे
सर्वस दात्विस सदृपः प्रयोगमदेन करणं एक्वताः समुच्छय इति प्रासे
ब्रूमः—नलंक्तरप्रयोगस्याप्फेढळे विचारः। नवासति निमित्ते प्रायश्चित्तं श्रुतमः।
तस्मात्प्रथमपयोगे एव निमित्तक्यः फ्रायश्चित्तमः। श्रावणं तत्त्वप्रवेशः फ्रायश्चित्त
विकल्पये। फिंच उद्दालनप्रक्ष्युन्ते कार्योपकर्ष्युन्ते गच्छगच्छगच्छगच्छणावताः समानश्चत्वादर्श
प्रायश्चित्तविनिराकलः। यदा तु क्रमेणाप्फेढळे श्वासां तदानीसज्जाविनिरो
विलेन पूर्वस प्रवजन्ता क्षणविद्धि नातिबाधाविद्योतरस यक्तिनिरंभताः इति चेत।
मैवमः। भृतिभिज्जातुवर्तस्तु पूर्वसापेक्षावाच्येव विरोधे सलयुक्तोपत्तिरेत
नाति। इहतु ब्लानव्याप्फेढळे ज्ञानित्यधातुविलेन इतःत्वप्रक्ष्युनिनिरावतः
नाति। उत्पथमानं चोरज्ञानं सहितस्तु पूर्वअणास्य वाधेनावोधवते।
नेतृ निर्रूपक्षवस्य समानत्वावृत्तज्ञानेनोतरस्य बाधकमिच्यते चेत।
पूर्वज्ञानोपरिचिद्दशा यायमचारमयोतरस्य बाध्यालयोगात्। उत्तरकाले 
तु स्वय बाधितं पूर्वज्ञानं कथमुतरस्य बाध्यं भेटतु नामयालक्षितुवर्तस साधार
पद्यामः। तस्मादत्तरकालेनाप्फेढळेनिमिच्यं प्रायश्चित्तमनुस्त्रयः। फिंच
युद्धाता पक्षापद्धतस्य तदा तस्मात्प्रक्ष्युन्ते प्रवजन्तानिमित्त प्राय-
श्चित्तमनुस्त्रय तच प्रायश्चित्तमनुस्त्रय—प्रथमप्रयोगमः दक्षिणाहितमनुस्त्रय दितीय-
प्रयोगः पूर्व दिसता दक्षिणा दात्येति। पूर्वः च गवा त्रासाधिकं
शं दिसतं तस्य योतिष्योमक्षिणार्पण विहितवाच्यात्तरकालप्रयोगे
दात्येति देयतिः प्रासे ब्रूमः—प्रतित्वः प्रथमप्रक्ष्युनिते सति तत्त्वमितिः
सर्वज्ञानोतरस्य प्रायश्चित्ते प्रथमप्रयोगे प्रासे तेन च क्रतुस्माप्रत्यु-
कस्य दात्येति प्रासे ब्रूमः—प्रतित्वः प्रथमप्रक्ष्युनिते सति तत्त्वमितिः
सर्वज्ञानोतरस्य प्रायश्चित्ते प्रथमप्रयोगे प्रासे तेन च क्रतुस्माप्रत्यु-
कस्य दात्येति प्रासे ब्रूमः—प्रतित्वः प्रथमप्रक्ष्युनिते सति तत्त्वमितिः
सर्वज्ञानोतरस्य प्रायश्चित्ते प्रथमप्रयोगे प्रासे तेन च क्रतुस्माप्रत्यु-
न्यायात् समर्थ प्रत्येक विचित्रपूर्वकः । तदेवं निरूपितो विधिः ।

दिन्दा वायुधत् इति शान्तीनिषयः । बाधकस्य दक्षिणान्तरस्य तत्रानुकलवात् ।
यद्विषितं तदुत्तरप्रयोगे देयमिश्रेतावदेव तत्रोष्टे । दिलितं च सर्वस्वमिन्यतुः ।
अतं उदकालीनोन्द्रात्रपच्छिदनिमित्ते एवपि पुनःप्रयोगे पुर्वकालीनप्रतिहत्त्रपच्छिदप्रयुक्तं सर्वसमीच्छादत्वमिद्यादिकमर्थं निरूपणीयमभिप्रेयु विनिरूपणाधुलसंहारति—तदेवमिति ।
तस्मिन्नतिः प्रत्यष् उदकप्रकारे-प्रेयसंः ।

यः सर्वकर्ता सकलामरुपस्मृतानं च वेदोपस्त राधीकाकृष्णकृत्यदाता ।
साम्बो हि सोमार्धविभूषणाङ्कं नौमि देवाचिन्तपद्धपाठम् ॥ १ ॥
कौमुदीव्याकरणातिहितः ।

अथ मच्छमांसः ।

प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मरकमा मतः । तेषां च ताड्यार्थस्मरकतेनावर्थवच्चमू । नतु तदुच्याराममद्यार्थमुः सम्बवति द्रश्यकलक्तेनएषकल्पनाया अन्यायायत्वात् । नच द्रश्यार्थसरणस्य प्रकारान्तरेणापि संभवान्मात्राणां व्यथेमिति वाच्यमुः । मच्छेरू सर्वन्यायेऽस्मिन्नियमविविधाष्ट्रणात् ।

नियमविविधि: ।

नानासाधनायशक्रियायामेकसाधनप्रामाण्यास्मापवसाधनस्य प्राप्ताः किनिनेयमविविधि: । यथाभ: ‘विचिनित्तमप्रास्ताः नियमः पाक्षिके सति । तत्र चान्याय च त्रासां परिसंच्छेष्टे गीयत्’ इति । अस्यार्थः प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्रास्ताः प्राप्ताः किनिनेयमविविधि: यथा ‘चारेत’ ।

इदानी मच्छस्य वेदसां निर्द्वयाति — प्रयोगेति । तेषामिति । मच्छा-प्रामाणिविधिः । ताड्यार्थिति । प्रयोगसमवेतार्थित्यर्थिः । अश्वचिन्तिति । प्रयोगव्यवहारिः । नतु मच्छारामस्यार्थस्मरकतेनाभ्युपवच्च: कुतलोषण प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मरकतेनैव प्रयोगवृत्तित्य आह—नतिविति । तदुच्यारणिति । मच्छारामिविधिः । तत्र हेतुमाह—द्रश्यकलक्तव इति । नतु द्रश्य देवतार्थसरणस्य ब्राह्मणवाक्यादिनापि संभवामच्छारामस्यार्थतत्त्वकलानवजीकरां तदाभासत वैयर्यपरिश्रमाशङ्केष्क मच्छेरू सोग्यः स्वतेष्व इति नियमविविधशास्त्रानां मच्छारामस्य वैयर्यमिति परिहरति—न-चेत्यादिना ।

नतु किलिक्षणको नियमविविधियदार्श्याध्रणाद्वार्थस्मरकस्य व्यवच्छेदे चभ्यत्व इत्याश्रय: नियमविविधिकिलिक्षणमाह—नानासाधनेति । तत्र सम-तिमाह—यथाभुरेति । तां व्याप्तेः —अस्यार्थ इत्यादिना । तत्रापि विचिनित्तमप्रात्रात्विति प्रधानपद्ममूम्बिविधियं व्याप्तेः—प्रमाणान्तरेणेति । प्रमाणान्तरेण यद्येश्चारणास्य तद्येश्चारण प्राप्ताः यो विचि: सोड्कृतविविधि:—
खर्कामः हत्यादि: । स्वर्गार्थकयागसः प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तवा नवानात् । पश्चेष्टप्राप्त स्यापको विधिनियमविधि: । यथा त्रिहीनवहन्तीः त्यादि: । कथमः पश्चेष्टप्राप्तस्यनेत्रित्वमेव दित्यम् । अनेन वाच्यात्मक वैत्त्यार्थतं न प्रतिपाद्यते वयच्यतिरेकसिद्धवात् । किंतु नियमः । सत्साहास्यपूर्णम् । वैत्त्यसः हि नानोपयो-यसाथ्यतः वादायमात्तः परिलक्ष्य उपायान्तरं ग्रहीतुमारस्ते, तदाव- बास्त्याप्राप्तवेन वाक्यार्थानामकमासां पूर्णमेववानेन विधिना

लयः: । तत्रोदाहरणमाहं—यथेति । तथ्यार्थकविष्ठंहेतुरामहं—खर्कामः । स्वर्गार्थकवेन प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तसः वागसः तदर्थेति येति खर्काम इ- 

tनु श्रीहीनवहन्तीलोकावधातिविष्ठ: कथं पश्चेष्टप्राप्तस्य वाच्यात्मकात्मक प्रापकाः श्रीकिरति:। पैठुर्यार्थात्मेन प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तसः वायसः तस्य तस्यान्तरेण नित्यान्तः नवानात् विधिनियमात्मक विविषाणात्मक वित्तुष्टतः न प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य तस्यानात्मकात्मकतिरेकसिद्धवात् । अवधानातिरपलते श्रीहीणाः वै-

tृष्ण्य जायते तदस्य तदभावते इति साध्यानन्तिमतिः परिहर्ति—कथमि-

t्यादिना । इत्यथाविष्ठ । अनेन वक्ष्यार्थापाणिके नेत्रित्व संस्कृत: । नौ यदावाहतां

tीनां सर्वान्तवेन वैंत्यार्थस्यनमश्वनवव्यवस्थितिरेकाम्यां सिद्ध: तदा श्रीहीनवहन्तीव- बाचाधार्थाधिर्वनवव्यवस्थितिरेकसिद्धाधार्थापाणिकेन वैवाहिनीवधाततुवादकतादि-

t्यादिन:—किंतुत्थति:। नायक विधिनात् वादात्मेन वैवव्य नयम- 

tिविधाप्यानाप्पापार्थितिः परिहर्ति—नियम इति । श्रीहीणाः वैवाहिनीव

tात्मेन संपादनीयतिः नियम: प्रतिपाद्यते इत्यथ: । नौ तात्त्यानियमप्र- 

tिपापोत्सर जीहसो वाक्याभायं भववीत्यत्र आह—सचेति । स एवाप्राप्त- 

tांश्च्छुरिष्यो नियमंस्त्रावक्याभायं इत्यथ: । नौ कथमन्त्रापाणिशे रुम्यते 

tस्य पूज्यानास्य विष्णे: सार्थक्यमिवतोंत्रापाणिश्चूरिष्यो वाक्याभायामुपाद- 

t्यति—वैत्त्यादिना। उपादित्वमापाणिश्चूरिष्यो वाक्याभायामुपाद-
कौमुदीव्याख्यासाहितः

कन्येते। अतत्र नियमविधायप्राप्तांश्चूर्णात्मर्को नियम एव वाक्यार्थः। पक्षेष्ठप्राप्तांवातः विधानमिति यावत्।

परिसंह्यविधिः।

उभयोऽथ युगपत्रामावितरस्याध्यात्मचिप्रो विधिः परिसंह्यविधिः।

वथा-‘पञ्चपञ्चवर्णा महत्त्वा’ इति। इदम् हि वाक्यं न पञ्चन्व-महत्त्वं पन्तः, तस्य रागतः प्रास्तवात्। नापि नियमपरं पञ्चन्वपञ्च-भक्तमहत्त्वस्य युगपत्रास्ते। पक्षेष्ठ प्रास्तवावात्। अतः इदमपञ्चन्व-भक्तमहत्त्वनिश्चितिपरिचितं महति परिसंह्यविधिः।

परिसंह्यवायः अःतर्विधायःलक्षणाश्रमेऽदिनः।

सा च द्विविधा-अःतर्व लक्षणकी मेित। तत् अःतर्व इदत्तीत। सा च द्विविधा। एवकारण। पञ्चामात्यकेरितित्तो त्र्यायवचनस्ते। तथा पञ्चन्वमहत्त्वं इति तु लक्षणकिः।

रत्ती-अत्तेति। अस्य विचे-प्राप्तांश्चूर्णपञ्चमप्रतिपद्दती-अस्यविचे।

परस्परसनिधिर्महाः। पञ्च इति। यावद्दित। परस्परसनिधिर्महाः।

तत्र चेयावल्लर्कर्ष परिसंह्यविधिर्प्रस्तु-च्च च्चाते-उभयोऽथेति। तत्रोद-हरमाः। यथेति। अस्यायद्यमप्राप्तविधित्वमफ-पञ्चमविधित्वमाश्रयं निर-राचेतेः। इदं हि। तत्र हेतु माः। तत्तेति। पञ्चन्वभक्तमहत्त्वं इति।

अस्य बाक्यस्य नियममितित्वम्पि निराचेतेः-नापि। तत्रापि हेतु माः। पञ्चन्वेनेति। अत: इति। विचे-प्राप्तात्यमाचित्वम्। इदुमेति। पञ्च पञ्चन्वभक्तमहत्त्वं इति बाक्यमितिः। पञ्चन्वभक्तमहत्त्वं निरृत्तिति स केनापि प्राता। तत्तत्त्ता तद्यथा कल्याणे। नायस्य बाक्यस्यानुवादक्यमिति। तत्तथा। सै-वात्र बाक्यार्थः इति भावः।

सा च परिसंह्यः द्विविधेष्यः-सा चेति। आचायुद्धभार्ति-त-त्रेति। द्वयः। परिसंह्ययोममन्ये। इत्याथः। अग्नेति। प्रकृत इत्याथः। अव- यन्तिति। अब्रजानंतित्याथः। गायनंतिति यावत्। श्रीया: परिसंह्यवायः। सत्ते हेतु माः। एवकारणेति। द्वितीयामुद्धार्ति-पञ्चेति। पञ्चपञ्च-
अर्थसंग्रहः

इतरनिद्विचिवाचकपदाभावात्। अतएवेषा विद्रोपग्रस्ता।
परिसंध्याया दौष्ट्रतयम्।

दोषांतर च श्रुतहानि—रश्नुतकलपना—प्रासवाध्येति। तदुकम्—
‘श्रुतार्थस परिलयागाद्वश्रुतार्थश्रुतकलपनम्’। प्रासव वाधादितेयं परि-
संख्या विद्रूपणा’ हि। श्रुत्स पञ्चनिशभक्षणस्य हानात्। अश्रुताधिक
पञ्चनिशभक्षणसिद्धै: कलपनात्। प्रासव चापञ्चनिशभक्षणस्य वाधा-
नादिति। अर्थिः दोषांतरे दोषांद्र शब्दनिष्ठम्। प्रासवाधस्तवर्त्तः
निष्ठ हि। दिक्।

अथ नामधेयमीमांसा।

येषा तु प्रयोगसमेतार्थसारकतं न संभवति तदुच्चारणस्यान-
न्यगत्याश्चार्थसंकर्तं कल्प्यत हि नानर्थक्यमिति। नामधेयानां च
विधेयार्थस्परिच्छेदकत्यार्थवच्चृम्। तथाहि ‘उत्सदा यज्ञेत पशुकाम’

(वायीतु ‘पञ्च पञ्चनिश्वा भक्षया श्रक्षक्र्तेन राघव। शशक: शाद्वी गोवा
खण्डी कूमोभुवं पञ्चम्।’ इत्यादिवरचनोदाहता बोध्या।) अस्या अपि तत्कारे
हेतुमाह—इतरनिद्विचीतः। अतएवेति। इतरनिद्विचिवाचकपदाभावाध-
दित्यः। एषेति। वाक्षणीकीस्तः।

दोषांतर दृश्योयति—दोषांतर चेति। तत्र श्रुतहानो हेतुमाह—
श्रुत्येति। अश्रुतकलपनायां हेतुमाह—अश्रुत्येति। प्रासव बाधेपि
हेतुमाह—प्रासविति। राग्य: प्रासवेत्यः। अस्य दोषप्रयस्य व्यवस्थाया
इतिविद्यमाह—अस्बिद्येति। दोषप्रयमथ्य इतियः।

नृत् कथं सर्वेण्या मन्थ्राणा प्रयोगसमेतार्थसारकतेनवार्थसत्वसुपपपवते हुं-
फडादिमश्रणा प्रयोगसमेतार्थसारकतेनवार्थसत्वसुपपवतादिव्यास्यवाह—येष्यमित्या
दिना। तदुच्चारणेषि। हुंफडादिमश्रोचारणेषि। अनन्त्यग्या-
ष्ट्यार्थमित्यार्थस्थितिमिति पद्रुद्धद्। हि नानर्थक्यमिति। अतो
हेतुहुंफडादिमश्रणां नानर्थक्यमिति। मन्थ्रास्य यथायथ प्रयोगवच्च-
सुपपपादानी क्रममात्रा नामधेयानां सार्थ्यमुच्चपाद्वाति—नामधेयाना-
मिति। विधेयार्थस्परिच्छेदकत्तेति। विज्ञातीयन्यसंहतक्तेन विधेयार्थे—

1 प्रकक्तपनादिति पादो भावति।
इत्यत्रोऽदिष्टं यागनामेघं तेन च विधयार्थपरिचितेदं क्रियते।
तथाहि अनेन वाच्येनामासत्वात्फलोदेः यागो विशीयते। याग-
सामान्येऽविषयतवात् यागविशेष एव विशीयते। तत्र कोष्ठीप्
यागविशेष इत्येक्षायामुःदिष्टवदुःदिष्ट्रुपो याग इति ज्ञायते।
उद्देश्या यागेन पशुं भावेदित्यन्त्र सामानाधिकरणेन नाम-
ध्येयान्यावात्।

निश्चयकत्तेवः। विधेयार्थसैव समर्थकत्यति यावत्। पूर्वतेन प्रदर्श-
यति—तथाहीत्यादिना। तेन चेति। उद्देश्या चेत्येः। उद्दी-
पच्छवदस्य विधेयार्थपरिचितकत्या नामप्रायविद्रशीताय भूमिकामारचयति—
तथाहीत्यादिना। अनेनेति। ‘उद्देश्या यजेत पशुकाम’ इत्यादिनेवेऽतः।
फलोदेः नेति। पशुसपपकोदेः नेति। यागेति। साधनवैद्यत्वम-
न्तरेण फलवैद्यत्वानुपपत्तेनैत्र यागसामान्यं विशीयते। ततथै यागविशेष एव
विशीयत इत्यः। तेतिः। यागविशेषम् विद्यते इत्यः। कौशी
यागविशेषाः इति यागविशेषोपयेक्षायामालिकथः। उद्दीपच्छवदस्य
दुःदिष्ट्रुपो याग इति ज्ञायत इति। उद्दीपच्छवदस्युपनहृतीमामको यो यागः। त
एतावत् यागविशेषाः इति विद्यते इत्यः। एवं सिद्धमुद्रोऽदिष्टवदस्य धार्कर्ष्यानायां
धिकर्षणेनाश्यां वहितमाहू—उद्देश्याः। नन्दाऽदिष्टवदस्य नीठवृष्टविनील
नीठपदस्योऽत्पदसमाधिकरण्यचजिसामानाधिकरण्यै। भवेक्षनिन्यात्यायेक-
तेनेति चेत्रय, वैष्णवात्। तथाहि तत्र हि नीठपदस्यार्यो नीठवृष्टां उत्तरवे-
दायथादिष्टधोषपद्वादतिर्तिस्यो भवति, शक्यत्वां तु नीठपद्वां तादादा
पद्वादिष्टधोषपद्वसमाधिकरण्यपूपपथते। उद्दीपच्छवदस्य तु व्याज्यगतयाग-
विशेषसन्तिकतितिर्तिको वेष्टति, तस्येव तत्र विशेषतसर्वपल्लवात्।
तत्तथार्यो

न्तरावाचकसामाज्यनो नीठच्छवदस्य नीठदादिष्टधोषपद्वसमाधिकरण्य-
वजिसामानाधिकरण्यपूपपथते, किंतृत्वम् ‘वैश्वदेवायामिष्के’ सत्रामिष्क्यादस्य वै-
श्चदेवस्यादस्य समाधिकरण्यावृत्त, वैश्वदेवीयामस्य हि देवतात्त्वित्तावृत्त
तत्स्य च ‘सायम्येवते’ तिर्तवर्णामां स्मरणात् सर्वनाम्यां चोपशेषाविषेः—
यांतून निमित्तचतुष्वयमी
नामेयाने निमित्तचतुष्वयमी
नामेयाने च निमित्तचतुष्वयमी
मत्वर्थुलक्षणाभासार्थायकमें
द्वमात्रचतुष्वयशास्त्राच्यापेदेशाचेति
तत्र ‘उद्विदा येत पशुकाम’
इत्यत्रोद्विदित्वाच्चस्त्रय
यागानामेयाने तत्त्वमत्वर्थुलक्षणाभासार्थात
tथाहिन्
तावदनेन वाक्येन फलंश्रीति यागानिधानमुः
तंत्रति च गुणानिधानमुः
ष्ठानिचित्वेन विशेषुपरममुः
तत्र कोऽसं वैश्वेनीशाबद्धोपायो विशेष इत्येको
श्रीवायम् आमिशापदसानिधानादमिशारूपो विशेष इत्यवगमध्ये। यथाहुः—‘आ
मिशारूपो देवतापुरुषो वदोऽवेष तद्विलत। आमिशापदसानिधानादस्वेत विषया
पर्ण’मिति। तसां यथा वैश्वेनीशाबद्धोपायविशेषसम्पर्क्येननामिशापदस्व वैश्वेनीशाबद्धो
सामानाधिकार्यमेव सामान्यसाधारणविशेषचाहृत्यगतायागानिधानेष
सम्पर्कप्रमेये नोन्दिक-छद्दय् यजसामाधिकारणसिन्धुप्रकारार्गेव नामेयाने
नामन्न्यः सादुरीति। तथाचोक ‘तदवीनावाळाणागिरोपिन्द्रि’रिति।
तत्र निमित्तचतुष्वयायाक्तियाः—नामेयायत्वं चेति । निमित्तचतुष
द्यं निरिञ्जयति—मत्त्वर्थेयायायिना । तत्रायनिमित्तचतुष्वयायामाहति—तत्रो
द्विदा यजेतेति। तत्रैति चतुष्वं मध्य इत्येको। अत्र मत्वर्थुलक्षणापत्रमें
श्रीनाय तावदक्येतमापायति—न तावदिति। अन्तौद्विदि तुष्टिविधे
भूमिप्रकरणात्य व्युत्पक्ता खनिजवाच्यासादुक्क्षादृश्यो भवेच्छाच उद्विदा य
जेत पशुकाम’ इत्येत वाक्येन यागेन पमुः भावेयागाः च खनिज्येन भाव
येदिति फलंश्रीति यागानिधानं यागात्मति च गुणानिधानं किरैते, तत्र न
शुम्बत इत्येको। तत्र हेतुमाह—वाक्येति। आत्मित्सुप्राक्ष्येतमापातेति
यथा। नन्ननेन वाक्येन खनिजग्रुपमु गुण एव स्वरीयते। ‘द्वानु जुहोती’
यनेन गुणानिधान सामायवताः। नन्नन शुभङ्करकः कर्मदागी विशेषत
स्विति वाच्चम्। पर्यन्त गुणानिधान। यथा गोदेन्ने गुणानिधानेन
पश्चयो गोदेन्नुयाद्य फलं तथेऽह खनिजगुणाय फलंतु यथि चसमें
नायं: प्रणयती। विहिष् प्रकटतया प्रणयनमाधिन्या गोदेन्ने विशेषते तर्क
त्रापि ज्योतिःश्च यजेतेति विहिष् प्रकटां ज्योतिःश्चमाधिन्याय खनिजं विशी—
युज्ये, वाक्यमेदाराने:। उद्दित्रच्छाब्दसु गुणसमर्पकत्वे च यागस्याप्यप्रामाल्यतं गुणविशिष्टकमेवविधानं वाच्यम्। उद्दित्तता यागन पांडु मात्रेदिति विशिष्टविधि च मत्तर्थलक्षणेऽयुज्ये।

नामचेतयत्वं द्वितीयं वाक्यमेदेवोदाहरणम्।

‘चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम’ इत्यत्र चित्राश्चाब्दसु कर्मनामाध्यवर्तं वाक्यमेदारभवत्। तथाहि न तावदाव गुणविशिष्टप्रामाल्यविधानं संभवति। ‘दृष्टि मधु पयो गृहुं धानाः उद्दक तप्तुलातसंस्तं प्राजायतं’ तत्समाधुरविधिरिवाश्चक पशुकामो यजेतस्या पद्दस्याप्रमानं—पशुरूपं फलं यागन कुर्पितं। तत्र केन यागनेवपेशा उद्दित्तते तुति मात्रं पदं यागनामचेतानावने। उद्दित्त यजुषकामने यागनेति निवीक्ष्या नामत्रमुद्धिवपद्योपपपपते। नावाचमपि गुणविशिष्टनामाध्यवयोऽश्वदिवर्चमसामान्य निर्देशं इति वाच्यम्। सामानाधिकरणस्य निर्देशं कलवत्। तथाहि उद्दित्रानमके यागन पशुरूपं फलं कुर्पितं दर्शते। सामानाधिकरणं लंबयते। गुणविशिष्टे तु खनिजेन साधयो यो यागस्य तावदाव—फलं कुर्पिते देवीचित्रारण यथात्। तथावतमस्। किच् नातेन वाक्येन ज्योतिषायमे खनिजरूपो गुणो विधातुं शक्यते, तस्य सोमन् यजेतेवत्यात्तिनिष्कृतसमापणपुष्करस्वदृढ्यतात्। किच् ये कवयोद्धच्छाब्दसु खनिष्ट्रुप्प्रणसमपकसं स्वीकरते तद्य यत्र तेन गुणं: सर्वपर्योष्टदकरणीयोविष्फ्रात्वादने वाक्येन खनिष्ट्रुप्पुणिष्टकमेवविधानं वक्तमन्ययथा वाक्यमेदस्यः। तत्क्षित्तलक्ष्यार्थसक्तिनिविताय यागनेति सामानाधिकरणेनान्वयो भविष्यति। तथाच मत्तर्थलक्षणापतितिति परिहरति—उद्दित्रच्छाब्दस्या दिन। उद्दित्तत्ति। ‘सोमन् यजेते’ति विधिर्निहीनप्रस्ताव इति शेषः।

इति द्वितीयं वाक्यमेदप्रसरं नामप्रमापि निमित्तमुदाहरणार्थ दश्यति—चित्रया यजेती। वाक्यमेदारपपाद्यति—तथा हीत्यादिना। अतेि। ‘चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम’ इत्यस्मिन्वाय इत्यतः। गुणविशिष्टेऽर्थि। चित्राश्चाब्दस्यसूत्ति चित्रचरणांकृतिकृतिविशिष्टस्य:। अत्र विशिष्टविधानांसंहारे हृदमाहे—द्रिश्यादिना। तत्संख्यं प्राजापत्यः।
पत्तिमिलनेन गुणस्व विहिततत्त्वातिद्विशिष्ट्यागविलयनुपप्पतः।
यगस्य फलसंवन्धे गुणसंबन्धे च विधीमाने वाक्यमेदः।
तस्माचित्राशयदः कर्मनामदेहयम्।
तथा चित्रायागेन पर्षु भावयेदिति सामानाधिकरणेनावन्याच्य वाक्यमेदः।
प्रकटेरस्येकृत्रियत्वेन चित्राशयद्वाच्यविलयत्वोपपपति।

मितीति। तद्भवधिमिल्येकृत्युपक्रमप्रजापतिदेवताकं कर्ममेयः।
तद्भवधिमिल्ये।
निरक्तुगुणविधिदैस्तेः।
दश्यवायदिन्तनकार्याय सत्कर्मोपपति
वाक्यविद्यात् त्त्वजुगुणविद्याभिद्वाविद्याभिन्वता सत्तारस्वेदगुणविद्याभिन्वता
शक्तिः त्त्वमेदि भावः।
अन्तर दश्यवायवाच्य दश्यादिनी पदेव दश्याणि श्रुतावाच्यानि,
उदक्ष पर्षु प्रभावादायात्सः, श्रुतितप्यविसंबंधायाचायायस्य वाच्यस्य
वाच्यात्त्वात्।
तथा च त्रयां दश्यादिनी विचित्रायणे देयम्म्व्याये
पदाम्बातान्ताति।

नन्वत्र वाच्ये संविचरितायक्तस्तुतस्य यागस्य
पशुस्वपपफलसंबन्ध्यास विचित्रायक्तस्तुतस्य पुराणसंबन्ध्यायस
विद्याति।

तदववस्त्रां कर्म-नामभेदयतां चित्राशयद्वाच्यक्षारावः—यागशेति।
तथा यागेन पर्षु भाव यागेन च ताश्यागेन भावयेदिति यागस्य
गुणजोभोभयसंबन्धे विद्यायमाने सत्यविश्वासामस्य वाक्यमेदः दुर्बलता इति भावः।
उपपादितं वाक्यमेदरस्यम्पसंहरति—
सिद्धे, चित्राशयद्वस तथामाने वाच्य योजयति—

tथाचेति।
सामानाधिकरणेनेति।
विचित्रावधिन्त्याग-सामानाधिकरणेन नामेभवाधिस्वायत्तानामकास्य यागेन पर्षु भावेविद्यार-कारकात् निहितवाक्यमेदापतिरिष्ट्यः।
अनेकद्रव्यत्वेनेति।

दश्यवाय-चित्रायणेकद्रव्यस्याधिकरणेत्वेनेति।
नन्तु चित्राशयविचित्रायक्तस्यः।

प्रतिततो: ब्रह्मस्य च विभवमः।
प्राणिविस्तारज्जूत्रत्वेन दश्यिद्रव्यं कर्मणि निर्विशेषस्य
वाक्यमेदः प्रकटे कर्मणि तादात्माविधियां कियते यत् प्राणिद्रव्यं
कर्मणि, अनासाराधिरां चाचार्यां प्रकृतिमात्रे प्रवेशाधिकारात्।
चित्रायक्तस्यापनार्थाधिकरणेकद्रव्यस्याधिकरणेनेति।

१  द्रव्यर्वते चित्रा इति पाठ।
तत्प्रत्येक शास्त्राध्यायमेत्यत्वम्।

‘अग्रिहोत्र जुहोती’ त्यत्र अग्रिहोत्रश्रवणस्य कर्मनामधेयतंतं तत्प्रत्येक शास्त्रात्। तस्य गुणस्य प्रस्त्यापकस्य-प्राप्तस्य शास्त्रस्य विधिमान्तत्वात्, अग्रिहोत्र श्रवणं कर्मनामधेयमिति यात्रात्। नन्वयं गुण-कर्मणि तेन गुणो विधियते। तथाच ‘अग्रिहोत्र पशुमालमात्रेते’ तिथि विहितं पशुयागमन वाक्ये यज्ञेति पदेनानुष्ठ तत्र चित्रापदेन चित्राविकल्पं पूर्णी गुणी विधियते हि चेच। चित्रलेण बृहतीन च तं भावे दिति इयोरूणास्य-योगिधार्ये वाक्यमेव श्रवणस्य सर्वसंमतत्वात्। तथाचोक्तम्—‘प्रात् कर्मणि नन्वयो विधातु’ शाक्यस्ते गुणः। अग्राते तु विषयेन्नवहोक्रेव्यक्ततम्।’ हि इति।

नन्वयं वाक्यमेव परिहाराय गुणमयविशिष्ट पशुद्वस्य-रूपम् कारं विधियत इति चेच। गौरववक्षणायक्षेत्रमेव प्रसवत्त चित्रानामकस्य याग्योपतिचवर्णम् भवति। याग्यमङ्गलयोगोद्धारेद्या-दित्रवमुक्तापितदेवतादेवोपयोगिधार्यात्। उपनसयं च तस्य याग्यसः चित्राय यज्ञेत पशुक्रमः’ इयेतपदेन वाक्यमेव याग्यस भुजसंभज्जोष्णवत्। एनच सति प्रश्नार्थौ दध्येत। अग्रिहोत्र चारस्तुनादेन, तादशुगुणविधाने तु प्रकटसहारायकत्रक्त्रिये प्रसवेयातो, लिङ्गप्रयोग्य चारुवादलाएकार-न्मुहो विध्यो बाध्येत, तस्मातिच्यार्यापदं नामधेयेव न गुणविधिरिति व्ययूम।

इदारी तत्प्रत्येक शास्त्रश्रवणार्तीयनिमित्तावमधेरत्वमित्रिहोत्रश्रवणस्य प्रदर्श-यति—अग्रिहोत्रमिति। ‘तत्प्रत्येक चारुशास्त्रमिति’ हि तत्प्रत्येक चारुस्त्रम्। तस्य भवितार्थमाहिं—तस्येलियार्थन।

नन्वयं अग्रिहोत्रु हुजीनो विशिष्टपशु गुणसैव विधिं नामधेयत्वमित्रिहोत्र-श्रवणस्य शीक्षार्थमिति विधिमिति। तथसः सत्त्वसमासमाधिष्ठयो होमाधार्यत्वानिर्मुखस्य गुणस्य विधानं शीक्षितस्य तदात्त्वात्रेषां निर्मुखस्य गुणस्य वाक्यान्तरेण प्रातात्त्वलोकतेन भविष्यान्नायायक्षमाप्तेते-
विषयित कुतो नेति चेत्र। गुद्रार्हौ होत्रमात्तितिः समसीमसमापानो तिरिध्य होमाशार्थव्रेनात्रिरूपो गुणो विवेयस्तुदा ‘यदाहृन्नीये जुहोती’ त्यानेनेतस्याः प्रामात्सर सरवराख्यात्मकम्, अयम्ये होत्रमति चतुर्थीसमासमार्थि अस्त्रिदेवतारूपगुणोपनेन विधीयत् इति चेत्र।

तदेवताया: शामनान्यरेण प्रामात्सर।

देवतारूपेष्वानांप्रियापक्षाख्ये प्रथमः।

किं तत्क्षास्तान्तरमिति चेत्र। ‘यदाम्ये च प्रजापत्ये च सायां जुहोती’ तति केचित्। अपरे तु ‘अनुज्ञायोतिः द्वरायोतिः साहेति मन्त्रचरण एवार्थिरूपः’

लयः—गुद्रार्हाविलादिना। चतुर्थीसमासमार्थि तिरिध्य अस्त्रिदेवतारूपस्य गुणस्य विधानमार्थे द्वैते—चतुर्थील्यादिना। नात्र देवतारूपेष्वानांस्य गुणस्य विधानमुपपचत्ति इति समावेच्छे—नेति। तत्र हेतुमहाय—तहेव—

tयाया इति। अयम्ये तच्छब्दध्ये।

देवतारूपेष्वानांप्रियापक्षाशास्त्र प्राच्छिन्न—किमिति। केमांचिन्मतानुसारेऽऽोधराह—यदाम्ये चेत्र। अत्रस्मार्थितिरिध्यस्मार्थिण्य प्रामात्सरस्मार्थमनूय तत्सुभित्रप्रजापतिमात्रविवाने ठाम्वं तदुभमसुभित्रवीज्य विधाने। गौर- विभिति न समुचितोमविन्याने ‘यदाम्ये च सायां जुहोती’ यथा स्वतंत्रक्षयो—

मित्रसागरस्वीकर्षिनेतिचित्रित्यनेन सूचितम्। अधुना सिद्धान्तमतेनोद्वराह—

अपरेतिचित्रित। किच ‘अनुज्ञायोतिः द्वरायोतिः साहेति सायां जुहोती’ तति विभित्ति मन्त्रं प्रामात्सरस्मार्थमनूय तत्सुभित्रस्य प्रजापते। ‘यदाम्ये च प्रजापत्ये च सायां जुहोती’ यथा सायां कालेश्विन्देवतालं विधीयते। ‘सूर्यो ज्योतिर्योतिः सूर्यः साहेति प्रात्सरहोती’ तति विभित्ति च मन्त्रं प्रासं सूर्य—

मनूय तत्सुभित्रस्य च तथा ‘यत्सुभित्र च प्रजापत्ये च प्रात्सरहोती’ यथा प्रासं कालेश्विन्देवतालं च विधीयते। तेनान्वेत्रस्मार्थिणां च मन्त्रितितविवेचे—

केनेतिव वायुक्त सिद्धे। ‘यदाम्ये च प्रजापत्ये सायां जुहोति, यत्सुभित्र च प्रात्सरहोती’ तेतर वायुद्वयं व्यविभिति निर्भरे सायां होमेश्विन्देवितरस्य प्रजापतिर्याने प्रात्सरहोतिः सूर्यसुभित्रस्य च तस्ये केनेतिव वायुक्त कुमार्यक्षयवा—
देवतापारकः । नन्वाश्रेम्मत्रैत्वनिकते प्रजापतिदेवताया वाचः स्यात् । मन्वत्रणयः चतुर्थीयो द्वैवलवातः । यथाहृः–तद्वितेन चतुर्थीया वा मन्वत्रणया वा पुनः । देवताया विधिस्त्र द्वर्द्वां तू परं परे मिति चेन्ह।

‘यद्यद्ये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीं' त्यत्र न केवले प्रजापतिविधानम्, किंतु मन्वत्रण्याप्राप्तसमाधिमनूः तत्सम्भवितः प्रजापतिदेवताया। एवंच न वाचः; केवलप्रजापतिविधानामात्यां ।

प्रजापतिनां विद्याधिक सुनिक्तोमथयावाहिनेषु कथं

दिवर्थं विस्तरणाधिक तु न्यायप्राप्ताः द्वस्यः । नन्वाश्रेम्मत्रैत्वनिकते प्रजापतिनां तथौ वाचः: स्यात्मण्यापतेतेश्चतुर्थीयो देवतालाभेन प्रातलेन प्रचललः । अहंसुतम मन्वर्थण्याप्रातलेन द्वैवलवाच । नच ‘सायं देववेते’ तित्त्र-तप्रज्ञावयशः देवतायेन समारणवः तथा ‘संप्रदाने चतुर्थीं’ तित्त्र संप्रदातामाः समायः: समरणाः । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् ।

तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् ।

तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । ।

तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । ।

तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । ।

तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । ।

तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । ।

तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथयत्रविविधता । स्यातिदित वाच्यम् । ।

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नेति वाच्यम्। समुचितोभयविधानापेक्षयान्यत: प्रासमप्रिमणोऽभद्र
समुचितप्रजायायतिमानविधानयाने लाघवात्। एवं प्रयाजेषु समिदा-
दिन्देवनाताः ‘समिधः समिधोऽस्र आज्ञस्य व्यन्तिः’ त्यादिसमच-
वर्णंभय: प्रासस्वतात् । ‘समिधोऽस्र यज्ञीत्यादिदिषु समिदादिश्वद्वानसत-
त्यादिस्मानामानवेयम्।

तद्यपेदेश्च अर्थमानवेयत्वम्।

‘श्रेयेनामाभिवधारण्येजेत्यत्र श्रेयेनशब्दस्य कर्मनामायेत्वत् तद्यप-
देशात्। तेन व्यपदेशावुपामानाचदन्यथावतः उत्पथितिः यावत्।
ततथाति यज्ञवेयं तस तु स्वतंत्रमभवति। यत्र श्रेयो विभेयः यस्तः,
तदर्शावेत्त्वात् स्वतंत्रत: कार्यं ‘यस्या वै श्रेयो निपत्यावदते एवमयं
रोहानुवादेन समुचितवृत्तिवेयोभण्यस्य विधानं क्रियत इति कर्म न स्वीकार्यत
इत्यादिः तत्योऽस्मुचितवृत्तिवेयापेक्षयां स्वरूपन्ति: प्रासमप्रिमणस्य वेय-
वेन समुचितप्रजायायतिमानविधानमेववृत्तिमं परिहर्षित-नवेल्दादितिः।
तत्रशास्त्रावृतामानवेये उदाहरणान्तरमाहै—एवमिति। समिदादिस्मान स्त्री-
वत्सशब्दाः इत्यादिस्मान सत्तानातपाताय: शब्दम् गुमन्ते।

इदानी चतुर्ग्रन्थिमितेन तद्यपेदेशाश्चुपेण श्रेयेनशब्दस्य कर्मनामायेयस्य
प्रदर्शितं—श्रेयेनाति। कर्मनामायेयत्वमिति। नन्त्र श्रेयेनशब्दस्य कर्म-
नामायेयत्वं न मवति, किंतु सोमयाग नियं सोमद्वयं वादित्वं तस्य
स्वाहे पश्चिदस्यरूपो गुण: काम्यो विभागे, तथा सति श्रेयेनशब्दस्य
पक्ष्यो लोकप्रसिद्धं हृदिपर्वतम् भवतीशास्त्रं श्रेयेनशब्दस्य कर्मनाम-
भेयं हेतुमाह—तद्यपेदेशादितिः। तद्यपेदेशाशः व्याच्ये—तेनेति।
श्रेयेनेवधेऽः। तत्तदिः। उपमानोपेयभवस्य भेदशैलत्वादेवारस्यवाद-
वाकः श्रेयेनोपमानेन विधेयस्तु: श्रेयेनामककर्मण्यबंधमेववापण्यान्त्र
पश्चिदस्यरूपो गुणो विधावृत्तं शक्यत इति भावः। तदर्शावुपाम-
चिंतेनोपपादद्विधै—तथाहीर्दादितिः। तदिति। विभेयस्य स्वते:
कर्मचिदादिधर्मः। अनुति। श्रेयेनाभिवधारण्येजेत्यत्वेऽधर्मः। श्रेयो
इति। श्रेयेनामककपक्षारुपो इत्येऽधर्मः। तथेवेति। श्रेयेनामककपक्षी-
द्विपत्तं आचायवं निपत्यादृतं इत्यनेनार्थवादेन म्वेनः स्त्रोतुं न शक्यः। श्येनोपमनेनार्थान्तरस्तुतंः क्रियमाणंत्वात्। नच श्येनोप-
मानलेन स एव स्त्रोतुं शक्यते, उपमानोपमेनमेवाश् भिन्ननिश्चिता
वात्। यदा तु श्येनसंज्ञो यांगो विश्लेष्यति तदार्थवादेन श्येनोप-
मानेन तस्य स्तुति: करो शक्यत इति श्येनशब्दः कर्मनामिधेयं
तथ्यपदेशादिति।
कर्मनामिधेयं उपत्तिचित्रणवल्लियस्तंबम्।
उपत्तिचित्रणवल्लियस्तंबम पश्चम नामदेवनिमित्तमिति केिचित्।

धिरेशस्वेयेऽः। यथेऽति। यथा श्येनः पक्षितिरेषो निपत्य मत्या-
दीर्घान्तुनादते एवमर्य म्येननामको यांगो द्विपत्तं आचायवं श्रां निप-
त्यादृतं इत्यः। यमाधिति। श्येनेनेति ब्राह्मेशयः। अतेऽति।
अत्र प्रकटेन् इत्यनार्थवादेन श्येनः पक्षितिरेष एव स्त्रोतुं न शक्यत
इत्यः। तत्त्व हेतुमाह—श्येनेति। नतु म्येनार्थवादोपमानेन श्येन एव
पक्षितिरेषः करं न स्त्रोतुं शक्यः यादिक्यत आह—न श्येनोपमानत्वे-
नेति। तद्दश्यते हेतुमाह—उपमानेति। यदैत्र श्येनसंज्ञकस्य याग्य
विधेयक्यम् स्त्रीकितं तदा ताण्डवार्थवादोपमानेन तस्य श्येननंज्ञकस्य याग्य
स्तुति: करं शक्यः भव्येनेयायाः—तद्द्वादिना। फलितमुपसंहति—
इती। एवुलेन प्रकारेणेऽः।
अतृ कर्मनामिधेयं चोल्लकतिष्टगुणवल्लियस्तंबं पश्चमम पिति निमित्त भव
तीति। केिचाचित्मतमाह—उपत्तिचित्रणेऽः। तत्त्रोदाहरणमाह—यथेऽति।
अतेऽति। अस्मिन्वाक्ये बैठेदेवशब्दस्य विश्वेदेवदेवताविधायकतः न संभा-
क्युपकतिष्टगुणवत्तीनां बलियवादविनवयः।। फलितमुपसंहति—
इती। तस्येऽः। अतेऽं बौधम्—चातुर्मायो चावारि प्रवेणी—
वैद्वेदो वस्तुप्रकाशः साक्षैः छुनासीरोर्चे।। तेषु प्रयो यवमेत्यद्वी
यागा विहिता:—अप्रेयमयाकपालं निर्याप्ति, सौँम्य चर्च, सावित्र द्वादशक-
पालं, सारस्वत चर्च, पौष्प चर्च, भाष्य तत्कपालं, वैद्वेदेवीमामिक्षां,
धानाप्रवत्यमेकपालभिदति। तेपामध्यां यागाना संविधानविदमानायते—
यथा वैष्णवेन यजते त्या त्याव्रततिष्ठति श्रावणां वलीयस्वाभिः
श्रेद्वेदश्रव्य विष्णुदेवेन तत्त्वाभिधानकल्पं न संबंधतीति दर्मनामधियन-
श्चिन्य बोधिन्त्यां भीतिमेवतं स्वतंत्रता भवेदतः कर्मनामभेदयतः
स्वदृढ्य न तत्त्वकथा श्रावण भीतिः प्रकटतयां विष्णुदेववर्पुस्मणसंप्रतिपत्तिः श्रावण साधूश कर्मनामरूपवेदक्षेत्र सत्त्वात्। 'यज्ञनेत्रे
द्वायं समयजंति तत्त्वेदवश्च वैष्णववर्पुत' हि ति।

वैष्णवेन यजते ति। अत्र चाश्रावणीयाग्रायायात्तेन नृसुर वैष्णवश्रव्य वैष्ण
वेदश्रव्यस्वाभिः विष्णुवेदादं अरुप्तस्तं गुणस्तेतु विद्यते। गुणपि वैष्णवायामादिकिः विशेष्येतिः: प्रातास्तथाप्रेमेतं दस्तो गुणे गुणात्वामादिकिः विद्यते। तेष्वार्यामादिकिः: सत्त्वित सत्त्वादं गुणभावतेतु देवता विकल्प्यात्म। नामवेदेश तु साधूश नामात्वायात्तेकं वायात्तेन गुणस्तेतु विशेष्येतिः प्रातास्तथाविधियानी विभिन्नात्तेन विशेष्येतिः प्रातास्तथाविधियानी विभिन्नात्तेन विशेष्येतिः प्रातास्तथाविधियानी विभिन्नात्तेन विशेष्येतिः। उत्पत्तिकायक्षेत्रात्तेन गुणस्तेतु विद्यते। 'प्राचीनप्राणो वैष्णवेन यजते' त्यादिः वैष्णवश्रव्यस्वाभिः विष्णुवेदादं अरुप्तस्तं गुणस्तेतु विद्यते। नामप्रभावितमित्तमूल्युता निश्चितस्तु द्रिया। अधिक्षाराणी विशेषां देवानामात्त्वादद्य सतस्तहर्षिताः सत्त्वां तत्त्वां वायात्तेन विशेष्येतिः। विशेष्येति अद्यान्त हृतिर्त्वानिष्ठां कर्तिर्त्व इति वा ते यज्ञायेत्वर्पुः नामात्त्वां मधियमिति, तथायच श्रावण ‘यज्ञनेत्रे: समयजंति तत्त्वाद्वेदस्य वैष्णववर्पुंमिति। देवताविकल्प्यस्तु समान-भवायात्तेन युज्यते, अर्थाद्वर्तु उत्तमायात्तेन विशेष्येति उत्तमविशेष्यादुवेदः: तस्मादवैष्णवश्रव्यः कर्मनामधियमिति सिद्धान्ता:। वस्तुगतिना
माथ्याय तत्त्वाद्वेदश्रव्यः कर्मनामधियमाहं -वस्तुस्तित्वा। प्रकटतयां इति। तत्त्वाद्वेदनामात्त्वायात्तेन सत्त्वां तत्त्वां प्रकटतयां इत्यत:। विशेष्येति। प्रकटतयां विशेष्यवर्पुस्मण: संप्रतिपति: संप्रातो यस्मात्त्वाद्रिवश्रव्यस्यस्य:। तत्र गुणप्राप्तं शाश्वमुदयहरिति-
यज्ञनेत्रात्तेन इति। अस्य शाश्वस्य कर्तुर्पुणं प्रकटे यागे विशेष्यवर्पुस्मण
प्राप्तक्षेत्रतिः भाव:। नामवेदेश तु सवेत्त्व व्यवहार एव। नवं-
পুরুষাঃ নিবর্তকঃ বাক্যঃ নিষেধঃ, নিষেধান্যাসাভ্যাসস্তুঃ। ক্রিয়নিদ্রিকজনকেনেনাত্মস্বাভাবিকুঃ। তথাহি যথা নিষেধঃ মন্ত্‌নাশায়শ্চলভাষ্মী জ্ঞানপুর্বকেনেনাত্মভাষ্মী। নিষেধঃ যাগাযায়ধিযাসাভ্যাসুমাশিক্ষাপুরুষঃ তথ্য নিষেধঃ। \\

ন্যায়নাগর্জুনলিখিতঃ।

নন্দ নিষেধান্যাসস্তুঃ কথা নিন্তনায়প্রতিপ্রতিক্ষেপে চেতন্তু চেতন্তু চেতন্তু।

তদং মল্লভক্তান্যাসিন্ধিনকানন্যাসালোপনননামায় বিচিত্রার্থশ্চ চৌদক্তার্থস্থানন নিরূপিতম। অথাৰ্যঃ নিষেধান্যাসালোপনায় নিরূপিতন শ্রমতয়িতীপুরুষাঃ নিষেধঃ।

তথায় মল্লভক্তান্যাসাৰ্থশ্চজনকেনেনাত্মত্তান্যাসত্তবায় নিরূপিতায় পুরুষাঃ নিষেধঃ।

নন্দ নিষেধান্যাসালোপনননামায় নিন্তনায়প্রতিপ্রতিক্ষেপে চেতন্তু চেতন্তু।

নন্দ নিষেধান্যাসালোপনননামায় নিন্তনায়প্রতিপ্রতিক্ষেপে চেতন্তু।

নন্দ নিষেধান্যাসালোপনননামায় নিন্তনায়প্রতিপ্রতিক্ষেপে চেতন্তু।
न तावदत्र धातृयथ्य नर्येनान्याय:। अन्यथवाधानेपि तस्य प्राक्यार्थभावान्यपरस्यनत्वेनोपस्थितम्। नहन्योपसर्जनलोपस्थितम्। अन्यथा राजपुरुषमानुवेयदावापि राज्य: क्रियायापचः। अतः प्रश्यार्थ्यत्र नर्येनान्याय:। तत्त्वापि नाल्यात्त्वाण्वाचार्यार्थम्भावानात्सा हिंदेश्वराच्छर्वर्त्नोपसर्जनलोपस्थितः। किंतु हिंदेश्वराच्छर्वद्भावानाः। तस्या: सर्वप्रेष्याः प्रधानत्वात्।

श्रेष्ठानाश्रद्धते—नन्विति। नर्येनान्यायस्य धातृयथ्यनावायधानेपि धातृयथ्य प्रार्थ्यार्थभावान्यपरस्यनत्वेनोपस्थितम् नर्येनान्यायः। संभवति। अन्यथोपसर्जनलोपस्थितस्यावाचार्यार्थसर्जनलोपस्थितयोग्यार्थितः परिहरति।—उच्चत्त प्रवाहिनम्। अत्रीति। ‘न कठजं भलाने’द्वाराबिविधः। अन्यथवाधानेपि धातृयथ्य नर्येनान्यायसूचः। तस्येति। धातृयथ्येऽस्यः। अन्यथोपसर्जनलोपस्थितस्यावाचार्यार्थोपसर्जनलोपस्थितस्य योग्यार्थिताः को दोष इत्यत आह—नन्विति। तत्र वार्तक दोषमाह—अन्यथेति। अन्यियोपार्णानोपस्थितस्य—तस्यायन्यृत्त विशेषणान्यान्यायस्यविवेकारे पुष्ठार्थसर्जनलोपस्थितस्य राज्योपि क्रियार्थं सर्जनन्यायापूर्वकोऽपीकोऽपी धातृयथ्यस्य नर्येनान्यायसमथवातः। दिक्क्यापि कार्णार्थार्थअत्यसर्जनलोपस्थितस्य तत्रायन्यायसमथवातः परिहरोपार्णायन्यायसमथवातः। नर्येनान्यायाः। भक्तियाह—अत इति। किंत्रु प्रत्यायादोपि दिक्क्यो भवतिक्यात्यात्वाण्वाचार्यार्थभावान्याय श्रव्दद्भावान चैति, तयामेव नाल्यात्वाण्वाचार्यायन्यायः अर्थायन्यायाः। नर्येनान्यायः। संभवतीयाह—तत्त्वापीति। तत्र हेतुमाह—तस्या इति। प्रवर्तनोपसर्जनलोपस्थितः। श्रव्दद्भावान्यायस्य विशेषणान्यात्वाण्वाचार्यार्थभावान्याय श्रव्दद्भावान्यायः। तत्र हेतुमाह—तस्या इति। प्रवर्तनोपसर्जनलोपस्थितः।
नर्तकेष्व ख्याति प्रत्यसमविभाषयुपदार्थिरतिरिथिबोधकतन्त्रमुः।
यथा घटो नास्तीख्यादेव अस्तीतिशश्रुद्धसमर्थाभियावहतो नन्द घटसङ्क-
विरोधि घटासचं गमयति तद्रह हेंसमथाभियावहतो नन्द हेंसर्थ-
प्रवर्तनानिर्विरोधिनी निर्विक्षणमेव वोधयति। तद्रह विविधवाक्यथव-
पृष्ठ्यं मां प्रत्यत्यतीति प्रतीते:। तसाच्रिपेदवाक्यस्यलेन निर्विक्षणेष
प्रयोजक कितु सर्वपैक्षया मुस्त्येवोनेसथिततः, तव शब्दभावनायायमवाचि
तन्तति भावः।

एवं शब्दभावनारूपस्य प्रस्यार्थस्य प्रस्न्तनानिरोपोऽय सज्जेनान्ये सिद्धे
नमः प्रत्यार्थेऽमूलप्रस्न्तनानिरोपिनिर्विक्षणोऽधकलप्रदर्शनाय प्रशमं तत्व-
भावं प्रदर्शयति—नर्तकेष्व ख्याति इति। अत्र स्वसमिभाषयुपदार्थिर-
पितृविविधकरं स्वतन्त्वपदार्थिरतिरिथिबोधकतन्त्रमुः। तेन कठज्ञादिपपदार्थीना
मथि विरोधिनिरोधकरं नन्दो दुर्भो स्वतन्त्रिमायणेन सहस्रहून्यासमसमि-
व्याहार्य स्वतविज्ञानो निरस्तरमुः। तेषां नज्ञनितपदार्थिवाचार्यस्य दर्शितलये
नन्दस्तिरिथिरिथिबोधकसंस्कारायू:। नमः स्वसमिभाषयुपदार्थिरतिरिथिबोधकतन्त्रम
द्धातेन सम्बन्धित—यथेष्टादनित्यं घटसङ्कविरोधिति। नास्तीख्यादेव
कस्तासंबंधस्मर्थीति सत्तशाब्दान्यस्य नन्दाय बोधयति इति सत्वनिरुपपकाका-
थ्या: स्वतादृढान्वितसाधविरोधितिरङ्गेयः। इद्धानी नमः सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनस्य
फलं दर्शयति—तद्रहि। तत्तद्धिवयः। तत्तपदशितस्वभावं नज्ञिनः।
इहेति। 'न कठज्ञाम मक्ख्यें गाणेन न हस्तं' इयादोऽद्भ काक्य इत्येकः। नन्द
छिदः प्रस्न्तनाप्रतिपादकं सिद्धे तत्स्वभावज्जस्तदथ। प्रस्न्तनानिरोपिनिर्विक्षण
प्रत्यार्थे भेल्या तस्य प्रस्न्तनयमेव तदेव कुलाय इयादश्रेण तव हेंसमवाहे—विखिति।
प्रतीतिति। प्रस्न्तनाप्रतीतिरङ्गेयः। यद्वा 'यजेत स्कंग्कासा' इति विविधवाक्यश्रेण
मां प्रवर्त्यति प्रस्न्तनाप्रतीतितवं, 'न कठज्ञाम मक्ख्यें'दियाधिनिरो
पेदवाक्यश्रेणेयं न स्वप्नान्त्यतिति स्निर्विक्षणप्रतीतिरिथियाहुः। विशुद्ध
दिहेतुवाक्यं द्धातन्त्रार्थान्तितिक्रियायः। नन्द भावना प्रतिशालयं
निर्विक्षणवाक्यार्थमुपसंहति—तसादिति। 'न कठज्ञाम मक्ख्यें'दिस्त्र कठज्ञ-
वाक्यार्थः । यदा तु प्रखयांशस्य तत्रानवे वात्सं तदा धातुनिर्माय तत्रानवः ।

बाधकं द्विविधम् ।

तच बाधकं द्विविधम् । तस्य तत्तमित्युपक्रमो विकल्पप्रसङ्किष्ठं । तत्त्रायं
‘नेत्रेतोत्तमतादिन्यं’मिल्यादोः तस्य तत्तमित्युपक्रमपैदाय तदाय पाठात् ।
तथाचात् पुरुषादाश्यम् । तथाहि—ततशब्दस्य कर्त्तव्यार्थं रुद्धध्व—
कर्मकमल्काशरानुक्रमयुपक्रमप्रवृत्तिनिजानकद्वैरनाप्रति विद्वयप्रवृत्तिनाविविधानिर्धितनिति नाच वाक्यार्थः । एवमन्यापि लिङ्गवाक्येषु सर्वं निवृत्तनाया एव वाक्यार्थनि
विभिन्निष्ठयोबिन्निष्ठयार्थमपुषपन्न भवति, हननारिधर्मनिर्विकालार्थविभाषणम्
पक्षे तु कर्त्तव्यात्याय एवोभयं त्वमित्राश्रमरूपसिद्ध्वं त्रायो तु युक्तं ।
यथाहृ—‘अन्तरं यादवं थोके ब्रह्मध्यायमेथयोऽः’ द्विते तात्त्वेव विधान्
प्रतिप्रेष्योऽर्थितं । तस्मानिविख्यन्तैव प्रतिप्रेष्यं वाक्यार्थं इति सिद्धम् । यदि तु
प्रखयार्थस्य नर्वेणनायं किचिदनिर्म स्वत: तदा धातुर्मिथवन्न नर्वेणनायं
भवतीहां—यदात्वियादिना।

तत्र बाधकं विभज्यते—ततचेति । प्रखयार्थस्य नर्वेणनायं वर्तमानं चेयः ।
तत्राचमिति । तत्रोदकृष्ठभाष्यम् आचार्यकमिथ्यं । तस्य तत्त—
मितीति । तस्य धातकस्य ब्रह्मचारिणिविषेधस्य त्रतं प्रजापतिदेवतादात्मानीश्वर
पांसक्तवाच्यं किचिदनृष्ठेयमिथ्यं । एतदायक्यापाठादिति ।
‘नेत्रेतोत्तमतादिन्यं’ नालसंख्यं कदाचनेर्मेतदायक्यापाठादित्यं । तथाचेति ।
तस्य तत्तमिति स्रातकस्यानुपयुपक्रमं ‘नेत्रेतोत्तमतं’मिल्याविकायक्यापाठे चासिन
्याये पर्यंदास्य समाध्रीयत इथ्यं । किचं ‘नेत्रेतोत्तमतादिल्’मित्रत
नालप्रमिताश्रयं तपस्यें त्रृती नतु पर्यंदासं, लक्षणादोः प्रतिप्रेष्यं च
प्रातिसूत्रकलायद्रुदकस्य प्रतिप्रेष्यं वैधिक्यं प्रातिस्तु प्रयासना भवेत् ।
तथाच सति यत्र कर्त्ताविशेष्यानि विभिन्तत तथाय प्रतिप्रेष्यं उद्योगमोहिदेशं
प्रवेशते । एवंच सति नात्र फल कल्पनीय स्वातः । पर्यासात्माश्रयं पुष्यार्थस्य
श्रीकारितथाििष्ठयं फलस्य कल्पनीयतवामाहेत्, तस्मादन्त्र कथं तपस्यं प्रतिपर
इत्याश्रयं, तस्य तत्तमित्युपक्रमं ‘नेत्रेतोत्तमति’म्यावाच्छात्मालायतस्य
चस्य व्रतसम्भन्त्र स्थानकस्य व्रतान्तर कर्त्त्वभीनोपक्रमातृत्वं किं तत्त्वते प्रतिवेद्यमित्याकालनाथाद्वारे ‘नेत्रेश्वरनं’मिलादिना कर्त्त्वार्थं एव प्रातिपादित्यं। अन्यथा पूर्वोर्वार्क्योरकार्क्यन्तर्वं न स्त्रातं। तथाच नर्घेन्न न प्रत्यार्थीन्न्यं। कर्त्त्वार्थंनवोदयात्। विध्यत्त्वतिर्वर्तनान्तिराधिनिविन्दनान्यां एव तार्टाहशनं चोधनानं। तसाथ्र कर्त्त्वार्थंच कर्त्त्व्रूपार्थं रुद्त्वादान किचिदसुवेयस्य प्रतिवेदित्वं। तत्र पर्यासार्थ्यां सत्यवोपपष्टते। किंचोफ्र्रामावधे प्रतिवेद्यसम्भवित्वाछानापि कर्त्त्वत्वात्। उपक्रमावधे तु स्थानकाणुक्त्रयंत्रानावेत्ते प्रतिवेद्यत्वात्। काली तान्तिक्कन्तराल्यक्ष्याया स्थानकमन्तप्रदेशनायास्य। वाक्य्यावाक्यार्दशात्र कर्त्त्वं एव कर्त्त्वपर्यं वक्तव्यं। सच पर्यासार्थ्यां कम्यंते निशेषपर्यं तु दुःखेम एवेवनिप्राणेष पर्यासार्थ्यार्धसपुष्यापदयवित्—तत्त्वाहीण्यात्। नेक्षेत्रोदान्त्यायानीर्स्यार्थ्यस्य प्रतिपादिनात्मके वाधकमाहं—अन्यथेति। पूर्वंतर्वेति। तस्य व्रतसम्भन्त्र पूर्व्यंत्रक्षमु। नेक्षेत्रोदान्त्याणावत्सर्वाभ्यं तु तथेवेत्रार्थक्षमु वाधितेवथर्थुः। नसु नेक्षेत्रोदान्त्याणानी भवेत्र कर्त्त्वेत्रार्थ्याभ्यं प्रतिपादित्वं तत्त्वादिकमन्ययात। तथाच नेक्षेत्रोदान्त्याणानीर्स्यार्थ्यस्य प्रतिपादिनात्मके च नर्घेन्न प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयावकाण्डो न भवतीयर्थुः। नसु नेक्षेत्रोदान्त्याणानी भवेत्र कर्त्त्वेत्रार्थ्याभ्यं प्रतिपादिनात्मके च नर्घेन्न प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयावकाण्डो न भवतीयर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थ्यानी भवेत्र कर्त्त्वेत्रार्थ्याभ्यं प्रतिपादित्वं तत्त्वादिकमन्ययात। तस्य नर्घेन्न प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थाचार्यस्य नर्घेन्न प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यात्र नर्घेन्न प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थान्न्यान्वयार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थर्थुः। नसु प्रत्यार्थार्थर्थुः।
त्राभावान्। तस्माचेन्द्रित्यत्र नझा धात्विचिरोधीनीक्रणसंयक्त एव लक्षणया प्रतिपादते तस्मा कर्त्यायतसंभवात्।

पर्युदासपक्षे नेष्टेतेल्या वाक्यार्थः।

आदिन्यानिकनीक्रणसंयक्तेन महायेदिति वाक्यार्थः। तत्र महायाक्षाहामुि अति गौरस बियुक्तो भवतीति वाक्ये शेषावगतः।

धातुना योगात्मा धात्व्रेष्यक्रणाविरोधी कष्णार्थः प्रतिपादते। यथापि नोदभाव एव शक्ति। तथाचेन्द्रक्षामात्र एव नञ्जः शक्यायिः धावात् नञ्जः तद्व्री-रोधी तस्मादधामाष्टिततेन गौरवापते। तदन्त्रविश्रृंज्ञतदभावेषु नजिति समां तु प्रत्येक्षिमाणां न शत्यभिमाणां तथापि नेष्टेतेल्यां प्रत्ययस्य नञ्जां संबन्धात् नञ्जुसंवस्त्रु-यन च तेन तावदकळ्यति विशेषः लीलर्त्यः। तत्र न तावद्वितेऽथ विस्तारशुक्तं शक्यते, नञ्जां तद्भावायोगणात्। नापि तदभावावे विस्तारशुक्तं शक्यते, अवाक्यस्वाविषयतवत्। तस्मात् पर्युदासपक्षाणेन धात्वेष्यक्रण-णाविरोधी कष्णात्र धियानयोगोयों नञ्जा लक्षणया प्रतिपादते। च सब विधानयोगः पदार्थोद्देशीक्रणसंयक्त एव तस्येष्यक्रणाविरोधकर्मेऽवसंभवाच च। च संक्षेपोद्देशीक्रणाविरोधकर्मेऽवसंभवाच च।

पर्युदासपक्षे नेष्टेतेल्यानि लक्षणसंयक्तप्रक्षेपार्थि—तत्सादिति। लक्षणेति। वसम्भवाहात्मपदार्थाभाव एव नञ्जः। शक्यायः भवति। तथाच शसंवस्त्रुमाश्वाल्यार्थो नञ्जा शक्या प्रतिपाद्यत् नञ्जः तद्भावसंवस्त्रुमां तद्भाविरोधिनि लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते। तद्भावाध्यूर्द्रितिनि संबन्धस्य संभवात्। इति तर्कार्थ। तथाचोषयः तद्भाववस्त्रुमां चादिय नेष्टेतिः इत्येवर्गः। संक्षेपोद्देशीक्रणाविरोधिनि विधीयमानात् नञ्जा लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यत इति भावः। तस्येति। अनीक्रणसं-क्रणेऽवसंभवाः।

पर्युदासपक्षे नेष्टेतेल्यानि लक्षणसंयक्तप्रक्षेपार्थि—आदि-स्वेति। यत्र पर्युदासपक्षे फलस्यात् कल्पनीयत्वापादितं तद्धि न, वाक्येश्वागत्व वाक्यैः फलस्य कल्पनीयत्वाश्वाल्याणेनात्र भाव्यान्वस्य प्रदेशार्थि—तत्स्येति। अनीक्रणसंयक्तप्रक्षेपार्थि। एसास बियुकुरो
पापक्षयो भाव्यतथाश्बरते। एवं च पूर्वाचार्योरेकाचार्यतं निर्विवेकते।
नचात्र धातव्यधिरोधिनः पदार्थान्तरसापि संभवात्तथमनीक्षणसंकल्पेन सावनान्नयं इति वाच्यम्।
तस्य कर्त्तव्यताभावेन प्रक्षेपे भावनान्नयायोग्यत्वशक्ति।
द्वितीयं 'यजलितु येष्यजामहं करोति नातुयाज्येनित्यादायत्र विकल्पप्रसंस्कृता च पशुदासाधारणात्।

विकल्पप्रसंस्कृतं पशुदासाधारणात्।

तथाहि यथात्व वाक्ये नजर्येष प्रत्यार्थाश्चत: स्वाधू, 'अनुयाजेषु येष यजामहेद्वितीय मत्रस्य प्रतिपेधः सातु, अनुयाजेषु येषजामहं न

भवतीति। पापते विरहितोभवतीधर्मः। किच नेकरोक्तान्तमादिकामिं ज्ञानीक्षणसंकल्पसप्ताहुष्टेय द्यायम् प्रतिपादने तस्य वत्तति व्याकरणान्तरहस्य नेकरोक्तान्तमादिशब्य- नेत्रान्तरसप्ताहुष्टेय नेत्रान्तरस्या द्यायमि।

नरु धातव्यक्षणविरोधिनो बहवः पदार्थं अनुज्ञेता। संहित, ततानं कथमं वायेनन्नयानं संकल्पस्वेतैव भाव- नायं कर्णाधीनां निकृष्ठ इत्यासाध्यं परिहर्षति—नचेतेनादिना।

वद्यां पदार्थान्तराणं पदार्थान्तराणं च धातुप्रक्षणविरोधिमिं संहित, तथापि कायुक्तकाय्क्षणविशेषाश्चात्मकेन वायेनन्नयानं संहित, तथापि ततानं बहवां निकृष्ठ इत्यासाध्यं परिहर्षति—नचेतेनादिना।

संहित इत्याभिप्रेयः तत्र हेतुमाहं—तसेति। पदार्थान्तराणं पदार्थान्तराणं च धातुप्रक्षणविरोधिमिं संहित, तथापि कायुक्तकाय्क्षणविशेषाश्चात्मकेन वायेनन्नयानं संहित, तथापि ततानं बहवां निकृष्ठ इत्यासाध्यं परिहर्षति—नचेतेनादिना।

अन्तः पशुदासाधारणां विकल्पप्रसंस्कृतां निर्विवेकते—तथाहि स्वाधू।

सचेति। निपथ्येङ्गः। तत्र हेतुमाहं—मायाः येषैर्ति। मायादेवैर्ति।
कुष्ठादिति। सच प्रासिपुर्वः एव, प्रासिपुर्वः प्रतिपाद्यात्। प्रासिश्व
‘यज्ञतिष्ठ येवज्ञामहं करोती’ति शास्त्रादेव वाच्या। शास्त्रास्यच
प्रतिलेखे चिकित्र एव नन्तु वाधः। प्रासिमूलरागस्येव तन्मूलशक्-

शाब्दण्डनादेवर गतः: प्रास्यसत्ममवाच्य शाब्दण्डेत् प्रास्यविश्वेयेवर:।
उपपादितां विकल्पप्रसङ्कितमूलसंहति—शाब्दण्डस्येति। नन्तु यथा रा-
गतो हननादी। प्रकृति पुरुषं हननादिप्रासिमूलभूतारागस्य बाधेन ततो न
हनत्वं इत्यादिशाष्ट्रसं निर्विष्टति, तथा ‘यज्ञतिष्ठ येवज्ञामहं करोती’ति
शाब्दादन्यायेष्वं पुनःस्नानकाले यज्ञतिविविशेषादेव ‘ये यज्ञामहं’ इति
मन्त्रस्य समुच्छारे प्रकृति पुरुषं तत्वारितमूलभूतस्य प्रविशितशाब्दस्य यज्ञति-
सामान्ये ‘ये यज्ञामहं’ इति मन्त्राप्राप्यन्यायेश्वरे बाधेन ततो ‘नानुयाजेशु
ये यज्ञामहं करोती’ति शाब्दिक निर्विष्टायो इति कथं न शाब्दण्डस्य बाध:
स्वाध्यत्व आहं—प्रासिति। शाब्दण्डबाधित स्वयं इति शेषः। तन्मूलशाब्द-
स्येति। ‘ये यज्ञामहं’ इति मन्त्रप्रासिमूलशाब्दात् ‘यज्ञतिष्ठ ये यज्ञामहं
करोती’‘येवकु र्पाँचल्यात्तरेण ‘नानुयाजेशु यज्ञामहं करोती’‘येवकु र्पाँच
प्रविशितमन्त्रप्रासिमूलभूतस्य प्रविशितशाब्दस्य बाधायोगादिवर्त्य:।

d Marxist

व्यतिरेकी बोध्यः। तथाच यथा हननादिप्रासिमूलरागस्य भाष्ट्रविश्वासितकस्य
शाब्दण्ड बाधेन भवति तथा मन्त्रप्रासिमूलशाब्दात्तरेण मन्त्रप्रासिमूल-
शाब्दस्य बाधेन न युक्ते निषेधशाब्दस्य निषेधातिविशिष्टवेत्वेन तद्भाषक्या-
वार्तवादादिवयुपहर्ष तप्याभिविधित्वं मूल इति भवत्। यथा तन्मूलशाब्दादिति
प्रकृति प्रविशेष्यवेत्ती, तेनानुष्ठविभविभिविकृतिप्रथितार्थाय श्रमः: कर्तव्यः स्वात्।
केवलतु तन्मूलशाब्दादिति बाधामूलशाब्दान्यात् कपल्यातिप्रासिमूलरागस्य यथा
वाचस्य शाब्दात्तरेण प्रासिमूलशाब्दस्य बाधायोगादिति व्याच्यक्ते। नन्तु
यथा प्रदाचिकरणकोमविधायकविशेषशाब्दणाम्यात्मनीयाधिकरणकोमविधाय-
कस्य सामायशाब्दस्य बाधः किर्त्ये, तथायुाजेशु ये यज्ञामहम्मण्डरि-
प्रकृतिश्वशेषशाब्दण यागसामायेन तन्मूलविचायकस्य सामायशाब्दस्य
कौमुदीव्यायासहित: ।

खस्य शाश्वान्तरेण वायायोगात्। नन्त 'पदे जुहोती'ति विशेषशास्त्रीया
'हजरनी: जुहोती'ति शाश्वयेचे 'नान्याजेलीव्यायनेन 'यजतिष्ठि ये यजामहं
करोती'तया बाष्क स्वाम्यति वाच्यम् । परस्परितरिपेष्योऽधेः
शाश्वयोजे-यायाबनक्षात्। पद्यशास्त्रा हि स्वायथ्यविधानार्थासाहवनी
यनास्तान्यालविण्यापेष्ट्वरुः। प्रकटे तु निषेधाशास्त्रा निषेध-व्यस-
क्यथर्थ 'यजतिष्ठि ये यजामह' मित्रायापेर्विंनि निषेधपेष्ट्वरुः।

बायायोगोपद्धारः।

त्वस्चाच्छाच्छात्विविवित्स्य शाश्वान्तरेण प्रतिष्ठे विकल्प एव । सच न
युकः । विकल्पे शाश्वय पाष्किलकोभामायापातात्। नन्तानुयाजेषु ये
यजामहमित्स्यायुद्यत' नान्याजेलुच्यव्यायामण्यं संभवति, त्री-
वाष्ल: कथं न क्रियत ईवाश्वात्म्य परिहर्षति—नचेल्यादिना । नन्त वायामबनक्षात
हेतुमाह—परस्परेति। शाश्वयोकयिष्ने बायायाबनक्षाते परस्परितरिपेष्ट्
हेतु: पद्याश्वय पदाविष्ठकयिष्ने होमन्यासायापेणज्ञविधानार्थामहवनीयाश्वया
रेष्क्यादुयाजेषु ये यजामहमब्रतिदेखिकरणकयिष्ने तत्र प्रतिष्ठेयाप्यसक्यथः
यजतिष्ठामयः तदाश्वयविधानार्थायामण्यश्वयापेष्ट्वाचेति तदावतादार्या-
न्तितकोोस्यं प्रदर्श्यति—पद्याश्वयेल्यादिना। तथा प्रतिष्ठेयायान-
श्वय विशेषविपियनले प्रबलवस्वद्रविसर्गायुथायुपायज्ञात्वेन प्रबलवस्त्रीलिति
न प्रतिष्ठेयायामण्य विशेषश्व अपेष्ट्वादो युक्त इति चित्रितप्रतिपिल्लाद्रि-
कल्य: स्वाम्य न युक्त: ईवासरिधास्त्रीभिमविष्ट्वाति भावः।

बायायोग सुपरोहति—तस्यादिति। मन्त्रविधानाश्वयास्त्र तत्रप्रति-
पेष्कर्षात्म्य बायायोगात्दिकित्स्यापि तेन प्रतिष्ठे विकल्प एव स्वाच्छ बाष्क
स्यथः। नन्त: भवतु विकल्प एव तेन कि हीयत इत्यत आह—
सचेति। विकल्पयायुक्ते हेतुमाह—विकल्प इति। नन्तु विकल्पस्वी-
कारे कथं पश्चे शाश्वयाप्रामाण्यपात इत्यत आह—नभीति। यथा
श्रीडिक्षानुज्याद्वारस्मये यवदुःश्वय न प्रामाण्यं भवति, तथा विधायक-
शाश्वानुसारेण 'ये यजामह' इति मत्रायुलयाजेपुहारणामतुडात्यसमये न तत्र-
पिल्लाद्रिश्वय प्रामाण्यं संभवतीत्यथः। किच विकल्पस्वे हि दिरेणहक-
हियागातुन्याने यवशाक्षरस्वः। दिर्रर्द्दकल्पना च स्यात्। विधिश्रवर्तिषयव्यतीर्थपुर्वार्थत्वादस्य, अतो नात्र प्रतिष्ठेख्यायथमयमसु, किंतु नोसुन्यासंवादसंप्रदायमाल्यस्य पर्युद्रासारसः। इत्यथा चालुयाजयतिरिक्तेन यजतिरि ये यजामहां इति मयं कुर्यादिति वाक्यार्थंशः। नोसुन्याजयतिरिति राशिणिष्ठत्वाद्। एवंच न विकल्पं। अत्र च स्वायते ये यजामहस्मितानि न विधीयते, यजतिरि ये यजामहं-इत्यनेनेव श्रास्तवाः। किंतु सामान्यशाक्ष्राश्च—ये यजामहं इ-ल्पनाप्रस्तोतिः प्रत्येकैपुर्वार्थत्वादस्य स्यात्। विधिशास्त्रायादेवायावमवमात्रे यदुनृयाजेदिण ये यजामहं इति मय्यासं करणं कश्चनोकरारो भव्यतीति प्रतिष्ठेख्यादार्थिः तत्र तदक्रमे-णकश्चनोकरारो भव्यति। दशर्योण्यास्य नृत्तवदनाकरणादिज्योक्तकार-दिस्मवगम्यं तत्त्विपकारदर्मदृष्टपरिभाषितं दिर्रर्द्दकल्पनाप्रस्तुतं इत्याह— दिर्रर्द्दकल्पना चेति। तत्र हेतुमहं—विध्वति। पुरुषार्थत्वादिति। विधानवच्यान्त्रियः इत्युपार्थत्वायावमवमात्रे संपादकवार्तिः। तस्मातुन्याजेश्वरिः। यादृश्यान्त्रियेकारे विकल्पार्थदिष्टानि विधानात्मकाः। समाख्रीयते, किंतु नोसुन्यासंतुवर्तवदनाकरणादिज्योक्तकार-दिस्मवगम्यं तत्त्विपकारदर्मदृष्टपरिभाषितं दिर्रर्द्दकल्पनाप्रस्तुतं इत्याह— दिर्रर्द्दकल्पना चेति। अत्र हेतुमहं—विध्वति। पुरुषार्थत्वादिति। विधानवच्यान्त्रियः इत्युपार्थत्वायावमवमात्रे संपादकवार्तिः। तस्मातुन्याजेश्वरिः। यादृश्यान्त्रियेकारे विकल्पार्थदिष्टानि विधानात्मकाः। समाख्रीयते, किंतु नोसुन्यासंतुवर्तवदनाकरणादिज्योक्तकार-दिस्मवगम्यं तत्त्विपकारदर्मदृष्टपरिभाषितं दिर्रर्द्दकल्पनाप्रस्तुतं इत्याह— दिर्रर्द्दकल्पना चेति। अनेन पर्यासस्यकारणं चेति। अत्र हेतुदासस्य तार्किक-विधिशास्त्रमें करोत्तरात्तातित्त्व नोसुन्याजेश्वरिः। तस्मातुन्याजेश्वरिः। यादृश्यान्त्रियेकारे विकल्पार्थदिष्टानि विधानात्मकाः। समाख्रीयते, किंतु नोसुन्यासंतुवर्तवदनाकरणादिज्योक्तकार-दिस्मवगम्यं तत्त्विपकारदर्मदृष्टपरिभाषितं दिर्रर्द्दकल्पनाप्रस्तुतं इत्याह— दिर्रर्द्दकल्पना चेति। अनेन पर्यासस्यकारणं चेति। अत्र हेतुदासस्य तार्किक-विधिशास्त्रमें करोत्तरात्तातित्त्व नोसुन्याजेश्वरिः। तस्मातुन्याजेश्वरिः। यादृश्यान्त्रियेकारे विकल्पार्थदिष्टानि विधानात्मकाः। समाख्रीयते, किंतु नोसुन्यासंतुवर्तवदनाकरणादिज्योक्तकार-
त्यनुवादनेति सतानुयाजृतिरित्कविषयशक्तिः विधीयते। यद्यज्ञितुष्य येवजामहं करोति तदनुयाजृतितिरित्कविषयशक्तिः।

पर्युदासंपर्यायेयोकरोत्तर्थनमः।

ननवेंत समानयाञ्ज्ञप्रायः स्वीकारे संकोचनहुप्तसंहारात्म्युः-दासः वेदोऽनुञ्जित्वें चेन। उपसंहारो हि तन्मात्रसंकोचाच्यः। यथा पुरोडाष्ट चतुर्थकरोत्तर्तिति समानयाञ्ज्ञचतुर्थकरणमाः आर्येष्य चतुर्थकरोत्तर्तिति संकोचपाद्येयपुरोडाष्टमात्रे संकोच्येति। पर्युदास-स्तु तदन्यामात्रसंकोचाच्यः इति ततो भेदात्। क्रान्तिविधिकप्रसंक्षया-गणनायाञ्ज्ञतिरित्कविषयमेवै ‘येव यजामहै’ इति मकः करत्वत् त्या प्रासः। अनुयाजेतु तु तस्य करत्वत्वेनाप्रातः कर्त्तिप्रर्थितिपिनिधिवाच नात्र विकल्पस्त-ढोळपि नंभवति। वक्षणानयाञ्ज्ञतिरित्कविषयसमयिण्याङ्गः न नातुज्ञजे-वियायित्वायाञ्ज्ञप्रायम्यमपि भवति। तस्मात्पर्य्युदासाञ्यः वायकः वायकः वायकः

तैतु पर्युदासाञ्यः पललो ‘यज्ञितुष्य येव यजामहं करोती’ति समानयाञ्ज्ञेण यागमात्रे प्रातस्य ‘येव यजामहं’ इति मकः सत्यः नातुज्ञेषु येव यजामहं करोती’ति विशेषशाख्रेणायाञ्ज्ञतिरित्कविषये यागविशेषे संकोचनात्तुदासान्योपसंहाराम्-देवमातिति स्वातू। सामान्ये प्रातस्य विशेषे संकोचस्येवोपमंहारपरंपदर्धवात।

यथा ‘पुरोडाशं चतुर्था करोती’ति पुरोडाशसामान्ये प्रातस्य चतुर्थकरणस्य ‘आश्रयं चतुर्था करोती’स्वाते विशेषे संकोच इत्यादि:—ननवेञ्जिति।

‘पुरोडाशं चतुर्था करोती’यनेन पुरोडाशसामान्ये प्रातस्य चतुर्थकरणस्य ‘आश्रयं चतुर्था करोती’यनेन पुरोडाशसामान्ये प्रातस्य चतुर्थकरणस्य इत्यादि: प्रकर्थं तु यज्ञित्वियानिः यज्ञित्सामान्ये प्रातस्य ‘येव यजामहं’ इति मकः सत्योऽनुयाजे-वियायिति यज्ञित्विशेषोद्वारस्याञ्ज्ञात्म्यान्त्रे यज्ञित्विशेषे संकोच इत्युपसं-हारामपुर्युदासः भेदः सप्त एषाति परिहर्ति—गत्यायित्वा। तन्मात्रसंको-चर्यः इति। सामान्यप्रातस्य विशेषमात्रसंकोचा इत्यः। तत्रोदादहणमामहं—यथेति। तदन्यामात्रसंकोचाच्यः इति। सामान्यप्रातस्य विशेषमात्रसंकोचाच्यः इत्यः। इति ततो भेदाविचित्रे। एवमुक्तप्रकारेणोपसंहारायुः-दासः।
चप्यनन्यगत्या प्रतिषेधाद्वयणम्। यथा ‘नातिरात्रेऽपोदशिनं गृहातीत्’ायादौ। अत्र हि ‘अतिरात्रेऽपोदशिनं गृहातीति’ शास्त्रमात्रां-पोदशिप्रमेयस्य निशेषादिकलप्प्रस्तावकारापि न पूर्वदासाभ्ययणम्, असंभवात्। तथाहि यथ्यथा पोदशिपदार्थं नवज्ञान्यस्तदातिरात्रेऽपोदशिवितरितिकं गृहातीति वाक्यार्थविवीधार्थवः सातं स च न संभवति, अतिरात्रेऽपोदशिनं गृहातीति अर्थविभिन्निविरोधात्। यदि चातिरात्रेऽपदाेर्त्यन्यस्तदातिरात्रावितरितिकं पोदशिनं गृहातीति वाक्यार्थविवीधार्थवः सातस्तोष्यपि न संभवति तद्विचित्रितविरोधात्। अतोऽञ्जनन्य-मेदान तद्वौषदेपापतिरिवर्थः। अपरस्तूपसहारो नाम सामान्यत: प्राताष्य विषोपे नंकोचनरूपो विविध्यार्थिविशेषः अदुर्दासस्तु ‘पर्यंदस्तु: स विविधो यत्रोत्तरपदेन नत्रियात्मियुक्तकथा प्रतियातिनित्येन नात्रा धातुना च नाथ: संभवतः। तदृसाद्योतासत्त्वस्य: सत्य एतर्वेद इति न तद्वौषदेपातिरिवर्थायः। फिन यत्र तु पूर्वदस्तु आश्रितानुऽ न सक्षये तत्र विथकलप्प्रस्तावकारापि निशेषावर्थविवीधार्थवं इत्याभि—मुक्तिकित्ये विद्यण्यते। अन्नमात्ये इति। प्रतिषेधाद्वयणीयगतिविशेषस्य पूर्वादित्यसाधारणस्मृतिवेयर्थः। तद्वौषदेपार्थः--रत्नार्थितः। नातिरात्र इत्यादितत्वेऽप्रतिषेध प्रतिवेशये नत्यु पूर्वदासाः। अत्र चातिरात्र इत्यादित्वेऽप्रतिषेध प्रतिषेधमक्यापतिरिविवीधार्थः प्रतिषेधाद्वक्तिक्रमस- ग्रेख्यि पूर्वदासाभ्ययणासंबंधायित्वाभि—अत्र हीतायदिना। अत्र पूर्वदासाभ्ययणासंबंधायित्वाभि—तथाहीतायदिना। अत्र हीतायदिनाः। अत्र हि। नातिरात्रेऽपोदशिनिः गृहातीतस्वेयस्त:। पोदशिपदार्थेऽपन नवज्ञान्य इति। अतिरात्रेऽपन गृहातीतस्वेयस्तः। पोदशिपदार्थेऽपन नवज्ञान्य इति। अतिरात्रेऽपन गृहातीतस्वेयस्तः। पोदशिपदार्थेऽपन नवज्ञान्य इति। अतिरात्रेऽपन गृहातीतस्वेयस्तः। पोदशिपदार्थेऽपन नवज्ञान्य इति। अतिरात्रेऽपन गृहातीतस्वेयस्तः।
गला शास्त्रप्राप्तविष्णुग्रहणस्त्रैव निषेधः। नच विकल्पप्रस्तावित्त्वा-
प्येष्यंग्रहणीयत्वात् ॥

प्रतिप्रथिव्यमानस्य नानाथेहेतुत्तमः।

इत्याच्छ विषेषो यदिब्रह्मणेकः प्रतिप्रथिव्यमानस्य नानाधेहेतुत्तमः,
विविषेषोऽभयोऽसि कतर्थेत्त्वात् ॥ यत्र तु न विकल्पः
प्रासिंध रागत एव प्रतिप्रथिव्य पुरुषार्थः। तत्र प्रतिप्रथिव्यमानस्या-
हेतुत्तमः, यथा ‘न कल्यणः मञ्जिस्यदिनार्दी कल्यणस्मादेः’, तत्र

प्रतिप्रथिव्याद्यपि संवेद्य प्रतिप्रथेष्वा स्वीकृत्य इत्यः। अत्र प्रतिप्रथेषी सिद्धान्तिते
विकल्पप्रस्तावित्त्वात् च विषेषोऽसि कतर्थेत्त्वात्—मेयल्यादिनः। अत्रेदें
प्रथेषी स्वपनसम्यकः प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः। अत्र तु विकल्पाद्यपि पर्युत्त्रासो नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।

यथा नातिरात्रे प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः। नतु नातिरात्रेप्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।

प्रतिप्रथिव्यमानस्य नानाधेहेतुत्तमः। नतु नातिरात्रे प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।

नतु नातिरात्रे प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।

नतु नातिरात्रे प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।

नतु नातिरात्रे प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।

नतु नातिरात्रे प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।

नतु नातिरात्रे प्रासिंध नानाधेहेतुत्तमः।
मक्षणनिर्यस्यांमुऽ पुरुषार्थेत्र्वात्। न त 'दीक्षितो न दद्राति न जुहो-ती' यादिै शास्त्रमासदानहोमादीनां निषेधादिकत्यापरिचिति वाचयम्। खन्तः पुरुषार्थेनूऽदानहोमादीनां निषेधस्य पुरुषार्थेत्र्वामाबोधियपि

तित्रस्त्रस्मार्श्चक्षु परिहर्ति—नचेच्यािगि। खत् इति। खतः—पुरुषार्थेनूऽदानहोमादीनां परशुर्धे शालभृतिः, कल्पर्देशनेव च प्रतिपेध इति बोद्धशिष्यविचित्रत्वप्रत्येक्योपमोहस्तुहार्थवामात्तेन्न न विकल्पापति। किंच रागतः प्रास्तस पुरुषार्थेनूऽ प्रतिपेधे प्रतिपिध्यमानस्य कर्तव्यम्भक्षणादिविद्याहेतुवलीकारान्दानहोमादीः प्रतिपिध्यमान्याय्यानिः हेतुतयं संबन्धित सतयः रागतः प्रास्तसाबनात्, कर्तव्यम्भक्षणादिप्रतीक्षवतप्रतिपेधस्य पुरुषार्थेत्र्वामाबाक्षेत्विभाषाः। अथं बोधम्–ज्योतिषोऽपि श्रूते। 'दीक्षितो न दद्राति न जुहोति न प्रतिपेधे। तत्र यदानादिकं पुरुषार्थेन यथा कवर्त्तं तन्त्राप्युपदिध्यमतिदिकं च तस्यं प्रतिपेधे। कुलः। न ददातीयादिव्यनस्य सामान्यरूपबालेयधिहोत्रदानादीद्यापि प्रतिपेधे तस्यपदेशो स्वत्वं स्वायत्तिः ततोदिकं पुर्यथ चेत्येतादुभमेव कर्तव्यलेनोपिदिकं दानादिकमनुष्यादिक् मध्यमः पक्षः। न लाभिहोत्रदानादिकं पुरुषार्थेन यथैवत्तत्त्वादिकं ज्योतिषोपालेयं प्रांतं सत्यादिकं दानादिकं तयोम्योपस्मे प्रत्यक्षुयोपदिधिनिषेधसचयोपिधिमेव संसंहितादिति पुर्यथसैवनार्थ विषयं। नच लाभिहोत्रदानादीै। विधिनिषेध्योः प्ररुत्स्य विकल्पः शाश्वः, भिन्नविषयादित्। कर्तवर्तः विषयं। तु तदनुपायवर्त्तं तत्सामपुर्वस्य निषेधेः। नदु यत्र रागतः प्रास्तस प्रतिपेधः पुरुषार्थोऽभवित तत्र प्रतिपिध्यमान्याय्यानि हेतुतत्वं यथा कर्तव्यम्भक्षणादे:। तस्य स्वात्मगमनातिपेदस्य तु पुरुषार्थेत्र्वामाबात्त्व निषेध्यमानस्य स्वात्मगमनस्य कर्तव्यम्भक्षणेत्र्वामातिवपत आह—निषेधस्येति। यद्या निषेधेऽत्यादिपुरुषां मेवान्वति तत्र प्रतिपेधः। यथा कतातनीिनादिकमेव भवित। तथाच खतः पुरुषार्थेत्र्वादेयमर्यादः—सति इति। कर्तव्योपाधिमन्तरे। केवलवस्यस्तु तथा पुरुषार्थेत्र्वात् नादानादीै। निषेध्यस्य पुरुषार्थेत्र्वामाबोधिपि कवर्त्तं संभवान्वतिचिन्द्रमानस्य दनादीै। कर्तव्येऽवृष सहस्राधिकं बल्लेभुत्तमिति योजना। तथाच तेषामुदानस्य
निषिध्यमानसानथेहृतत्वात्, यथा ऋतू स्वभीमगमनादःऽ, तत्रिपथर्सख
कल्वथितेन तस्य कतुष्वेगुण्यसंपादकत्वात्
अर्थवाद्वाणामाः

प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतर्परं वाक्यमर्थवादः। तस्य च उक्तम् यथो-
जनवदर्धिपर्यथवासां। तथाहि--अर्थवादवाक्यः हि सार्थग्रंथिपादने
प्रयोजनाभावाद्वादियनिपेतयोः प्राशस्त्यनिन्दितं तत्त्वार्थः प्रतिपाद्यति।
सार्थमात्रपरं अनार्थग्रंथप्रसज्ञातं। आश्रायस्त्य हि क्रियाके--
धितात्। न चेत्तपः। ‘सार्थयोगस्यनिपत्तम्’ हृत्त्वधामनविधिना
सकलवेदार्थवाद्यात्वं कल्वथितेन बोधयतान्तर्विदेशस्य प्रयोजनवदर्धिपर्य-
वसायित्वं सूचयतोपात्तवेदार्थक्यारुपातः।

स्वतः पुरुषार्थवेदेपि कल्वुतान्यनकालेवः पुरुषार्थवित्तात्र तेषांमनुनवाय भवनन-
भोहेतुत्वमिति भावः।। तस्यैति।। केतौ स्वभीमगमनादेरित्यः।। केतौ स्वभी-
मनादः कल्वभक्ष्माणादिवदन्तर्धिपर्यन्तकादिदुः खोहेतुतेवः पि कतुष्वेगुण्यसंपादक-
वनादीहेतुत्वसंबंधावल्क्यात्राय निषिध्यमानसानथेहृतत्वमिति भावः।।
तस्माँनिपेत्वाद्वाणामाननिमोलितान्विदजनानकालेवः पुरुषार्थिनुवनिधिविविति
सिद्धम्।।

इदानी सार्थवादवादार्थनार्थवादरूपवेदामभास्य उक्तमाहः—प्राशस्त्र्येति। नदु ‘वायुः क्षेपिष्ठ देवते’वायुदर्थवादवाक्यायाशस्त्रवादत्र्यात्मानात्वात्
तस्य प्राशस्त्रादििपालं तदार्थसाधिक्षणमितिः तस्यैति।।
तस्यार्थवादस्य उक्तमाह प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतर्प्रतिपादकसंहस्तिते नेदे उक्तमानसाधिक्षणमिति।।
अर्थवादस्य फलवदर्धिपर्यथवासांमेवोपपाद्यति—तथाहि-
बायादिना।। अर्थवादवाक्यः केतौ प्राशस्त्रादिनिदितते दे प्रतिपादतीतयन्वयः।।
नन्त्वर्थवादस्य सार्थमात्रपरते कथमानर्थक्यप्रस्तशः ‘वायुः क्षेपिष्ठ’वायुदर्थ-
वादवाक्याक्ष्मानग्रामादिवाच्यात् देवतारूपार्थमून्त्वालित प्रतीयमानवादादित्वम् आहः—आ-
प्रायास्येति।। समस्तवेदव ग्रामान्त्रिकारणान्तर्विदेशस्य मद्दिर्दार्थप्रतिपाद-

1 निषिध्यमानसाफेरती पाठः।
अर्थविचारमः।

सं द्विविच। विधिशेषो निषेधशेषश्चेति। तत्र 'वायुव्यः ध्रुवमभूतकालमेवतः त्यादिविधिशेषो निषेधशेषश्चेति। बविष्यं रजतं न देयं' त्यादिनिषेधशेषश्चेति। 'सोऽरोदीदरोदीदृशुद्रस्व खट्टके' त्यादिनिषेधशेषश्चेति।

कस्य स्वार्थमात्रपरे सार्थकमुपपचतं इति भावः। अर्थविचारायानामनथर्यात्वस्पन्तलमार्गः परिहरते—नचेत्यादिना।

अर्थवांद विभज्य—सं द्विविचं हि। विधिशेषं इत्यादि। सोऽरोदी दृशुद्रस्वं खट्टके। प्रशासं—निष्ठा—परक्तिः—पुराकल्पः-भेदात्। तत्र प्रशासंसाधी दुःकाले योऽसम् मात्र एवं वेदे॥ इत्यादि। 'वायुव्यः ध्रुवमभूतकालमेवतः त्यादिविधिशेषश्चेति। बविष्यं रजतं न देयं' त्यादिनिषेधशेषश्चेति। 'सोऽरोदीदरोदीदृशुद्रस्व खट्टके' त्यादिनिषेधशेषश्चेति।

परेरेदं महतः पुरोपेन कर्म क्षत्रियमिति प्रतिपक्षकोष्ठं विद्यमानं इति। परेरेदं महतः पुरोपेन कर्म क्षत्रियमिति प्रतिपक्षकोष्ठं विद्यमानं इति। परेरेदं महतः पुरोपेन कर्म क्षत्रियमिति प्रतिपक्षकोष्ठं विद्यमानं इति। परेरेदं महतः पुरोपेन कर्म क्षत्रियमिति प्रतिपक्षकोष्ठं विद्यमानं इति। परेरेदं महतः पुरोपेन कर्म क्षत्रियमिति प्रतिपक्षकोष्ठं विद्यमानं इति। परेरेदं महतः पुरोपेन कर्म क्षत्रियमिति प्रतिपक्षकोष्ठं विद्यमानं इति। परेरेदं महतः पुरोपेन कर्म क्षत्रियमिति प्रतिपक्षकोष्ठं विद्यमानं इति।
तत्वबोधकतयार्थवचम्। न च प्राशस्त्याद्वित्तीयस्य निष्प्रयोजनतवेन नार्येवादस्यार्थवच्चमिति वाच्यम्। आत्मादिविद्यादध्वन्तर्मानसे पुंसः प्रक्ष्यादिजिज्ञनकल्लेन तद्धोस्योपयोगात्।

अर्थवद्यम् मेवत्रयम्।

स पुनःसेवा। तदुक्तम्—‘विरोधे गुणवादः स्थानुवादोज्ज्वलार्थी’ तत्र। भूतार्थवदात्त्यान्तर्वायार्थादेशिलिङ्गम् श्रद्धिः। अस्वार्थः—प्रमाणान्तरविरोधे सत्यार्थवादो गुणवादः, यथा ‘आदित्यो युप’ इत्यादि। गृह आदिलामेद्ध्वी गृहस्तवाधिशिलादिवर्द्धुज्वलत्वप्रपोर्ज्ञेन लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते। प्रमाणान्तरार्थवादगार्थोपधकोर्त्त्वादोभजन्नाय। यथा ‘वर्णप्रमित्वमेवेकत्र’ विषयः, अत्र हिमाविरोधविवक्षायौ श्रलक्ष्यावतात्। प्रमाणान्तरविरोधविवक्षायत्त्वमार्थवादोभजन्याय। यथा ‘एतरो उत्तमाव वञ्जुमुद्यच्च’ इत्यादि।

विषेयकर्मार्थस्त्याद्वित्तीयस्य सुखद्वाराभवान्त्वरिविक्ष्णयते नार्थवादस्य तपतिप्रदनेनार्थवचमुपपश्चैतिथ इत्याःसृष्ट्यं परिहर्यति—नवेलथायिन।

तद्धोस्योपयोगादिति। अर्थवद्यमन्यप्राशस्त्याद्वित्तीयस्य विषेयकर्मामुद्यान्तरार्थवादस्यार्थवचमुपपश्चैतिथ इत्यहः।

स पुनःसेवादो गुणवादोभजन्याय भूतार्थार्थवत्ती श्रद्धिः संवत्तीति पुनर्पि तं चेत्यविभजते—स पुनःसेवति। तत्स्य तिरिक्तवे वृद्धसंस्तिसमादाहर्ति—

तद्वक्तमिति। तद्वक्तमिति। तयोर्वेन तद्रोपन तस्मादिति विव्रहः।

प्रमाणान्तरविरोधप्रमाणान्तरार्थवभार्यवेषेनाभिनिद्यथः। समुदाहःसंस्तिसमादाहर्तिः

व्याच्चे—अस्वार्थः इत्यादि। इतरो उत्तमादिति। अत्रौ इतर तत्त्वेनान्तरार्थवादगार्थोपधकोर्त्त्वादोभजन्याय।

प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपादनकार्योलोक्याविवक्षाय प्रमाणान्तरर्वद्ये तद्वक्तावेन प्रमाणान्तरणे

विरोधः। नैति प्रमाणान्तरार्थप्रतिपादनकार्योलोक्याविवक्षाय प्रदक्षिणान्तरार्थवादस्य नातिदिति भवः। एतस्मुपपश्चः विषेयवादार्थस्य प्रक्ष्यां पञ्चविवेद्यम् साक्षात्पर्ययः। यागादिचर्मप्रतिपादकलेखनार्थवचमुप-
एवंच ‘यजेत खर्गङ्गाम’ इत्यादिनिर्धारितवेदेः साक्षात्परम्परावाच यागादिधर्मश्चतिपादकतं सिद्धम्। सोऽथं धर्मां यदुद्रिष्य विहित-स्तुतुद्रिष्यैः क्रियमाणस्तद्वैः। इत्थरापरेण बुध्वचा क्रियमाणस्तु निःश्रेय-सहेतुः। नच तदर्पणतुधारानं प्रमाणार्थां भृत्योऽद्विनै यद् भासि यजुहसी ददरासिः यत्। उपचयसिः कौन्तेय तत्क्रुद्ध यद्दर्पण-मिति भगवधृतास्मतेऽरेव प्रमाणत्वात्। स्त्रितिचरणे तत्प्राप्यमान्यस्तु श्रुतिमूलकत्वेऽन व्यवस्थापनादिदिर्यति श्रिप्रमुः॥

संहरति—एवंचेति। उक्तेन प्रकारेण वेदेऽति। योऽय यागादिः प्रयो धर्मां यज्ञगृहितस्मुद्रिष्यात्त्विहित: सोऽथं तादुशारक्तवादेः नाश्रीयमाण्यं एव तत्र फलस्मु हेतुमर्यमः। परमेश्वरसर्पणमानीयानाश्रीयमाण्यमः चित्रसुद्रिष्यत्रात्मान्धानात्त्विहिता वैराजपरम्परायात्संयोगार्थकत्वानप्रयाशायुष्मान्यविविधिधिः। श्रुतिमूलकत्वात्—सोऽध्यमित्वादिः। परमेश्वरसर्पणबुध्वानाण्यात्त्र प्रमाणाभावमान्यात्। तत्र भग-वद्यक्य प्रमाणयति—नचेत्या निद्रा। तत्थः स्तृतेर्प्राप्यमान्यशाख्य तत्र त्रो तत्त्विप्रदे श्रितमूः ‘अष्टकः’ कर्त्यायुः। इत्यादिस्तृतिवाक्यं न धर्मेऽप्रमाणः। पौरुषेनाक्षयः सति मूलप्राप्यार्हितवादिप्रमुत्रभक्तवते। अथ मूलप्राप्यार्हितवा वेदार्थ एव स्तृतिमित्रभ्रुत इति मन्येथा: ताहि वेदेन्य तदर्थ-स्त्रावगतवादिः स्तृतिरानायती च मात्र तद्दृष्टीयानुवादफलादप्रमाण्यमिति प्राते ब्रूमः—विमतः स्तृतिजेतस्मृतिहैर्दिकमनाधिपीतस्तृतिवत्वात् उपनय-नायनादिदिश्वतित्वं। नच वैवर्ध्यः शाख्यनायमः। असदादीना प्रयवेशेऽ परोक्षेऽनात्त्वेवेत् स्तिकारवणेयार्थस्येकत्र सर्वक्रिप्यामाणकतः। तत्रादिः स्तृतियेत्तः प्रमाणमिति।
ಕौमुदीव्याह्यासहित: ॥

बालानं सुख्योथाय भास्त्रेण सुमेघसा ॥
रचितोऽवय समासेन जैमिनीयथार्थमः ॥ १ ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायलोगाविद्या मार्गकरिचितपूर्वचिमांसा-
थेसंग्रहनामांके प्रकरणं समासिमगात् ॥

नन्तु किम्बनन संग्रहनिरूपणेन विस्तृताध्यायिन्यथेन जैमिनीयथार्थ-
बोधसंवादियारुक्ष्य संग्रहनिरूपणे स्वप्रभृतिनिमित्त्प्रदर्शणं—बालान-
नामिति। तेषां विस्तृतिवेन दुःखान्तवान तेवर्षाबालिकपूवमासां-
साधरणाणां जैमिनीयथार्थासोऽः संभवति। अनेन तु नवविस्तृतशा-
य्रोपेषादारा मंभवेत्रे स इति भाव: ॥

टीकाविहीने तु कुःता हि टीका पूर्वेन तु तत्रेशी घटाणे संप्रेहेडिसिन् ॥
दुर्बौधशास्त्रे किमु मात्राणां द्यायि दोषं न सहनति धीरा: ॥ १ ॥

यदास्या बन्धवयोक्ष्य विना लघृमेतवा फड़हेतुतां गता।
प्रणाम: सोमं मुडाधिकारणं किम्वेवेंजनम्बेदकु मुखेनुम्बिकः: न ॥

मदीयम्ब: शिवादसेवां गुरुः कटाक्कक्कक्कन लघ्वया।
प्रयुक्तमानः शिवादस्यं प्रयं तु भूयानुग्रहतोषकारणं ॥ ३ ॥

सुजनपदविनीतो दुर्जनादूरमिष्टो
ग्रहस्तस्तबस्त्रेण द्यायामेशां: ॥
श्रुतिमणिपदविनीतो मिशुरकम्बराख्योः
सुजनननिवेशन्य ब्रह्मवं चक्कर ॥ ४ ॥

गुणगणमणिसिन्धुः शम्मुपादेकमको
निगमशिरसि निष्ठो जातवैराग्यचितः।
श्रुतिनिलिनिविके भायुभागो य ईश-
लमिस्महिम्पुर्जं नौिमि गोिपं यतीन्द्रम ॥ ५ ॥

१ गोपालमिलयर्थः ॥
तस्मादेव गुरुवरादभिषेकः गोपालश्रमपदगीयमानेद्वात् ॥

येनोमाधवचरणान्जसेविनात्र तं कन्दे महिमगुरुं विशालवुद्रिम् ॥ ६ ॥

या काशी निकिबिधपुरोऽभिभरस्य प्राणान्ते सकलशिवप्रदा प्रसिद्धा ॥

यत्रां सकलसुरेशद्वैतीशवस्त्रत्रेयं सुजनहितप्रदा निविद्वा ॥ ७ ॥

इति श्रीमतःप्रभुसपरिब्राह्मणकारूणोपालनसरस्वतीश्रीपृष्ठवादशिश्चिप्पती

श्रीसदाशिवन्द्रसरस्वतीशिष्येण श्रीरामश्रवणं शिवयोगिगिर्यन्

विरचितं मीमांसार्थसंग्रहहृदयेन चरमवर्णमानसमगते ॥

समासोद्धिष्ठ ग्रन्थः ॥